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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of financial incentives to promote 
health behaviour change. Financial incentives include tangible rewards as cash, vouchers 
and lotteries that are offered to individuals conditional to the fulfilment of health 
guidelines. Despite the growing use of such patient incentives in practice, some 
fundamental questions are yet to be answered: (1) Are financial incentives effective? (2) 
What type and size of incentive is more effective? (3) Do patient income and past health 
behaviour moderate the impact of incentives? These questions are analysed in the context 
of (a) blood donation and (b) compliance with health care including adherence to 
treatment, disease screening, immunisation and appointment keeping. Behavioural 
economics, in particular prospect theory, provide the theoretical foundations for this work 
and substantiate my hypotheses about the effect of financial incentives.  
I perform the first meta-analyses in the literature to quantify the impact of patient financial 
incentives to promote blood donation (chapter 3) and compliance (chapter 4). These results 
show that financial incentives do not promote blood donation but increase compliance with 
health care, particularly for low income patients. 
Two large field studies were developed to further examine the effect of incentives in 
compliance - testing pioneer incentive schemes. I test the impact of a certain (£5 voucher) 
versus uncertain (£200 lottery) incentive framed either as a gain or loss to promote 
Chlamydia screening (chapter 5). I also develop the first study ever testing preferences for 
sequences of events in the field – using the naturalistic setting of colorectal cancer. This 
study compared the effect of a €10 incentive offered at the end of screening versus two €5 
incentives offered at the beginning and end of screening (chapter 6). The former showed 
the voucher framed as a gain was the most effective incentive and the latter showed that 
smaller two €5 incentives increase screening more than a single €10 incentive (which had a 
detrimental effect compared to no incentive). 
I fundamentally contribute to the literature by showing that (i) patient financial incentives 
do not increase the quantity of blood donations and may have an adverse effect on quality, 
providing empirical evidence to a long-standing policy debate. Furthermore (ii) small 
certain rewards around £5 are likely to be the optimal incentive for compliance with health 
care, (iii) higher incentives may be more effective if offered as smaller segregated 
incentives of the same amount and (iv) incentives have over twice the impact on low 
income patients than on more affluent patients.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars and policy makers have long strived to understand the underpinnings of behaviour 
change (Shumaker et al, 2009). A long array of interventions to change health behaviour 
has been identified in the literature (Haynes et al, 2005; McDonald et al, 2002; Michie et 
al, 2008). Twenty-six types of interventions have been catalogued (Abraham & Michie, 
2008) ranging from information, education, persuasion, coercion to complex multifactor 
environmental restructuring. Nonetheless, changing behavioural patterns - and particularly 
in the health domain - has proven to be a challenge. There is no conclusive evidence to 
support the application of a particular intervention to promote health behaviour and no 
single strategy has showed a clear comparative advantage across different health contexts 
(Michie et al, 2011; Haynes et al, 2005). 
Furthermore, interventions do not necessarily target the factors that have been 
acknowledged as barriers to health behaviour and are seldom theoretically grounded 
(Michie & Abraham, 2004; Michie & Prestwich, 2010; Bartholomew & Mullen, 2011). 
The majority of interventions found in the public health literature are informational, aiming 
to promote health behaviour change through improved knowledge and attitude change 
(DiMatteo et al. 2012). But the effectiveness of this approach has been proved limited 
(Berben et al, 2011) as people don’t always make decisions based on information (e.g., 
Ashraf et al, 2013). There is an increasing call for interventions that target health behaviour 
change directly, by tackling key motivational or contextual barriers (Schedlbauer et al, 
2010; Michie & Johnson, 2012). Financial incentives are included in this category of 
interventions (Michie et al. 2008). 
The purpose of this work is to examine the impact of patient financial incentives to 
promote health behaviour change. These patient financial incentives include tangible offers 
of cash, vouchers and gifts to be given to individuals upon the contingent fulfilment of 
health recommendations – individuals may not be ‘patients’ per se but this designation is 
intended to express a form of demand-side incentives explicitly and contingently offered to 
individuals.  
Although the use of financial incentives is common in health settings, these patient 
incentives are distinct from previous applications of incentives in health. On the supply-
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side of health care, physicians are often targeted with pay-for-performance schemes based 
on organisational and clinical outcomes (Gillam et al, 2012; Dushkeiko et al, 2006; 
Rodwin, 2004). Market-based reforms in several countries are increasing hospital 
competition by imposing conditional budget allocations based on past performance and 
acting as financial incentives (Eijkenaar et al, 2013). With respect to patient behaviour, the 
more traditional approach to changing behaviour using incentives has been through a 
change in prices. Higher taxes on tobacco and alcohol have been used to reduce 
consumption (Husten & Deyton, 2013) and fiscal food policies have been proposed to 
reduce unhealthy food intake (Mytton et al, 2007; Thow et al, 2010). In the past year 
Denmark has introduced a “fat tax,” Hungary a “junk food tax,” and France a tax on 
sweetened drinks (Mytton et al, 2012). On a different angle, reducing medical fees or 
increasing copayments in insurance plans are also commonly used to increase the uptake of 
GP visits or generics (Finkelstein et al, 2012; Rezayatmand et al, 2013). 
The patient financial incentives analysed here are an alternative demand-side approach to 
changing individuals’ health behaviour.  Known as conditional cash transfers (CCT) in 
developing countries, such financial incentives have become a standard policy tool to 
promote the use of primary health care services, namely prenatal care, child immunization 
and HIV screening (Ranganathan & Lagarde, 2012; Kohler & Thornton, 2012). In higher 
income countries - including the UK - there has been a more widespread application of 
patient incentives in health care interventions. Incentives are offered not just to promote 
child immunization and prenatal care but also smoking cessation (Volpp et al. 2009), drug 
abstinence (Higgins et al. 2012), weight loss (John et al, 2011), appointment keeping (Post 
et al, 2006), cancer screening (Stone et al. 2002) and adherence to chronic disease 
medication (Claassen et al, 2007; Volpp et al. 2008).  
Evaluation studies in developing countries have shown a significant positive impact 
of financial incentives in promoting child immunization and school enrolment (Gertler, 
2004; Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; De Brauw & Hoddinott, 2011) and promoting HIV 
screening in adults (Thornton, 2008). However, the effectiveness of contingent financial 
incentives in developed countries is not yet clear. In developed countries, the significant 
effect of patient incentives has only been established to promote drug abstinence (Lussier 
et al, 2006). The effectiveness of these patient incentives in higher income countries is still 
being established for most other health contexts and fundamental questions still need to be 
answered (Ashcroft et al, 2008; Marteau et al, 2009), not only about overall effectiveness 
but also possible moderator effects of type of incentive and patient socioeconomic 
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characteristics. This work examines the effect of patient financial incentives strictly in 
developed countries, for which no comprehensive evaluation studies have yet been 
developed. These crucial questions will be addressed in this work using blood donation and 
compliance with health care as research contexts.  
Financial incentives are one of several possible ways to think about health 
behaviour. The analysis of patient financial incentives as a strategy for health promotion 
does not neglect the myriad of personal and cultural barriers that influence health 
behaviour (Gerend et al, 2013) but may be successful at an aggregate level by increasing 
perceived immediate benefits and prompting individuals to engage in healthy behaviour 
(Milkman et al, 2012) – an intention reported by the vast majority of people (Wiedermann 
et al, 2009).  
 
1.1 Theoretical Standpoint 
Economic approaches to policymaking traditionally work under the assumption that 
individuals are rational agents with a stable and well-defined set of preferences from which 
they are capable to choose in ways that maximise their utility (Laffont & Martimort, 2009). 
Financial incentives are proposed under this assumption: the law of demand and the 
relative price effect work through the use of external incentives because motivation and 
preferences are taken to be fixed and given (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Kamenica, 2012). 
Economic theory derives its strength from predicting how people make cost-benefit 
calculations and change their behaviour in response to changes in incentives (Gneezy et al, 
2011).  
Although this framework has proved useful in many contexts, its assumptions may 
not always hold because people have limited cognitive abilities, are influenced by the 
context in which they make decisions, are driven by emotional reactions, and by the 
opinion of others (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Gigerenzer & Gaissmeier, 2011; 
Kamenica, 2012). Poor compliance rates with health guidelines provide a good illustration 
of this standpoint (Rice, 2013): most individuals do not intentionally neglect medical 
advice but report memory lapses for health appointments, suspect medication side-effects 
or fear cancer screening (Weinstein & Klein, 1996; Phillips et al, 2001; Dunbar-Jacob et al, 
2009). This means that financial incentives – as paradigmatic tools from standard 
economic theory – may not always work as expected by the rational choice model (Ariely 
et al, 2009).    
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Behavioural economics integrates psychological insights – mostly from cognitive 
psychology - into standard economic theory in an attempt to address some of the 
descriptive limitations (Kahneman & Trversky, 1979; Dolan et al, 2010; Dellavigna, 2009; 
Heap, 2013; Loewenstein et al, 2013). Standard economic theory is a broad normative 
model about decision-making whereas behavioural economics is typically associated with 
descriptive models of choice. Disputes over the contributions of normative versus 
descriptive models have eroded over time with many of the ideas from behavioural 
economics having already been long incorporated in standard economics (e.g., Hossain & 
List, 2012; Rabin, 2013a; Duflo et al, 2012). Behavioural economics aims to improve the 
psychological realism of standard economics but often maintaining conventional 
techniques and goals: formal theoretical and empirical analysis using tractable models, 
with a focus on prediction and estimation (Rabin, 2013b). It can, in some cases, provide 
more an incremental change to standard economics than a paradigmatic change. 
Increasingly more, the standpoint in the literature is not competition between these 
approaches but contingency and cooperation (Harrison & Rutstrom, 2009). Considering the 
specific case of this work: if financial incentives are proven effective to promote health 
behavior change, standard economics may fully explain the result. But if incentive size has 
a negative effect, behavioural economics may be better equipped to explain such a finding. 
Behavioural economics assumes that financial incentives may be effective in 
changing behaviour – in agreement with standard economics in this point - but considers 
the importance of additional factors like the context in which incentives are offered, how 
incentives are framed, which type of incentive is offered or what is the delivery schedule of 
the incentive (Rice, 2013). Therefore, in addition to the general question if patient financial 
incentives work, I am interested in understanding if interventions grounded in behavioural 
research are more effective than standard applications of market incentives. Unlike 
previous incentive health interventions, which have been mostly atheoretical (Michie & 
Prestwich, 2010; Bartholomew & Mullen, 2011), the analysis and design of incentive 
schemes in this work will be informed by behavioural economics, particularly by prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
Prospect theory is a descriptive theory of choice that has been proven adequate to 
explain and predict systematic deviations from the rational choice model in several 
contexts including health (Winter & Parker, 2007; Abellan-Perpinan et al, 2008; Schwartz 
et al, 2008). Prospect theory is not specifically about financial incentives per se but it is 
about decision-making processes involving both risky (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and 
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riskless choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) - which can be used to substantiate research 
about financial incentives. This theory models choice as a two-phase process: the first 
phase involves editing while the second involves evaluation. This two-process is one of the 
distinctive features of prospect theory and both stages have implications to this work. In 
the editing stage, people develop simpler representations of the choice elements, in which 
mental accounting is included. Mental accounting is related to the subjective mental 
arithmetic operations performed by people to evaluate financial prospects and this stage 
may have implications for how incentives are framed to people (e.g., as a potential gain or 
avoidance of loss; as one gain or two gains of equal amount) and which type of incentive is 
offered (i.e., different incentives are categorized in different ‘mental boxes’). After the 
editing phase, individuals engage in the evaluation of the edited prospects and have been 
shown to (i) compare how expected outcomes depart from a reference point (typically 
current status quo), (ii) wanting more strongly to avoid a loss than to have a gain of equal 
value; and (iii) overweighting small probability outcomes. All these features have 
implications for the design of incentive schemes and will be extensively discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
Taking a behavioural perspective to the analysis of economic forces does not 
undermine them or to suggest they are unimportant. The highly influential work of Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008) Nudge makes this point very clearly. The first letter N on NUDGES 
stands for iNcentives (Thaler & Sustein, 2008, p. 109). According to Thaler and Sunstein, 
financial incentives are powerful policy tools and the most important modifications that 
could be made to market price incentives are changes in salience and framing: sensible 
choice architects choose the right incentives for the right people in the right context 
(p.106). In this work, behavioural economics and particularly prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) will work as the road maps to attempt to 
achieve this.  
The behavioural economics standpoint to behaviour change, essentially grounded in 
the ‘nudge’ approach can be considered a subset of the larger literature of behaviour 
modification (Michie et al, 2013). Nudge is a non-regulatory approach that attempts to 
motivate individual behaviour change through subtle alterations in the choice environments 
that people face (Oliver, 2013), including incentives, defaults, descriptive social norms, 
etc. The typology developed by Michie et al 2013 which lists and systematises the array of 
interventions in the literature used to promote behavioural change include these subtle 
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nudge interventions, albeit giving more emphasis on traditional deliberative approaches as 
information, education or counselling.             
Nonetheless, a feature that is specific to the nudge literature is the acknowledgment 
of a paternalistic viewpoint to behaviour change, particularly in health domains, which is 
not explicit in the general behaviour modification literature. The nudge approach is 
paternalistic in the sense of wanting to make individuals alter their behaviours such that 
they would be better off, as judged by their own stated preferences (Oliver, 2013; Marteau 
et al, 2009). People are nudged to make voluntary decisions that, according to deliberative 
selves, they would like to make. This is the angle I take on my work. 
An area in which behavioural economics differs from standard economic theory is 
the acknowledgement that incentives may decrease the likelihood of some behaviour 
occurring. Standard economics acknowledges that incentives may create unexpected 
effects such as externalities, but does not consider the possibility that incentives may be 
counterproductive in eliciting the incentivized behaviour. Titmuss’s manifesto (1971) for 
altruistic blood donation marked the start of discussions about the perverse effects of 
incentivizing behaviour that became known as motivational crowding-out. Motivational 
crowding-out is the umbrella term used in economics for the reverse of the relative price 
effect in economic theory, i.e., when higher incentives lead to lower (not higher) supply or 
effort (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kreps, 1997). There has 
been much discussion but little agreement about the definition of motivational crowding-
out; generally speaking, this concept is related to incentives being counterproductive if 
they affect individuals’ perception of autonomy and self-determination (Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Kohn, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2012). 
Evidence for motivational crowding-out in economics is measured as the decrease 
in the incentivised behaviour once rewards are introduced (Gneezy et al. 2011; Kamenica, 
2012). There is also a large literature in psychology about the undermining effect of 
rewards on intrinsic motivation, developed shortly after Titmuss (Deci, 1975). This 
tradition, however, analyzes motivational crowding-out once incentives are removed. This 
work does not provide any evidence on post-incentive periods and, therefore, I assess 
motivational crowding-out as defined in economic theory by considering negative 
behavioural effects in the presence of incentives. Although the expression is ‘motivational’ 
crowding-out, there is no actual assessment of psychological motivational factors. 
Detrimental effects on motivation are inferred from behaviour.  
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Behavioural research has exposed situations in which incentives backfire but so 
far the evidence is mostly restricted to contexts where people want to behave altruistically, 
are engaged in enjoyable activities or want to fulfil their duty as citizens (Deci et al. 1999; 
Bowles et al, 2008; Mellström & Johannesson, 2008). The existing evidence does not 
provide clear guidelines for or against the use of incentives in health settings (Promberger 
& Marteau, 2013). This work will make an essential contribution to the literature by 
providing empirical data to test the hypothesis of crowding-out effects in health behaviour.  
In addition to the importance of supporting the discussions about financial 
incentives in empirical data, one should also acknowledge the importance public 
acceptability of incentives when contemplating their use as a policy tool. Financial 
incentives are gaining momentum in the public arena and media (Brown & Promberger, 
2011). The effectiveness of incentive schemes and their potential benefits and harms has 
been subject to passionate discussions (Jochelson, 2006). Moral and ethical objections to 
such schemes have been raised (Parke et al, 2011), based on arguments that portray 
incentives as a form a coercion or bribery to patients. Financial incentives have been 
judged as less acceptable and less fair than medical interventions to promote health 
behaviour (Promeber et al, 2011). Public health providers tend to express favourable views 
to patients incentives whereas opposition comes mostly from third sector organisations and 
the media (Parke et al, 2011). The general public, however, may be persuaded by an 
increased perception of effectiveness. Promberger and colleagues (2012) showed that the 
acceptability of financial incentives increased with effectiveness, particularly when 
incentives become more effective than alternative approaches. Even a small increase in 
effectiveness from 10% to 11% increased the proportion favouring incentives from 46% to 
55%. If public acceptability is influenced by perception of effectiveness, a clear assessment 
of the impact of financial incentives may be a crucial contribution to a positive attitude 
change. 
 
1.2 Research and Policy Contexts 
The effect of patient financial incentives will be analysed in the contexts of blood donation 
and compliance with health care. The impact of incentives has not been established in 
either of these contexts and clarifying how incentives influence behaviour in both settings 
brings distinctive contributions to the literature.  
In addition to the importance of understanding the role of incentives in each context 
per se, their comparative analysis makes an additional contribution. For blood donation, 
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incentives are offered in exchange for an action that strictly benefits the health of others. 
For compliance, incentives are offered for people to take care of their own health - which 
they should do regardless of the incentive. This raises the question about the relative 
effectiveness of financial incentives to trigger self-interest versus ‘other-interest’ 
behaviour. This distinction may have a significant impact in the likelihood to accept the 
incentive, which incentive is more effective or the incentive size that is needed to promote 
change. 
 
1.2.1 Blood donation 
I start by analysing the impact of incentives in blood donation given its core position in the 
literature on incentives in health and its high policy relevance (Busby et al, 2013; Roach, 
2013). The influential book ’The Gift Relationship’ by Titmuss (1970) spurred the interest 
for unintended or counterproductive effects of financial incentives. Titmuss made the 
influential statement that a system based on voluntary blood donation would lead to better 
outcomes – higher blood quality supplied in a more efficient way – than a system paying 
for blood. However, Titmuss himself acknowledged the paucity of empirical data to test 
his assumptions. Arguments for and against the use of incentives to promote blood 
donation have been heavily debated in academia and the media over the years (e.g., 
Hartford, 2011) with economists by and large proposing opposing views to voluntary 
donations (Lacetera et al, 2013). Nevertheless, no clear attempts have been made to 
empirically settle this question.  
Most of the current discussion about motivational crowding-out is still done in 
reference to Titmuss’ work (Frey 1997; LeGrand, 2003; Promberger & Marteau, 2013). 
This has helped to maintain the payment for blood as highly controversial for decades. 
Scholars and policy makers emphasize the need to compromise in the implementation of 
acceptable and successful policies to increase blood supply – and implicitly assume 
incentives have to take some part of these policies (Ferguson et al, 2007; Lacetera et al, 
2013). Moreover, nonfinancial incentives have been proposed as the best possibility to cut 
across the rigid dichotomy of altruistic donations versus payment for donations (Buyx, 
2009; Sass, 2013). Given the key role of blood donation in the debate about the 
effectiveness of patient financial incentives, blood donation is the first context examined in 
this work.    
Titmuss’ work became the cornerstone for Governments and the World health 
Organisation (WHO hereafter) pleas of fully voluntary blood donation policies. The World 
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Health Assembly (WHA) passed the resolution WHA 28.72 in 1975 urging member states 
to develop blood systems based on voluntary non-remunerated donation of blood. In 1997, 
the WHO recommended that all blood donations should come from unpaid voluntary 
donors. However, by 2006, only 49 of 124 countries surveyed had established this as a 
standard. The WHO reiterated their position in 2009 with the Melbourne Declaration on 
100% Voluntary Non-remunerated Donation of Blood and Blood Components with the 
statement that “…paid donation can compromise the establishment of sustainable blood 
collection from voluntary non-remunerated blood donors” (World Health Organization, 
2009 p2).  
 In the United States, blood is donated through various organisations registered with 
the US Blood Bank including blood centres, the Red Cross and hospitals, with some 
providing financial incentives to encourage donation (Domen, 1995). In the UK, the blood 
supply is managed through NHS Blood and Transplant, with blood only taken from unpaid 
voluntary donors, although there is a donor award scheme that introduces various gifts with 
respect to the amount of blood being donated. Paid donors remain major blood suppliers in 
some European countries including Germany (Kretschmer et al, 2004). These examples 
reflect the diversity of policies across jurisdictions without a clear assessment that supports 
or refutes the use of financial incentives - in both the quantity and quality of the blood 
supplied.    
 
1.2.2 Health care compliance 
I will also analyse compliance with health care guidelines. This will include a set of 
behaviours (fully described below) with a significant impact in patient health and public 
expenditure (Neumman, 2012), providing a larger research context to examine several 
hypotheses about the effectiveness of incentives. 
There is a considerable debate around the meaning of compliance (or adherence) to 
medical recommendations (Vrijens et al. 2012). The WHO defined adherence as the extent 
to which patients’ behaviour corresponds to medical advice and recommended treatments 
(2003). A more recent review of the terminology used in the literature (Cramer et al. 2008) 
proposed compliance as a synonym to adherence, referring to the act of confirming to 
practitioners’ health recommendations with respect to timing, dosage and frequency.  
Medication noncompliance has traditionally been in the spotlight in the literature 
about health compliance behaviour with a large of number of studies focusing on barriers 
or determinants of medication compliance (Grosset et al, 2006; Sewitch et al, 2003; Horne, 
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2006; Schroeder et al, 2004). Noncompliance rates are reported to be significant, ranging 
from 30–70% for most chronic diseases, and overall, the WHO (2003) estimated that 50% 
of patients in developed countries do not adhere to medication as recommended. 
However, although most research has focused on compliance to medication, health 
care compliance includes a variety of other health behaviours beyond taking prescribed 
drugs, regarding which there is also evidence of concerning low compliance. With respect 
to cancer screening, breast cancer traditionally has the highest uptake around 65%-80% but 
cervical screening has an average adherence of 50%-75% and colorectal cancer 40%-60% 
(NCPIE, 2007; NHS, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009). Furthermore, people frequently miss 
medical appointments and do not always return for follow-ups to abnormal test results 
(Phillips et al, 2001; Osterberg & Blaschke, 2005). Compliance with health care guidelines 
has been shown to be particularly low in minority and ethnic groups (Dalton et al, 2011).  
In this work, I will be particularly focusing on one-shot or short-term health 
behaviours: disease screening e.g., cancer screening, sexually transmitted infections (STI) 
screening, tuberculosis (TB) screening, adult and child immunisation, attending medical 
appointments are included under the umbrella of health care compliance. These behaviours 
share a common feature: there is an immediate present cost (e.g. waiting time, side-effects, 
anxiety with test results) to increase the likelihood of future benefits (e.g. better health, 
longer life expectancy). Smoking cessation, drug abstinence and exercise or healthy eating 
habits are also health recommendations but, in opposition, are more habitual and sustained 
behaviours which imply the withdrawal of immediate (often addictive) rewards to achieve 
future benefits. These lifestyle behaviour changes will not be included in the present work 
because the way in which patients respond to incentive in these contexts are likely to be 
different from one-shot or more time-limited situations (Garavan & Weierstall, 2012) and 
may not be directly comparable. Furthermore, research on financial incentives targeted 
more habitual behaviours like smoking cessation or exercise habits (e.g., Charness & 
Rabin, 2009) and more research is needed about one-shot or short-term health behaviours.   
Patients’ failure to adhere to medical advice is a major limiting factor in achieving 
therapeutic goals (Haskard et al, 2009) and is considered a critical health problem (WHO, 
2003). Noncompliance significantly decreases health treatment outcomes (DiMatteo et al, 
2002), is associated with higher mortality (Simpson et al, 2006; Rasmussen et al, 2007) 
and increases overall health expenditure (Bouchery et al, 2011; Finkelstein et al, 2009; 
Sokol et al, 2005; Horne, 2006). At a social level, there are negative externalities related to 
both noncompliance with treatment for infectious diseases and increased inequity 
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(Braveman & Gruskin, 2003) because economic deprivation is strongly related to poor 
health care compliance (Ashton et al, 2003; Dixon et al, 2007).   
Numerous barriers to compliance have been identified and the literature on the 
determinants of noncompliance is abundant. However, evidence on interventions to 
promote compliance is far more limited (European Union ABC Project, 2012) and 
financial incentives have been increasingly proposed as a possible intervention (Marteau et 
al, 2011; Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et al, 2008). I will contribute to the literature by 
evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives as a tool to promote compliance with 
health care guidelines.  
 
 
1.3 Methodological Options and Research Questions 
This work poses three main research questions to be answered in two systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses, and two large field studies. Prospect theory is the overarching 
framework used as the main theoretical foundation for this work, particularly relevant for 
the design and evaluation of incentives schemes. However, its contribution is 
predominantly centred on research Question 2, even though prospect theory is a solid point 
of reference throughout all research questions.  
Experimental studies in the lab are a sound methodological option to establish 
causal links and could have been used to elicit preferences for different incentives or to 
establish the effect of incentive size in hypothetical choice scenarios. However, this work 
is focused on understanding the behavioural effects stricto sensu of offering financial 
incentives to individuals for two main reasons. Firstly, there is evidence that stated versus 
revealed preferences may differ and the choices made in the lab even under incentive 
compatible scenarios may not predict behavioural patterns in natural settings (List & 
Gallet, 2001; Murphy et al, 2005). Secondly and directly related to this first reason, results 
from this work can potentially have significant implications for policy and population-level 
health interventions, which cautiously call for field testing (Harrison & List, 2004; Levitt 
& List, 2007, 2009). Therefore, this work is restricted to experimental field studies (i.e., 
evidence from naturally occurring settings from which causal links can be drawn) both for 
primary data collection (Chapter 5 and 6) and secondary data analyses in meta-analysis 
(Chapter 3 and 4).  
Meta-analysis of randomised trials is based on the assumption that each trial 
provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of an experimental treatment, with the 
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variability of the results between the studies being attributed to random variation (Egger et 
al, 1998; Sterne, 2009). The overall effect calculated from a set of similar and logically 
combined randomised trials is expected to provide an unbiased effect size estimate. The 
case of observational studies is fundamentally different because such studies are prone to 
the effects of confounding factors (e.g., unobserved confounding factors that cannot be 
measured with sufficient precision, which often occurs in epidemiological studies) or  the 
influence of biases (e.g., selection biases in case-control studies).” Regression analyses can 
control the effect of confounding factors and covariates but meta-analysis is based on raw 
unadjusted data. For these reasons, the two meta-analyses are exclusively based on 
experimental studies. 
 
1.3.1 Research Question 1 
 Are financial incentives effective? 
In the case of blood donation, to date there are only narrative reviews in the literature 
trying to answer this question. Two previous reviews have considered the impact of 
incentives on the likelihood of giving blood (Godin et al, 2012; Goette et al, 2010). One is 
an unsystematic review of the literature that mixes observational and experimental studies 
(Goette et al., 2010), in which the authors to conclude that incentives are effective to 
increase blood donation. The other review includes a wide variety of interventions (and not 
just incentives) to promote blood donation and report that there is insufficient evidence 
from incentive studies to draw any conclusion  (Godin et al., 2012). A recent newsworthy 
piece of opinion in Science by Lacetera and colleagues (2013) makes a public endorsement 
for the use of financial incentives. However, this support is based on the authors’ personal 
appraisal of past research. Given the absence of a systematic quantitative assessment of the 
literature on this topic, I will perform a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomised 
controlled trials regarding the impact of incentives in the quantity and quality of blood 
donated (chapter 3).  
  Concerning compliance, the pressing question is whether financial incentives 
actually work in developed countries because their positive impact has been shown in 
developing countries (De Brauw & Hoddinott, 2011). In higher income countries, several 
systematic reviews have been performed on the impact of incentives in different health 
contexts (Giuffrida & Torgerson, 1997; Kane et al, 2004; Jochelson, 2007; Sutherland et 
al, 2008) but this work has mostly been delivered in the form of narrative reviews, which 
do not provide any estimation of effect size. Kane and colleagues (2004) concluded that 
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incentives are effective to change ‘simple’ behaviours like attending medical appointments 
or immunisation but to a lesser extent more ‘complex’ life-style behaviours such as 
increasing exercise frequency, smoking cessation or drug abstinence. 
However, these results were based on a simple frequency analysis. The only meta-
analysis with a pooled estimate was performed in the area of drug abstinence with clinical 
patients (Lussier et al, 2006), reporting a strong positive effect. Yet this evidence is still not 
conclusive to inform if financial incentives are effective for the general (nonclinical i.e., 
with no diagnosed addiction condition) population or across a wider range of health 
behaviours. I will provide evidence to answer this question in the meta-analysis about 
compliance (chapter 4) and two field studies (chapter 5 and 6), the first related to 
Chlamydia screening and the second about colorectal cancer screening. 
For both contexts the analysis is based on what happens when incentives are 
offered to patients and as such, this work does not include data on post-incentive periods. 
The analysis of possible motivational crowding-out effects is part of this research question 
but restricted to happens to behaviour once incentive are introduced – in line with the 
tradition in economic research. Although blood donation and compliance with health care 
tend to be one-shot or occasional behaviours, they can be recurrent (e.g., annual) and thus 
it is still relevant to understand what is the effect of incentives on these behaviours over 
time. However, this is currently not the focus of this work, strictly examining short-term 
effects. The long-term effects of offering financial incentives in these health contexts were 
not included as a research question.  
I will bring timely and fundamental empirical evidence to the literature on 
crowding-out effects, which is mostly characterized by policy discussions and media 
debates without a clear empirical support.  
 
 
 
1.3.2 Research Question 2 
Which sort of incentive is more effective? 
In addition to showing if patient financial incentives work, it is also important to determine 
which sort of incentive is more likely to be effective in promoting behaviour change. This 
question includes both type and size of incentive. There is a wide variety of incentives 
offered in health interventions, some of which can be designated as cash-based (cash, 
cheques, lotteries for money) and others defined as goods-based (vouchers, coupons, gifts 
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or lotteries for vouchers). The analysis of the comparative effectiveness of different types 
of incentives is crucial not only theoretically (why do some work better than others?) but 
also on practical grounds (which is the type of incentive most likely to work?). 
For blood donation, the question of which type (but not size) of incentive to offer is 
a particularly debated topic. Scholars and policy makers often propose nonfinancial 
incentives to avoid the menace of crowding-out (Sass, 2013). A couple of recent 
observational studies suggest that nonfinancial incentives may be a successful approach. 
Lacetera and Macis (2010a) reported that donors report they would stop donating blood if 
given cash but not a voucher of the same nominal value whereas  Costa-i-Font et al (2013) 
found that people who favoured monetary rewards for blood donation are less likely to be 
donors but those who favour non-monetary rewards are more likely to have donated. These 
authors suggest that the (still hypothetical) negative effects of incentives in blood donation 
would be minimised by offering goods-based rewards instead of cash-based incentives. But 
hitherto it remains unclear if this self-reported data is supported by behavioural evidence. I 
will provide data on this topic by comparing financial versus nonfinancial incentives in the 
meta-analysis about blood donation (chapter 3).  
Compliance provides a wider setting to analyse different incentives. There are a 
few randomised controlled trials that tested the impact of different incentives, which have 
compared cash versus vouchers of an equal value. Cash was consistently more effective 
than vouchers in promoting health behaviour in all studies (Deren et al, 1994; Kamb et al, 
1998; Malotte et al, 1999, 2004; Tulsky et al, 2004; Vandrey et al, 2007). However, Kane 
and colleagues (2004) performed a review on a broader range of incentives and reported a 
frequency analysis in which negative incentives (e.g., sanctions) were effective in 90% of 
the cases, vouchers 80%, cash 73%, free medical charges 67%, lotteries 60% and gifts 
57%. These findings seem to contradict the results from the randomised controlled trials 
about cash vs. vouchers but a more precise data analysis is still required to establish these 
results more accurately. Also, Promberger and colleagues (2012) showed that grocery 
vouchers were more acceptable than cash or vouchers for luxury items (about a 20% 
difference). But this previous field studies raise the questions if stated preferences are 
consistent with behaviour.  
 About incentive size, there are only a couple of studies examining this issue and 
both in the context of compliance. A field study compared the offer of $5 cash versus $10 
cash (Malotte et al. 1998) and showed no significant difference between the incentives. But 
a meta-analysis in the context of drug abstinence (Lussier et al, 2006) showed a positive 
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effect of incentive size: the larger the incentive, the higher the likelihood to change 
behaviour. Again, it is not clear if the results of a clinical population in context of drug 
abstinence hold for the compliance of nonclinical patients. To address this gap, both the 
impact of incentive size and different types of incentives (cash, vouchers and lotteries) will 
be examined in meta-regression (chapter 4).  
The two field studies also include the test of different type and size of incentives 
but add the combination of other elements. In the first field experiment (chapter 5) I will 
test vouchers versus lotteries both framed either as a potential loss or as a potential gain. 
Message framing has been extensively applied to health settings but mostly this framing 
has been related to the different presentation of the outcomes of engaging or not in healthy 
behaviour (Rothman & Updegraff, 2010; Rice, 2013). The framing of offers or benefits to 
engage in healthy behaviour (not the health outcomes that derive from e.g., treatment or 
screening) has been significantly less explored (e.g., Romanowich & Lamb, 2013).  
In the second field study (chapter 6), I will test the impact of incentives offered 
either as a single payment (€10) or two instalments of equal amount (€5+€5) which 
provides indirect evidence for the effect of incentive size. But this study fundamentally 
contributes to the scarce research about the structure of incentive delivery and the field test 
of preferences for sequences of outcomes. The few lab-based studies about this topic 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; Linville & Fischer, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) 
suggest a preference for segregation of gains but the impact of integrating or segregating 
an incentive payoff has never been examined in the field. I test the effect of segregating 
incentives to increase the uptake of colorectal cancer screening, by comparing the impact 
of a single incentive (offered at the end of screening) versus two incentives with an equal 
total payoff (one offered at the beginning and the other at the end of the screening process).   
 
 
1.3.3 Research Question 3 
Are income and past behaviour effect modifiers of the impact of incentives? 
Patient income and past behaviour are hypothesized to be two important effect modifiers of 
the impact of financial incentives. A special attention is given to income because the 
effectiveness of incentives according to deprivation level is a topic that raises contradictory 
opinions. On one hand, the offer of financial incentives is expected to be more effective in 
low income patients than more affluent individuals. Given a diminishing marginal utility of 
income (Layard et al, 2008), the marginal positive effect of a e.g., £10 increase in real 
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income becomes progressively smaller the higher the initial level of income. Assuming 
that low income patients are more likely to be influenced by incentives, some authors think 
(Doran et al, 2008; Oliver & Brown, 2012) that incentives could be used as a policy tool to 
tackle health inequalities. But others consider that this expectation can be considered as 
coercion and bribery (Popay, 2008). Incentives might coerce low income people into 
changing behaviour because under high deprivation, the incentive offered may be 
necessary to fill basic needs and thus, unlikely to be refused. With respect to blood 
donation, the question of the low income of donors is not raised as a liability for 
themselves but to others. One of Titmuss’ main concerns was related to an adverse effect 
of financial incentives in the quality of the blood donated by attracting at-risk deprived 
donors.  
Despite the ethical considerations around the offer of incentives being out of our 
scope, it is important to understand the role of income as a possible moderator of the 
effectiveness of incentives. If incentives only work for low income people, incentives 
should not be used to promote health behaviour changes in more affluent individuals. I will 
present meta-regression data of the impact of patient financial incentives in individuals 
with low versus higher income (chapter 4).    
It is also unknown if there is an interaction between financial incentives and past 
health behaviour. Past behaviour tends to be a strong determinant of future behaviour 
(Chandon et al, 2011; Gardner & Lally, 2012; Lally & Gardner, 2013) through learning 
and habit formation (Lally et al, 2010; Crawford, 2010). Previous compliance (or lack of 
compliance) behavior is likely to moderate the effectiveness of incentives in influencing 
present behavior. Incentives may reinforce past compliance i.e., previously compliant 
patient may consider the offer of a financial incentive an additional benefit and sustain 
their compliant behaviour. In opposition, the offer of an incentive could have a detrimental 
impact in past compliers by introducing an element of control and perceived lack of 
autonomy (e.g., Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). In the case of patients who were previous 
noncompliers, incentives should have a positive impact if the utility gained overcomes 
perceived barriers and costs to compliance. 
This question is related to the hypothesis of crowding-out effects and past 
behaviour can be taken as a proxy for intrinsic motivation. The literature on motivational 
crowding-out (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 
1997) suggests that high levels of pre-incentive behaviour may be interpreted as a sign of 
high intrinsic motivation. This stream of literature (e.g., Deci & Ryan 1985) has always 
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defended that incentives are only expected to reduce intrinsic motivation when they are 
perceived as controlling of autonomous behaviour but might actually enhance effort to 
engage in new behaviour for which people are not intrinsically motivated at baseline 
(Promberger & Marteau, 2013). There is limited evidence on this topic but mostly 
suggesting that financial incentives work by attracting people not previously engaged with 
health behaviour (Charness & Gneezy, 2009; Stone et al, 1998). This was also a hypothesis 
posed by Titmuss for blood donation: incentives could alienate previous voluntary donors 
and attract new blood ‘sellers’. In the meta-analysis of blood donation (chapter 3), a 
subgroup analysis will be performed to separate the impact of incentives for first-time 
donors and habitual donors.  
 
 
1.4 Outline of Research 
This work is structured in six chapters in addition to this introductory chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 starts by presenting a literature review on financial incentives, starting with the 
groundwork in Psychology with behaviourism and operant conditioning (i.e., the study of 
behavioural change originated and maintained by reinforcement or punishment) which 
deeply influenced economic theory. This early research in operant conditioning is also 
important to understand the later discussions on motivational crowding-out. I will then 
discuss the standard economic theory standpoint on financial incentives, followed by the 
presentation of the framework of behavioural economics. I will particularly discuss how 
standard economic theory and behavioural economics differ in their hypotheses about the 
effectiveness of incentives. Finally, the literature on motivational crowding-out will be 
extensively debated given its centrality in the deliberation about the use of incentives to 
change health behaviour.  
 
Chapter 3 and 4 present the systematic reviews and meta-analyses of this work.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the empirical work on incentives and blood donation. It is a systematic 
review and meta-analysis to test Titmuss’ hypotheses about the impact of using incentives 
in the quantity and quality of the blood donated. It brings empirical data to the much 
debated problem of offering incentives to increase blood supply, to which no substantial 
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evidence-based progresses have been made since Titmuss in 1970. Although this the only 
empirical piece of work dedicated to blood donation in this thesis, I endorse that it makes a 
critical contribution to research and policy. I fundamentally contribute to the literature with 
a much need empirical analysis of Titmuss’ claims. An earlier version of this chapter is 
published in the journal Health Psychology, in the special issue of Behavioural Economics 
in Health.  
 
Chapter 4 synthesises past experimental research using patient financial incentives to 
promote health care compliance. I perform the first meta-analysis in the literature to 
estimate of the effect of incentive interventions. Meta-regression is used to estimate 
differences by type and size of incentive as well as patient income and past behaviour. A 
shorter version of this chapter is currently under review in the journal Social Science and 
Medicine. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 report on two large field studies to test innovative incentive schemes, 
both in the context of compliance. The field studies are developed in the contexts of 
Chlamydia screening (Chapter 5) and colorectal cancer screening (Chapter 6). The 
rationale for the choice of these two contexts is threefold: a) Chlamydia and colorectal 
cancer have a high prevalence in their target populations (young people aged 18-25 and 
older people 50-74), b) can be easily detected at premature treatable stages but c) the 
average uptake of screening is low in most countries, even in countries like the UK with 
established population-level free screening programmes.  
 
Chapter 5 is a cluster randomised trial (N=1060) testing a factorial design intervention: the 
offer of financial incentives (£5 voucher vs. lottery ticket for £200) framed as a potential 
gain or a loss. Financial incentives have been increasingly used by Primary Care Trusts in 
the UK in an attempt to increase screening rates and mostly under the form of vouchers or 
lotteries. The only evaluation study in the UK (Zenner et al, 2010) suggests a positive 
impact, mostly from vouchers. However, this conclusion is based on observational data 
and no causal link could yet be established. Furthermore, research on gain versus loss 
framing of health message is well-established but there is hardly any work about the 
impact of framing incentive offers. This study has been published in a special issue on 
Nudge in the journal Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 
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Chapter 6 is a randomised controlled trial (N=2478) testing the impact of incentives to 
promote the uptake of colorectal cancer screening. Incentivising colorectal cancer 
screening provides a naturalistic setting to test how people prefer the distribution of gains 
(incentives) in a temporal sequence of events. Screening is typically a multistep process 
and I test the effect of a one incentive (offered upon completion of screening) versus two 
incentives of the same amount (offered at the beginning and the end of screening). This 
field experiment makes a pioneering contribution to the literature by providing the first 
experimental test of preference for sequences of outcomes in the context of a critical public 
health setting. Colorectal cancer is the 3rd most common cancer worldwide after breast and 
lung cancer (WHO, 2012).  There is limited work on interventions to promote colorectal 
screening and only two studies offering financial incentives (Freedman & Mitchell, 1994; 
Miller & Wong, 1993) – showing contradictory results. This work received the 
Honourable Mention for Best Student Paper by the Portuguese Health Economics 
Association in October 2013. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the breadth and strength of the evidence provided to answer the three 
research questions posed and discusses my original contributions to the literature. It 
presents the implications of this work for research and policymaking – particularly related 
to recommendation or not of financial incentives to change health behaviour in specific 
contexts and population segments. Furthermore, this chapter acknowledges possible 
limitations and weaknesses of the research and debates the question of generalisability and 
external validity of the results. Future research prospects are also outlined.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents the literature review about financial incentives. I start with a 
presentation of the theoretical basis for the use of incentives to change behaviour, initially 
grounded in operant conditioning in psychology and later translated into standard 
economic theory with the law of demand, income effect and the principal-agent theory. I 
will then argue how the predictions from operant conditioning and standard economics do 
not seem to apply in some circumstances, discussed under the designation of motivational 
crowding-out effects. I will conclude this chapter with an outline of behavioural 
economics, its contributions to research on behaviour change and how behavioural 
principles, mostly derived from Prospect theory, may improve incentive interventions.  
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2.1 The Law of Effect and operant conditioning 
The Law of Effect, enunciated by Thorndike (1911), was the first attempt to systematise 
the hypotheses about the impact of external rewards and punishments. Based on decades of 
work with animal behaviour, Thorndike proposed that "of several responses made to the 
same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the 
animal will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that, 
when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely 
followed by discomfort to the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections 
with that situation weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur" (p. 
244). In his studies – similarly to most studies developed after Thorndike in this same line 
of research – animals were put into experimental boxes and had to provide a certain 
response (e.g., press a bar, pull a lever, push a button) to obtain food or avoid pain. This 
experimental apparatus formed the basis of research on operant behaviour (Postman, 
1947). Operant behaviour is behaviour controlled by its consequences; operant 
conditioning is the study of behavioural change originated and maintained by 
reinforcement or punishment (Standdon & Cerutti, 2003).  
Research on operant conditioning, formally initiated by Thorndike, was later 
developed and expanded particularly by Skinner (1938, 1953, 1969) which took the leap 
from animal results to human applications. This application of the principles of operant 
conditioning used (among others stimuli) financial incentives as reinforcers (offering cash 
or reducing the price of some good) or punishers (increasing fees or decreasing 
allowances).   
Figure 2.1 shows the different forms of operant conditioning which have been 
defined for human subjects (Martin & Pear, 2007). Operant conditioning is operationalised 
through reinforcement or punishment. Reinforcement is about giving people what makes 
them feel good whereas punishment is related to increasing levels of discomfort. The 
former is expected to enhance the likelihood of desirable behaviour and the latter to 
decrease the likelihood of undesirable behaviour. Punishment is implemented by 
increasing pain (positive punishment) or by decreasing pleasure (negative punishment). 
Reinforcement is slightly more complex. Positive reinforcement is implemented by 
providing rewards that increase pleasure and or negative reinforcement decreases pain. 
People reduce their internal levels of discomfort either by eliminating a source of pain 
(escape) or by avoiding an expected pain (avoidance). 
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Figure 2.1 Different types of operant conditioning 
 
Operant conditioning principles applied to the analysis of human behaviour are 
traditionally referred to as behaviour modification (Martin & Pear, 2007). This application 
started during the 1940s with the objective of increasing adaptive behaviour through 
reinforcement and decreasing maladaptive behaviour through punishment. Early 
application of these principles mostly targeted mental health patients and disruptive school 
behaviour (Petry, 2000). Research in these contexts is also designated as token economy 
and contingent management. A token economy mimics a small-scale economy with the 
inmates of health institutions - usually dedicated to mental health (Kadzin, 1982). A token 
is an object or symbol that can be exchanged for material reinforcers, services or 
privileges. Tokens aren’t primary reinforcers but secondary or learned reinforcers much in 
the same as money in real economies. Contingency management is a related type of 
program, most often directed at the treatment of substance use (Higgins et al, 2012). In 
voucher-based contingency management, patients earn vouchers exchangeable for retail 
items contingent upon objectively verified abstinence from drug use or compliance with 
medication. This particular form of contingency management was introduced in the early 
1990s as a treatment for cocaine dependence and has been proved highly effective (Lussier 
et al, 2006).  
This psychological literature is an important line of research to understand the use 
of financial incentives as tool for behaviour change because it pioneered the systematic 
Operant Conditioning 
Reinforcement Punishment 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Escape Avoidance 
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study of external stimuli in animal and human behaviour and had, many years later, a 
decisive role in the research about intrinsic motivation and motivational crowding-out – 
which will be present in a subsequent section.   
The modern application of incentives to behavioural change – either in economics 
or psychology - is fundamentally different from the initial operant conditioning research. 
Operant conditioning was developed originally to study learning processes and understand 
what determines future behaviour. Reinforcement (punishment) would increase (decrease) 
the likelihood of future desirable (undesirable) behaviour and thus, promote learning. 
Therefore, past experience with the incentive is the driving force behind the effect in 
present behaviour.  
However, with time, the principles of operant conditioning became tools to change 
present behaviour, with a radical change from a forward to a backward prediction of 
behaviour. Anticipated utility (or disutilty) is now the underlying mechanism that explains 
behaviour change. The promise of a reinforcer or punisher contingent with the 
performance of some behaviour is expected to increase or decrease the probability of that 
behaviour occurring. Expectancy and not experience drive behaviour change in the modern 
use of operant conditioning. 
 
2.2 Financial incentives in standard economic theory 
The economic analysis of decision-making largely amounts to understanding the 
differences in the choice structures faced by individuals. In this way, economic theory 
works under similar assumptions as operant conditioning. It expects that behaviour is 
influenced by its expected positive or negative consequences. People respond to changes in 
benefits or costs as these modify the choice structures in which decisions are taken 
(Laffont & Mortimer, 2009). Economic theory derives its strength from predicting how 
people make cost-benefit calculations and change their behaviour in response to changes in 
incentives (Fehr & Falk, 2002). The effect of incentives in behaviour is formalised in the 
economic law of demand which states that, all else being equal, the consumption of most 
products or services will increase as cost decreases.  
An incentive is understood as any factor (financial or non-financial) that enables or 
motivates a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring one choice to 
the alternatives. The most common distinction is between positive (reinforcement) and 
negative (punishment) incentives (Crumm, 1995; Smith, 2004), considering that positive 
refers to an addition in utility and negative refers to a subtraction in utility. A positive 
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incentive is an economic, legal or institutional measure designed to encourage beneficial 
activities to the economy or society. Both positive and negative reinforcement are 
considered positive incentives. Salaries, grants, awards, cash transfer or any kind of reward 
is considered positive reinforcement while reimbursement of expenses, free access to 
services, rebates or removal of sanctions correspond to negative reinforcement. Negative 
incentives (or disincentives) are mechanisms designed to discourage activities that are 
considered harmful or detrimental to the economy or society. Similarly, both positive and 
negative punishments are defined as negative incentives. Taxes, fines and penalties are 
considered punishers whereas the loss of benefits or cuts in bonuses acts as negative 
punishers by withdrawing previous rewards. 
Under the principal-agent theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), financial 
incentives will improve agent performance because the agent will increase effort to earn 
the incentive (Lazaer, 2000). The underlying mechanism of this theory is that performance 
is a function of effort, and that introducing desirable monetary incentives will motivate the 
agent to put forth greater effort (Bonner et al, 2000). Although effort is costly, the agent 
wants to earn the incentive, thus increasing effort and subsequently performance. This 
disciplining or price effect is at the heart of agency theory, rational choice, and utility 
maximization (Frey, 1997). 
The core assumptions of standard economic theory state that people have a scarcity 
of means - e.g., money, time, cognitive capacity - and face choices between competing 
ends. Individuals have preferences that are stable and well-defined and choose as if they 
were balancing the costs against the benefits of several alternatives. This process has the 
purpose to maximise expected utility given preferences and constraints. Standard 
economics assumes that people know what will make them better off and that they achieve 
such a state – given the resources available to them – by choosing in a calculated and 
deliberate way among the accessible alternatives. This rational choice framework is not 
bounded by a specific content and could be virtually applied to any human behaviour 
(Becker, 1976). The law of demand and the relative price effect work through the use of 
external incentives and motivation or preferences are taken to be given constants (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001). The use of financial incentives in experimental economics is also considered 
crucial to elicit more reliable incentive-compatible responses (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; 
Samuels & Whitecotton, 2011). 
What are the implications of the theories discussed to this point for the use of 
patient financial incentives? Both economic theory and operant conditioning predict that 
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incentives will increase the likelihood of desirable behaviour. Within the economic theory, 
both health care compliance and blood donation are predicted to occur when the 
anticipated utility of complying (e.g., peace of mind, warm glow) is higher than the utility 
of non-adherence (e.g., staying home) or the costs of performing it (e.g., pain). Likewise, 
non-adherence is predicted when the anticipated utility of not adhering to treatment exceed 
the disutility of adhering. In a much similar way, the principles of operant conditioning 
support that behaviour is strengthen or eliminated by its positive or negative consequences. 
If acting in a certain way e.g., taking my medication, will result in getting a reward e.g., 
$10, then I am more likely to take my medication because my behaviour was positively 
reinforced. 
However, opponents of the use of incentives to change patient behaviour (e.g., 
Popay, 2008) call attention to the multifactor nature of the barriers identified in health 
settings, which may suggest that there may be no universal prescription to tackle this 
problem. But underlying all noncompliant behaviour is the perception of some cost. Health 
care compliance represents a small certain increase in immediate costs (e.g., regardless of 
this cost being waiting time, fees or painful side-effects) to gain uncertain larger future 
benefits (e.g., increased life expectancy). Given that uncertainty about the length of life is a 
key determinant of the trade-off between present and future choices (Bommier, 2006; 
Bommier & Villeneuve, 2012) noncompliance can be considered rational behaviour. An 
incentive may change these cost-benefit calculations. The utility of future gains and 
disutility of future costs are heavily discounted and people tend to prefer small immediate 
rewards to larger delayed rewards and tend to postpone small immediate costs that may 
become larger future problems (Frederick et al, 2002; Monterosso & Ainslie, 2007). Given 
that individuals tend to have present-biased preferences (Daugherty & Brase, 2010), the 
offer of a financial incentive may offset the impact of time discounting by increasing 
present benefits (Reach, 2008). With respect to blood donation, the matter of uncertainty 
about future benefits is less pertinent. Low blood donation rates are likely to be primarily 
explained by a perception of immediate present costs and, according to standard economic 
theory, incentives should increase supply by transforming a donation into a net gain for 
donors. 
This suggests that all barriers reported by individuals as causes for poor compliance 
with health behaviour can be framed as costs – physical, cognitive or emotional. These 
perceived costs, notwithstanding their different natures, can be interpreted similarly and be 
considered an expression of revealed preferences (Lamiraud & Geoffard, 2007). Let’s take 
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the example of a woman that reports lack of time as the reason to miss cervical screening. 
Personal time is a scarce resource and this time is used to enjoy different activities that 
enter the individual utility function, the aim being maximising utility. At equilibrium, the 
ratio of time allocated to different activities equals the ratio of expected utilities. An 
increase (decrease) in the relative cost of an activity i.e., waiting time to see the doctor 
would tend to decrease (increase) the time allocated to that activity. The same rationale can 
be applied to other reported barriers. Given the consistent evidence that increased costs 
decrease compliance with health guidelines (Mojtabai & Olfson, 2003; Gibson et al, 2005; 
Hsu et al, 2006), an increase in perceived benefits with the contingent application of 
financial incentives is predicted to increase health behaviour. 
The bottom line is that standard economics (and operant conditioning) provide an 
overarching normative framework that makes general predictions about how behaviour 
will change in response to changes in incentive structures (Fehr & Falk, 2002) – and 
because it can be applied to a wide set of behaviours and explains many behavioural 
regularities, it has become the fundamental theoretical foundation for policy making. 
 
2.3 Motivational crowding-out: Exceptions to the general rule? 
However, the general predictions of standard economics and operant conditioning may not 
always apply. Titmuss’s manifesto for altruistic blood donation in his seminal book The 
Gift Relationship (1970) marked the start of wide-scale discussions about possible 
unanticipated or detrimental effects of offering financial incentives to individuals. This 
initially vague discussion later became labelled by Bruno Frey as the much cited concept 
of motivational crowding-out ((Frey, 1994, 1997; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Frey & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). Motivational crowding-out is the overarching term used in 
economics for an adverse and unexpected effect of incentives. Crowding-out effects are 
considered to be present when incentives promote changes in behaviour contrary to the 
expected direction, that is, rewards decrease the likelihood or frequency of behaviour and 
penalties increase it (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kreps, 
1997).  
Although Titmuss is often referenced as the first author to debate the relationship 
between motivation and external rewards and Bruno Frey pioneered the label of 
motivational crowding-out (1994), this research question was born in Psychology many 
years before either of these authors. Research on operant conditioning in animal behaviour 
– discussed in the previous section - identified the first signals that animals could have an 
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internal motivation system independent of external rewards (White, 1959). The behaviour 
of animals could be greatly predicted by the reinforcement or punishment stimuli used by 
the experimenter but there were many instances (puzzling to researchers) where the 
animals refused food to play in the experimental maze or wheel – even when induced 
hunger (Postman, 1947). The underlying reasons were unknown to researchers but the 
animal displayed an intrinsic need to master the environment and satisfaction was derived 
from it (White, 1959). This spurred criticism that the existent theories of motivation were 
strictly built upon primary drives and could not account for playful and exploratory 
behaviour, particularly in humans. Thus, new motivational concepts as ‘competence’ or 
‘intrinsic motivation’ were proposed.  
Much of the early research inspired by this evidence was conducted in children 
using the same experimental paradigm as the studies in operant conditioning in animals. 
Animals were observed in what was designated free-operant behaviour i.e., what happens 
to behaviour after removing the restrictions of the behavioural intervention. So did children 
in the early studies about intrinsic motivation (Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Intrinsic 
motivation was defined as performance of a task with “no apparent rewards except the 
activity itself” (Deci, 1971, p. 105) and operationalised by choosing tasks that participants 
already performed with sufficiently high persistence (puzzle solving and writing student 
newspaper headlines or spontaneous interest in a new drawing opportunity) (Promberger & 
Marteau, 2013).  Deci (1971) and Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett (1973) tested the hypothesis 
that rewards might undermine intrinsic motivation, by comparing behaviour levels between 
a group that received a tangible reward and a group that received no such reward, after the 
reward had been removed. Both studies found that behaviour levels were lower in the 
group that had previously been rewarded.  
Two decades after this experimental paradigm developed in the literature, a couple 
of large meta-analyses examined the prevalence of the undermining effect of rewards 
(Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Deci et al., 1999). These meta-analyses come to different 
conclusions, either that the undermining effect of tangible external rewards on intrinsic 
motivation is pervasive (Deci et al., 1999; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 2001), or that it is 
limited (Cameron, 2001; Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Cameron & Pierce, 1994) 
(Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Despite these differences in the evaluation of the impact of 
incentives, intrinsic motivation this literature “has always been defined in terms of reward 
effects on intrinsic motivation for interesting activities” (Deci et al, 2001). Following the 
original definition and operationalisation of intrinsic motivation, high levels of pre-reward 
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behaviour are assumed to imply high intrinsic motivation. Deci and Ryan (1985) predicted 
that rewards only reduce intrinsic motivation when they are perceived as controlling the 
behaviour, and might actually enhance intrinsic motivation if they promote feelings of 
competence (Promberger & Marteau, 2013).  
This entails that all goal-oriented activities i.e., activities that are performed as 
means to obtain something are not be in the realm of intrinsic motivation. This also implies 
that all health care behaviour should not be considered intrinsically motivating: disease 
screening or vaccines are not particularly enjoyable. Blood donation is also not enjoyable 
in itself – people do it to help others. Furthermore, according to the psychological 
literature, motivational crowding-out should occur under high levels of pre-incentive 
motivation, what is unlikely to happen for patients that, at baseline, do not comply with 
health care or do not donate blood. The main question from this stream of research is 
whether incentives will be interpreted by patients as controlling or as an opportunity to 
increase ‘competence’ in taking care of their own health. From the available evidence, it is 
not clear yet which circumstances will trigger a positive or adverse effect of incentives. 
The definition of intrinsic motivation was progressively expanded in Economics 
(Kreps, 1997; Frey, 1997; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Benabou & Tirole, 2003) to 
include not only things that people enjoy doing but also what people think they should do 
and its definition extended to any effect that is opposite to the relative price effect of 
economic theory. Frey and Jegen’s (2001) motivation crowding theory builds on the 
psychological literature and also include the perception of the incentive as controlling or 
undermining autonomy as the mechanism that leads to motivation crowding-out.  
Nonetheless, contrasting with studies in psychology, crowding-out effects within 
economic research are identified when unforeseen changes occur in behaviour concurrent 
with the incentive offer, rather than after its removal. Curiously, however, the only piece of 
evidence Titmuss initially presented in his work that suggested a negative impact of 
incentives is related to post-incentive donation behaviour, more in line with the 
psychological tradition. Referring to survey data from the former Soviet Union, Titmuss 
stated that only 72% of donors reported they would keep donating if payments were 
withdrawn and only 50% of donors would donate as often as they currently did. 
Economic studies on motivation crowding-out include new and often more complex 
contexts than the puzzles and tasks used in the psychological literature, including prosocial 
and citizenship behaviour (Frey, 1997; Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Laboratory studies 
often use economic games that require some cooperation between parties or a trade-off 
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between interests of different parties, as in principal-agent problems involving an agent 
acting with consequences for the principal, who relies on the agent, such as an employer 
relying on employee work effort (Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Questionnaire measures 
of real-world voting decisions have also been used. Frey and Oberholzer-Ghee (1997) 
found acceptance of the siting of a nuclear waste repository close by dropped from about 
50% to about 25% when financial compensation was offered. Volunteers who were paid a 
small amount worked fewer hours than unpaid volunteers (Frey & Goette, 1999).  
Generally speaking, in the economic literature the concept of motivational 
crowding-out is explained in reference to social preferences. Agents have preferences other 
than money and these preferences may interfere in the relationship between monetary 
incentives and effort. Many of the unintended effects of incentives occur because people 
act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as 
dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals (Bowles & Hwang, 2008) and the offer of an 
incentive may inform the agent that the principal does not trust him or wants to control him 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). This is a possible explanation why the public acceptability of 
financial incentives may be low in situations in which the values of human dignity, 
autonomy or solidarity are salient (Park et al, 2011; Promberger et al, 2011, 2012). 
Monetary incentives have been proven detrimental to ‘other-regarding’ preferences by 
triggering self-interest (Bowles, 2008): the mere priming of money has been shown to 
increase selfish behaviour (Vohs et al, 2008). 
Bowles and colleagues (Bowles and Kwang, 2008; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 
2012) claim that standard economic theory predicts independence between incentives and 
social preferences based on a separability assumption (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012): 
changes in social preferences are not dependent on the presence and magnitude of financial 
incentives. But there is increasing evidence showing that this separability assumption does 
not hold. More often than not, research has suggested that monetary incentives crowd-out 
nonmonetary motivations – acting as substitutes. 
Bowles (2008) based this claim on a series of field studies suggesting an adverse 
effects of monetary incentives in situations involving pro-social or citizenship behaviour. 
In Haifa (Gneezy and Rustishini, 2000), at six day care centres, a fine was imposed on 
parents who were late picking up their children at the end of the day. Parents responded to 
the fine by doubling the fraction of time they arrived late. When after 12 weeks the fine 
was revoked, parents increased lateness persisted. In a natural experiment, Holmås and 
colleagues (2010) found that hospital length of stay was longer in a hospital using fines to 
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reduce length of stay compared with a hospital not using monetary punishment. Similar 
adverse effects of monetary incentives in social preferences have also been reported in 
rudimentary small-scale societies (Heinrich et al, 2005).  
Bowles and colleagues (2008) interpret the results as examples of monetary 
incentives crowding-out agents’ intrinsic motivation, leading to a reduction in effort. While 
acknowledging that other interpretations are possible, the authors support these 
counterproductive effects illustrate a kind of negative synergy between monetary 
incentives and moral behaviour. Taken together, this evidence suggests that financial 
incentives should be effective when offered to individuals to take care of their own health 
– as in the case of compliance with health care - but not when their actions influence the 
health or well-being of others – as the case of blood donation. 
Although increasing numbers of studies uncover exceptions to the income effect, 
the conditions under which they occur are currently not well understood (Gneezy et al, 
2011). The vagueness of the definition of intrinsic motivation in the economic research 
creates uncertainty about what to expect in the health contexts analysed in this work. 
Promberger and Marteau (2013) performed a comprehensive systematic review of the 
literature and also concluded that the available evidence does not allow drawing clear 
implications for health behaviour.  
My work will add to the literature on motivational crowding-out by providing 
evidence of the impact of financial incentives to change the health behaviour in the field 
Again, it should be reinforced that possible detrimental effects in intrinsic motivation will 
be inferred from observable changes in behaviour. I will contribute to long-standing debate 
about the impact of incentives in blood donation and I will also offer evidence for 
compliance with health care, which integrates a large and important set of health 
behaviours.    
 
2.4 Financial incentives in behavioural economics 
Behavioural economics integrates psychological insights – mostly from cognitive 
psychology - into mainstream economics in an attempt to address some of the descriptive 
limitations of standard theory (Dellavigna, 2009; Heap, 2013; Loewenstein et al, 2013). 
The analysis of how social preferences affect the relationship between incentives and 
behaviour – discussed above as a possible cause for crowding-out effects - is one of the 
core features of behavioural economics. However, most of the earlier and distinctive 
contributions of behavioural economics to the literature are related to the bounded 
40 
 
rationality of agents. Assuming the bounded rationality of agents brings about a different 
set of implications for incentive interventions that I will discuss next. 
The initial developments of behavioural economics were born from the query about 
the validity of the maximisation assumption in standard economic theory. Herbert Simon 
introduced the concept of bounded rationality as the descriptive alternative to 
maximisation (Rice, 2013). He claimed that people face several cognitive limitations in 
how much information they can process and how much they can remember when needed. 
Moreover, because people have to make decisions about a large number of things, they 
intuitively use shortcuts or heuristics rather than engaging in utility-maximising behaviour. 
Therefore, people satisfice rather than maximise as a way of mitigating what would 
otherwise be an overwhelming amount of information given their limitations in cognition 
and time. Simon argued that far more attention should be given to decisions making 
processes per se and this formed the foundation for behavioural economics because 
standard economic theory assumes that people will choose the best option available by 
simply matching their preferences with price and quality data. He incited research to 
understand this ‘heuristic thinking’ better and the initial decades of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s work were dedicated to the update of the rational agent model (Kanheman, 
2003). 
Over time, research proved Simon’s hypotheses right and research on bounded 
rationality expanded showing that lay reasoning does not always adhere to the laws of 
logic, the calculus of probability or the maximization of expected utility (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2003ab). Individuals have been shown to misunderstand 
complex information about costs and benefits (Liebman & Zeckauser, 2004) and 
misinterpret data about risk and uncertainty (Gigerenzer & Galesic, 2012). People tend to 
put off difficult choices and in some extreme situations may avoid choosing altogether 
(Tversky & Shafir, 1992; Luce, 1998). Most individuals are highly influenced by the 
context in which choices are presented (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012) and make 
inaccurate predictions about the consequences of their past decisions (Wilson & Gilbert, 
2005). 
What are the implications of bounded rationality literature to incentive 
interventions? Primarily, it draws attention to the possibility that financial incentives – as 
tools aiming to foster cost-benefit calculations and rational choice – may not always work 
as expected by standard economics (Ariely et al, 2009). It also highlights the importance of 
understanding how patients code, organise and structure the information regarding the 
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offer of the financial incentive. This is the stance taken by Thaler and Sustein (2008), 
according to which financial incentives are powerful policy tools that behavioural 
economics does not overlook. In fact, market price incentives should be adjusted in terms 
of salience and framing i.e., incentives should be highlighted in comparison to the current 
status quo (reference point) and should be framed in the most motivating way to people, 
according to behavioural principles. I will now present and discuss the principles and 
concepts from prospect theory as a key framework to motivate and inform the design of 
incentive schemes. 
 
2.5 The contribution of prospect theory  
Criticisms to behavioural economics are very much in line with criticisms to psychology 
made by economists. Although behavioural models have proven to be, on average, 
descriptively more accurate, there is no overarching model of human behaviour from 
which general predictions can be made. Behavioural economics and psychology are based 
on a myriad of lower level models that are contextually bounded, lacking tractability and 
parsimony.  
One of the chief exceptions to this criticism is prospect theory, which provides a 
higher degree of formalisation compared to most psychological models. Prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has been the most influential framework offered under the 
outskirts of behavioural economics. This is a descriptive theory of decision-making under 
risk which main features were also applied to riskless choice a decade after its initial 
formulation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This theory has been shown to have a high 
descriptive validity in several contexts including health (Winter & Parker, 2007; Abellan-
Perpinan et al, 2008; Schwartz et al, 2008) and it explain systematic deviations from the 
rational choice model. Prospect theory models choice as a two-phase process. The first 
phase involves editing while the second involves evaluation. 
 
2.5.1 Editing Phase 
The recognition of an editing phase is a distinctive characteristic from other choice 
theories. This phase consists of a preliminary analysis of the prospects in question, aiming 
to provide a simpler representation of the choice elements, facilitating subsequent 
evaluation. At this stage, individuals organise, reformulate and restructure the options 
available. People can code options as gains or losses, can combined different prospects 
with different probabilities or apply segregation rules between risky and riskless prospects. 
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In prospect theory, outcomes are evaluated via a utility function with a shape as shown in 
Figure 2.2 and this evaluation is determined by the editing and coding done at this first 
stage. 
Mental accounting is related to the subjective mental arithmetic operations 
performed by people to evaluate financial prospects (Thaler, 2004). With respect to their 
own finances, individuals set mental budgets for different expenses i.e., different ‘mental 
boxes’ which they allocate to expenses in e.g., food, housing, leisure (Thaler, 1999). There 
is evidence that these categories or ‘mental boxes’ are not fungible because people tend to 
make relatively strict budget allocations (Hastings and Shapiro, 2013). This means that 
when the budget allocated to a specific account is over, for instance ‘Indulgence’ (e.g., 
special dinners, expensive clothing), people typically do not transfer funds from other 
accounts (e.g., food, transportation) to finance further indulgencies. This is an important 
point for the design of incentive schemes because the offer of a voucher for a luxury 
product or entertainment may unexpectedly top-up the indulgence account. Given the 
typical budget constraints experienced by most people, gift cards for indulgence or luxury 
goods may be more appealing than grocery vouchers of the same amount. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Value function from Prospect theory 
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2.5.2 Evaluation Phase  
After the editing phase, individuals engage in the evaluation of the edited prospects. The 
overall value of a prospect is expressed in terms of two scales, v and ᴨ. The first scale, v, 
assigns to each outcome x a number v(x), which reflects the subjective value of that 
outcome (Figure 2.2). The second scale, ᴨ, associates with each probability p a decision 
weight ᴨ(p), which reflects the impact of p on the overall value of the prospect (Figure 
2.3). The first scale entails an explanation for (a) reference points, (b) loss aversion and (c) 
diminishing marginal sensitivity. The second scale is related to (d) decision weighting or 
weighted probability functions.   
 
a) Reference Point. Outcomes are defined relative to a reference point or status quo (x=0), 
which serves as a zero point in the value scale. The value function measures the value of 
deviations from that reference point in terms of gains or losses. It is often assumed that the 
relevant reference point is current status of wealth or welfare but it can also be expected 
status or goals. Heath and colleagues (1999) showed that unachieved goals are felt as 
losses even if there is an absolute gain. Expectations have an important role to play in 
reference points. When people expect a pay rise of 10% and are just awarded 5%, they tend 
to be disappointed. In this case, the reference point in not current pay but expected pay 
and, thus, people are likely code and evaluate the final pay award as a loss (Wilkinson, 
2008). This evidence suggests that incentives interventions should emphasise that the 
reference point is no incentive (zero): patients are not typically offered incentives to care of 
their health and (in most countries) to donate blood. Thus, the offer of a financial incentive 
in health settings is a clear departure from patients’ reference point and can be highlighted 
in the framing of the incentive.  
 
 b) Loss aversion. The same outcome is valued differently if it is above (gain) or below 
(loss) the reference point and people are significantly more sensitive to losses than gains 
[ν(x) <- ν(-x) for x>0]. This is a broad-spectrum effect found in different contexts 
(Baumeister et al, 2001). Bad experiences, failures and dispossessions are more memorable 
than their positive counterparts. Although this appears to be a robust effect, its causes are 
not clear. Evolutionary explanations are among the most endorsed, with evidence tracking 
loss aversion to our survival instinct (Kim et al, 2006). In health settings, this effect has 
been particularly explored in the framing of health outcomes (Banks et al, 1995; Rothman 
et al, 1999; McCormick & McElroy, 2009).  
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Loss aversion is probably to single most prominent element in prospect theory and 
it has greatly influenced research and the interpretation of the psychological costs of losses. 
But interestingly, research from operant conditioning based on animal behaviour strongly 
favoured positive reinforcement as the most effective strategy to promote and maintain 
future behaviour (Postman, 1947). The initial work of Thorndike with animals 
demonstrated that punishment was ineffective to eliminate undesirable behaviour. He 
showed that the impact of punishment was highly dependent of the organism’s propensity 
to endure pain. It seemed that punishment had an indirect effect in eliminating the wrong 
response: it mostly increased the variability of behaviour, thus increasing the opportunities 
for the occurrence of the correct response, which would then be reinforced in the right 
direction by reinforcement (Postman, 1947). These results seem in striking contradiction 
with lay conceptions of what drives behaviour change because the effectiveness of 
punishment has practically become an axiom in the literature.  
 Despite the great centrality given to loss aversion in behavioural research, Kermer 
and colleagues (2006) suggest it is mostly an affective forecasting error. Loss aversion 
occurs because people expect losses to have greater hedonic impact than gains of equal 
magnitude. In two studies, these authors showed that people predicted that losses in a 
gambling task would have greater hedonic impact than would gains of equal magnitude, 
but when people actually gambled, losses did not have the negative emotional impact they 
initially predicted. People overestimated the hedonic impact of losses because they 
underestimated their tendency to rationalize losses and overestimated their tendency to 
dwell on losses. The asymmetrical impact of losses and gains could thus be more a 
property of affective forecasts than a property of affective experience. 
Nevertheless, is often found in the literature the assumption that interventions based 
on penalties and fees are more effective at changing behaviour than rewards (Li & 
Chapman, 2013; King et al, 2013; Rice, 2013). However, this hypothesis was never been 
tested despite the centrality of loss aversion in debates about policy interventions. I will 
provide evidence from the field about the relative effectiveness of gain versus loss framed 
incentive offers (chapter 5). This is not a test of penalties versus rewards per se but a proxy 
about how people respond to incentives presented as potential gains or losses (forgone 
gains).   
 
c) Diminishing marginal sensitivity.  Prospect theory considers that the marginal value of 
both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude. Initial improvements from 
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the reference point are perceived as very significant, with subsequent gains felt less 
intensively. Similarly, initial losses are the most painful but additional decrements are less 
so. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) endorsed that the evaluation of monetary changes 
follows the same pattern as many sensorial and perceptual dimensions: the psychological 
response is a concave function of the magnitude of the physical change. This point has 
particular implications to the size of the incentive offer. Diminishing marginal sensitivity 
in combination with the reference point (which is typically being offered no contingent 
incentive for health behaviour) suggest that even small financial incentives could trigger 
significant behavioural changes. I will dedicate a particular attention to incentive size later 
in this chapter. Incentive size is a central feature of the incentive scheme and will base my 
discussion not only on Prospect Theory but also on posterior research (Gneezy et al, 2000; 
Ariely et al, 2009; Pokorny, 2008). 
 
d)  Decision weighting. People underweight probable outcomes compared with outcomes 
that are obtained with certainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This phenomenon was 
designated certainty effect because the reduction of the probability of winning from 
certainty to some probability p<1 has a greater effect than the corresponding probability 
reduction from p1 to p2 both 0<p<1 (Kanheman & Tversky, 1986). Prospect theory 
porposes that people replace probabilities by decision weights: the value of each outcome 
is multiplied by a decision weight (Figure 2.3). Nevertheless, decision weights are a 
function of probabilities: Π(p)=f(p). These weights measure the impact of events on the 
desirability of the prospects and not their likelihood and is possible that Π(p)<p or Π(p)>p.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Probability weighting function from Prospect theory 
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Decisions weights are usually lower than the corresponding probabilities except for 
low probabilities; people tend to overweight small probabilities and overestimate the 
frequency of rare events. These authors propose that this is the root of the attractiveness of 
gambling. In later work (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) they showed that people tend to be 
risk-seeking for gains of low probability, suggesting that lotteries may be effective 
incentives to promote changes in health behaviour. 
The implications of decision weighting for the design of incentive schemes are not 
straightforward. On one hand, there is evidence for a robust certainty effect (Kanheman & 
Tversky, 1979), implying that certain incentives, even if with a smaller expected value than 
prize draws (Kanheman & Tversky, 1986), should be more effective to promote behaviour 
change. Additionally, research has shown that people have a strong preference for 
immediate gratification and amplify the value of immediate (relative to delayed) outcomes. 
This immediacy effect (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) has been proposed as a derivative of 
the certainty effect (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995). Both uncertainty and time affect 
behaviour via a common underlying dimension in such a way that making an outcome 
uncertain is equivalent to making it delayed (Weber & Chapman, 2005a). Thus, offering a 
prize draw in exchange for a health behaviour that poses immediate costs to patients should 
be less effective than a certain incentive.  
 But concomitantly there is evidence that people are risk-seeking (or less risk 
averse) for gains when payoffs are low (Weber & Chapman, 2005b). People prefer taking 
risks when only ‘peanuts’ are involved (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) e.g., between a 
certain £1 and a 10% chance of £10, most people prefer the gamble. Volpp and colleagues 
(2009) have shown that lotteries with a small expected value are effective to promote 
adherence to medication – although they did not compare the effectiveness of these 
lotteries with a certain incentive. 
To date, most research examining decision weighting is strictly lab-based, 
evaluating stated preferences with no effort required from subjects. My hypothesis for field 
data is that, in the case of health behaviour involving immediate costs for patients, the 
certainty effect is likely to be dominant, providing a sure compensation. The feeling of 
uncertainty about the future – which is particularly salient when performing e.g., cancer 
screening – may lead people to prefer immediate soothing rewards (Milkman, 2012). In 
this work, I will provide meta-regression (chapter 4) and primary field data (chapter 5) on 
this hypothesis.   
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2.5.3 Evaluating Joint Outcomes 
The value function from Prospect theory (Figure 2.2) is defined over single unidimensional 
outcomes that the authors later extended to single, multi-attribute outcomes (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Thaler (1985, 2008) extended this analysis to compound outcomes, to 
answer the question of how a joint outcome (x,y) is evaluated. The value function is 
concave for gains (v’’<0, x>0) and thus v(x)+v(y)> v(x+y). This assumption suggests that 
gains should be segregated to increase overall utility. Segregated gains are hypothesised to 
provide more utility due to diminishing marginal utility. The marginal utility of income is 
defined as the incremental change in utility (or satisfaction) that is due to a unit change in 
income. The broader concept of marginal utility is the change in utility resulting from a 
given change in the consumption of a good (Layard et al, 2008). Because the first X% of a 
gain accounts for more than X% of its hedonic benefit, one can offset diminishing 
marginal utility by segregating a gain into a smaller a series of smaller gains (Morewedge 
et al, 2007). At a single point in time, a second unit of the same good provides less hedonic 
impact than the first. Two gains at different moments may be more satisfactory because, 
after the first gain, the reference level is reset to zero and the second gain provides a new 
higher utility. In the case of losses, given that the value function is convex in this domain 
(v’’>0, x<0), an integration of outcomes is expected to be preferred: v(-x)+v(-y)< v(-
(x+y)). After a first loss, the reference point is reset to incorporate the new (lower) status 
quo and a second loss would feel more painful, given the steepness of the value functions 
of losses. 
 Joint outcomes may not be strictly positive or negative. A mixed gain is expressed 
in the form of (x,-y) with x>y implying a net gain whereas a mixed loss is defined by x<y, 
involving a net loss. Thaler (1985; 2008) proposes that losses should be cancelled against 
larger gains, meaning that a decrease in a gain should be integrated: v(x)+v(-y)<v(x-y). But 
a small reduction in the absolute value of a loss should be segregated – or what Thaler 
designates the ‘silver lining’ effect. For instance, in the case (£40, -£6,000), segregation is 
preferred since v is relatively flat near -6,000. However, if the values are closer as (£40,-
£50) integration may be preferred since the gain of the £40 is likely to be valued less than 
the reduction of the loss from £50 to £10.      
Considering the first editing phase of Prospect theory, the prospect of cancer 
screening, upon the offer of an incentive, can be recoded from a loss to a mixed outcome. 
A mixed gain is expressed in the form of (x,-y) with x>y implying a net gain. This will be 
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the case if the incentive overcomes the cost of screening. A mixed loss is defined by x<y, 
involving a net loss and screening will still ultimately be perceived as a cost if the 
incentive is not sufficiently appealing to patients. 
The scarce evidence on this mental arithmetic for sets of gains and losses comes 
entirely from lab studies and stated preferences. In the few existent studies, participants are 
presented pairs of scenarios comparing a single outcome with two outcomes of the same 
absolute value. In response to the following setting (Thaler, 1985): “Mr. A was given 
tickets to lotteries involving the World Series. He won $50 in one lottery and $25 in the 
other. Mr. B was given a ticket to a single, larger World Series lottery. He won $75. Who 
was happier?” As expected, the majority of participants (64%) answered Mr. A. Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) analysed the evaluation of separate gains that included a temporal 
order. They proposed that the process of segregating gains is facilitated by having events 
occur on different days and, conversely, that integrating events should be easier if the 
events occur on the same day. These authors presented participants (N=65) with the 
following scenario. There is a pair of events: (i) win a $25 lottery and (ii) win a $50 lottery 
and these events happen on the same day for Mr. A or two weeks apart for Mr. B. Who is 
happier? 63% of participants answer Mr. B. Participants seemed to prefer to spread out the 
arrival of pleasant events, presumably to help segregate the utility experienced and spread 
good outcomes over time. 
There are more studies analysing the impact of integrating losses due to its 
important marketing applications for consumer purchases e.g., $120 for product plus $20 
for shipping or $140 shipping included, mostly corroborating the preference for integration 
of losses (Kim, 2006; Ross & Simonson, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Heath et al, 
1995). For mixed outcomes, similar scenarios were employed. From Thaler (1985): “Mr. 
A’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend $200 to repair the damage. The 
same the car was damaged he won $25 in the office football pool. Mr. B’s car was 
damaged in the parking lot. He had to spend $175 to repair the damage. Who was more 
upset?” 70% (n=87) answered Mr. B. For mixed gains: “Mr. A bought his first New York 
State Lottery and won $100. Also, in a freak accident, he damaged the rug in his apartment 
and had to pay the landlord $80. Mr. B bought hist first New York State lottery and won 
$20. Who was happier?” 72% answered Mr. B.  
This rationale of gain segregation, nevertheless, raises an important question of 
time preferences as an opposing force to diminishing marginal utility. The motivation to 
spread consumption over time and the motivation to concentrate consumption in the 
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present are conflicting. People tend to exhibit positive time preferences: individuals are 
impatient and crave immediate consumption, preferring gains sooner rather than later. And 
this effect holds either assuming either exponential or hyperbolic time discounting 
(Frederickson et al, 2002). Also, people have negative time preferences for costs, 
suggesting that segregation (and not integration) should be preferred. People are expected 
to want to feel their pains as late as possible. These are considered robust effects in 
intertemporal choice research (Read et al, 2002). However, studies examining time 
discounting are concerned on how people evaluate simple prospects consisting of a simple 
outcome obtained at a specific point in time (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).  
No research to date has applied research about the coding and evaluation of joint 
outcomes to behavioural interventions – so far there are only observational and lab studies. 
The implications for health care settings may be extensive. If no incentives are offered to 
promote health care compliance, the health procedures should be integrated as much as 
possible. For instance, present HPV immunisation as a single goal, not three immunisation 
doses. Given that compliance is likely to be perceived as an immediate cost to patients, the 
multiple doses should be integrated. But if some incentive is offered to patients, this gain 
should be segregated and highlighted to patients.  
I will present the first behavioural evidence of preferences for segregation versus 
integration of gains, in a field study using colorectal cancer screening as research context 
(chapter 6). 
 
2.6 The impact of incentive size 
A critical feature of incentive interventions is the value of the incentive offered to 
participants. Standard economics and operant conditioning make similar predictions with 
respect to the impact of incentive size. Under standard economic theory, the impact of 
financial incentives in behaviour is a monotonic function of incentive size (Laffont & 
Mortimer, 2009). Other things being equal, increased size of incentive will lead to 
increased likelihood of behaviour change. Larger payoffs both increase the marginal gain 
for patients and are more likely to cover the costs of complying with health 
recommendations. The similarities with operant conditioning are particularly visible in this 
point (Miltenberger, 2011): ‘the effectiveness of a stimulus as a reinforcer is greater if the 
amount or magnitude of a stimulus is greater (...) a larger positive reinforce strengthens 
the behaviour that produces it to a greater extent than a smaller amount or magnitude of 
the same reinforcer’ (p.76). The size of the reinforcer is determinant in cost-benefit 
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calculations and poor effects from incentives are usually attributed to the small size of the 
incentives offered. 
However, there is evidence that the relationship between incentive size and 
behaviour may be more complex than this general prediction. Heyman and Ariely (2004) 
proposed two types of markets that determine the association between behaviour and 
incentives: a social market characterized by social relationships and a monetary market, 
defined market pricing relationships. They propose that in money-markets, effort will 
increase with payment level but in social-markets effort will be unrelated to incentive size. 
This hypothesis was operationalised by the type of incentive offered: participants were 
offered candies (which was assumed to create a social market relationship) or cash (which 
was assumed to create a money market relationship). Effort in several tasks was positively 
associated with the amount of cash received but not by the quality (as a proxy for cost) of 
the candies offered.  
Despite proposing this dichotomy of social vs. money markets that moderate the 
impact of incentives, Heyman and Ariely (2004) show the expected monotonic relationship 
between money and behaviour: more cash led to more effort. But there is a growing 
literature in behavioural economics exposing a nonmonotonic relationship between 
performance and incentive size. And this has also been interpreted as a sign of crowding-
out effects (Conrad & Perry, 2009).  
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) offered students different amounts of money for each 
correct answer (in a total of 50 questions) in a quiz. Compared to a control group (no 
payment), very small incentives (2.5 cents per question) led to a worse performance but 
higher incentives (25 cents or 75 cents per question) led to better performance. The authors 
mostly highlighted the adverse role of very small incentives and concluded that small (but 
not large) incentives could have crowding-out effects for effort and performance. 
However, the authors disregarded the lack of difference between the higher incentives 
which could lead, respectively for 25 cents and 75 cents per question, to an overall payoff 
of $12,5 and $37,5.    
Some years later, a couple of papers exposed a different pattern between incentive 
size and behaviour. Ariely and colleagues (2009) also tested the impact of different 
incentive sizes. Participants were offered 4, 40 or 400 rupees (corresponding to $0.1, $1 or 
$10) to perform a variety of lab tasks. Overall, they showed that the high incentive led to 
worse performance than the low and mid incentives – which did not have significantly 
different effects. Similarly, Pokorny (2008) showed an inverse-U shaped relationship 
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between incentive size and performance. Compared to a control group (no incentive), 
participants were offered $0.01 (very low), $.05 (low) or $0.5 (high) incentives per point in 
a quiz (in a total maximum of 48 points). Results showed that very low and low incentives 
outperformed the high incentive. Compared to the control group, only the very low 
incentive led to better performance.    
The reasons underlying these nonmonotonic associations are not yet clear. 
Differences may depend on the context under analysis e.g., work performance versus 
prosocial behaviour or may be based on concerns with self-image e.g., my performance is 
not driven by money (Ariely et al, 2010; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000) that is more salient 
in social markets than money markets (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). To this point, the 
implications for health behaviour are difficult to draw. If the role of incentive size is driven 
by the type of market perceived by patients (Heyman & Ariely, 2004), blood donation may 
be considered a social market and thus be insensitive to incentive value. Compliance with 
health care may be a social market or money market depending on e.g., the relationship 
with the GP. I will explore the impact of incentive size on health behaviour both with 
meta-regression analyses (Chapter 3 and 4) and experimental field evidence (Chapter 6). 
 
2.7 An integrative framework for behavioural public policy 
The discussion of the behavioural research performed to this point will direct the empirical 
analysis of this work – guiding the hypotheses for secondary data analysis (chapters 3 and 
4) and informing the design of incentive schemes for primary data collection (chapters 5 
and 6).  
This evidence-based approach is different from most research performed to date. 
Michie and colleagues (2011) reviewed over 1000 interventions and showed that only 
15%-20% of the studies were well-defined and grounded in the literature. Most 
interventions are often poorly defined, not justified by theory and implemented without 
supporting empirical evidence (Abraham & Michie, 2008).  
I propose a classification of the most frequent type of policy interventions using 
economic incentives according to the main principles of operant conditioning (Table 2.1). 
Policy interventions always carry underlying behavioural assumptions - even if not explicit 
– and I suggest this framework for analysis. An attempt to match financial incentives to the 
principles of operant conditioning provides policy making with a theoretical framework, 
grounded in behavioural research, and informs the development of policy guidelines based 
on the effectiveness of each type of incentive.  
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 Reinforcement Punishment 
Positive 
Salaries; Bonuses 
Vouchers, lotteries 
Cash transfers 
Tax increase 
Fines 
Penalties 
Negative 
Sanction removal 
Tax reduction/ exemption 
Refund/ Rebate 
Withdrawal of welfare benefits 
Embargos 
Cuts in public services 
Table 2.1 Categorisation of financial incentives according to operant conditioning 
 
There is some controversy regarding an actual difference between positive and 
negative reinforcement (Martin & Pear, 2007). Some authors claim that this distinction is 
not clear because it is not possible to know if individuals perceive a deduction in taxes as 
positive (increased gains) or negative reinforcement (decreased costs).  
Furthermore, in financial terms, there is no positive punishment strictly speaking. 
The case of physical punishment is more direct: a slap in the face is a true positive 
punishment because it increases the sensory level of pain. A tax is a punishment because it 
reduces the amount of available income to individuals and, therefore, could also be 
considered negative reinforcement. In fact, in most situations behaviour appears to be 
motivated by avoidance conditioning (Figure 2.1 p.27) which is a type of negative 
reinforcement e.g., we pay taxes to avoid legal penalties, we behave in public to avoid 
social censure, we drive within speed limits to avoid a ticket. Loss aversion, in operant 
conditioning terms, is mostly avoidance of pain (negative reinforcement) because it is 
referred to the prospect or anticipation of a loss. Operant conditioning research favoured 
the use of reinforcement to change behaviour (Magoon et al, 2008) whereas behavioural 
economics, mostly based on the concept of loss aversion, predicts that punishment will be 
more effective.  
If these operant conditioning principles are translated to incentive interventions in 
the contexts under analysis in this work, the same rationale is presented in Table 2.2 and 
examples are given for each category. I endorse that this integrative framework is lacking 
in public policy to evaluate the (relative) effectiveness of different incentives often used 
indistinctively. Although the literature is populated with strong theoretical concepts and 
numerous empirical regularities, to date it it is not clear which type of interventions works 
better in which situation for which people. Striving for evidence-based policy is designing 
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well-designed studies testing comparative intervention effects – preferably informed by 
behavioural principles which may help to clarify the underlying processes involved in 
behaviour and shed light on unexpected or adverse effects found. This work will make a 
modest contribution to achieve this goal, by looking at the role of incentives used as 
positive reinforcers to promote health behaviour.  
 
 Reinforcement Punishment 
Positive 
Interventions that reward patients 
for health care compliance or 
blood donation   
 
Conditional cash transfers, gifts, 
lotteries or vouchers 
Interventions that punish patients with 
sanctions, penalties or fees for lack of 
compliance with health care or blood 
donation  
Likely to be difficult to implement for both 
compliance and blood donation  due to 
ethical criticisms 
Negative 
Interventions that reduce patients’ 
costs with health care compliance 
or blood donation  
 
Reimbursement of fees, free 
screening, transportation 
included, prepaid postage 
Interventions in which there is an initial 
endowment and patients experience 
deductions for each missed compliance or 
blood donation appointment 
Difficult to implement for blood donation 
Commitment devices with loss of 
deposited funds; withdrawal of welfare 
benefits 
Table 2.2 Financial incentives according to operant conditioning principles 
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Chapter 3 
 
Incentivising Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?  
 
Titmuss hypothesized that (i) paying blood donors would reduce the quality of the blood 
donated and (ii) would be economically inefficient. I report here the first systematic review 
and meta-analysis to test his hypotheses, reporting on both financial and non-financial 
incentives. Studies deemed eligible for inclusion were peer-reviewed studies that presented 
data on the quantity (as a proxy for efficiency) and quality of blood donated comparing 
people who donated blood when offered an incentive and those donating blood with no 
offer of an incentive.  
Electronic and hand searches were performed in the main databases from inception to 
2013. Eight experimental studies (about blood quantity) and 13 observational studies 
(about blood quality) met the inclusion criteria. The included studies in the meta-analysis 
for quantity of blood involved 93,328 participants. No meta-analysis was performed for 
observational studies. 
Based on the small number of papers found, incentives had no impact on the likelihood of 
donation. Subgroup analyses suggest that there was no difference between financial and 
non-financial incentives in the quantity of blood donated, although the number of papers 
involved is too small for this conclusion to be meaningful. Of the two experimental studies 
that assessed quality of blood, one found no effect and the other found an adverse effect 
from the offer of a free cholesterol test (β=0.011 p<.05). The observational studies suggest 
that offering financial incentives for blood increases the chances of transfusion-
transmissible infections unless payments are contingent upon blood quality. This evidence 
suggests that Titmuss’ hypothesis of the economic inefficiency of incentives is correct. 
There is insufficient experimental evidence to assess the impact of incentives on the 
quality of the blood provided but observational data cautions against a possible adverse 
effect.   
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3.1 The lasting impact of The Gift Relationship 
The empirical analysis in this work starts with blood donation. This chapter is dedicated to 
examining the impact of offering financial incentives to increase blood donation, testing 
Titmuss’ hypotheses for both quantity and quality of the blood donated. I report here the 
first systematic review to test these hypotheses, reporting on both financial versus non-
financial incentives and the impact of incentives on first-time donors versus previous 
donors.  
This topic of paying for blood has been heavily debated since The Gift Relationship 
(1970) by Richard Titmuss, which became the seminal work against paying for blood. The 
Gift Relationship (1970) is mostly a reflection about the role of altruism in modern society, 
attempting to reconcile economic policy with the morality
1
 of individual action. Blood 
donation takes the central stage as a metaphor for the questions that society should 
preserve from the “language of price elasticity and profit-maximisation” because this type 
of reasoning may have “far-reaching implications for human values and all social service 
institutions” (p.220).   
Titmuss draws on the contrast between the US blood supply system (mostly 
dependent on paid donors) and that in the UK (based entirely on unpaid donors), 
comparing the characteristics of blood donors, national statistics for blood supply and 
demand, and surveys of donors’ motivations. The book’s core premise is that altruistic 
blood donations are superior to a commercial provision of blood on the grounds of blood 
quality, economic efficiency and moral value. Titmuss’s prediction that payment would 
decrease blood quality was based on numerous reports by US doctors of blood obtained 
from those with drug addictions and infectious diseases who successfully concealed their 
condition. In a market context, blood donors are motivated to withhold information about 
their health status as this disclosure may affect the price offered for their blood or even 
disqualify them as blood donors.  
Contrary to common belief (e.g., Chmielewski et al, 2012; Mellström & 
Johannesson, 2008), Titmuss did not predict that blood quantity would decrease if 
incentives were introduced. He did, however, consider the economic efficiency of paying 
for blood and the cost per unit of blood, which he claimed was higher in countries that paid 
donors because of a higher waste of blood and administrative costs. Blood quantity can be 
                                                 
1
 It is not my intention to trigger a discussion about morality as it is such a complex construct outside the 
scope of this work. Any references to the concept ‘moral’ or ‘morality’ were used in reference to Titmuss’ 
own designations. According to Titmuss (1970), his work is about “the morality of individual wills” and “a 
moral choice to give in non-monetary forms to strangers” (page 59). 
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taken as a proxy for efficiency because, given the same amount of blood, the cost per unit 
from a paid source is higher than that from an unpaid source. In this review I will take the 
likelihood of donation as a proxy for economic efficiency of incentivised donations.  
 These arguments raised a heated discussion, particularly among economists, with 
criticism of Titmuss for his narrow view of market forces and lack of empirical support 
(Arrow, 1972; Solow, 1971). Proponents of the free-market for blood supply formulated 
the hypothesis that paying donors for blood would increase supply, based on earlier 
analyses (Cooper & Culyer, 1968).  
But most importantly for Titmuss - and the most well-known feature of his work - 
is his defence of the superior moral value of altruistic blood donations compared to paid 
donations.  He argued that decreasing the opportunity for altruistic donations with the offer 
of payment could have unpredictable negative consequences by limiting people’s freedom 
to give out of regard for the needs of others. Although this assumption was not based on 
empirical evidence, he presented survey data suggesting the negative impact of incentives 
in the former Soviet Union showing that after incentives were introduced, only 72% of 
donors reported they would keep donating if payments were withdrawn and only 50% of 
donors would donate as often as they currently did.  
It is important to emphasize that this survey data was the only evidence backing 
Titmuss in the formulation of his arguments. Titmuss neither showed that financial 
incentives have a detrimental effect in blood donation nor proved that paying for blood 
decreases the quality of blood supplied. He presented his hypotheses, grounded in a 
humanistic view of the role of Social Policy as a building block of a better and more 
cooperative society. If a price could be attributed to blood – as a metaphor for the deepest 
human values – Social Policy would be nothing more than economic policy.   
Despite the paucity of evidence presented in his book, Titmuss’ idealistic ideas 
influenced blood acquisition policies on a global level. From 1975, the WHO has defended 
nonpaid blood donations and in 2009 strongly reinforced this stance with the Melbourne 
Declaration on 100% Voluntary Non-remunerated Donation of Blood and Blood 
Components with the statement that “…paid donation can compromise the establishment 
of sustainable blood collection from voluntary non-remunerated blood donors” (WHO, 
2009 p2). Most blood agencies worldwide follow the WHO guidelines (Domen, 1995).  
Substantiating the endorsement for voluntary donations, the majority of nonclinical 
research about blood donation focus on understanding the personal and contextual factors 
associated with blood donation – and not clarifying the role of financial incentives. 
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Research has mostly been directed at identifying the barriers that prevent individuals from 
donating blood and the proposed interventions make an effort to divert these hurdles 
(Conner et al, 2013; France et al, 2011; Holly et al, 2012). 
The most common barriers reported by individuals are (1) fear of the blood 
donation procedure e.g., needles, possible fainting, (2) scheduling difficulties and (3) lack 
of motivation to donate blood (Ferguson et al, 2007). Interventions to tackle (1) target 
people who have already decided to donate and aim to make the donation experience more 
enjoyable. These interventions are based on distraction, minimisation of muscle tension 
and fluid intake (e.g., Ditto et al, 2003). Interventions aiming to tackle (2) scheduling 
difficulties and (3) lack of motivation to donate blood has been mainly influenced by 
psychosociological reasoned actions models, primarily the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991). Research in this stream includes mostly cross-sectional studies, examining 
how cognitive and motivational variables increase an intention to donate – working under 
the assumption that intentions will lead to behaviour. The extensive studies analysing the 
role of the theory of planned behaviour variables have shown that attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control and subjective norms, all positively influence the intention to donate 
(Bednall et al, 2013). The theory of planned behaviour is often supplemented with 
additional variables such as self-efficacy or past donation behaviour that significantly 
increase the predictive value of the model to predict donation intentions (Ferguson et al, 
2008).  
The role of helping motivation and altruism has also been comprehensively 
analysed. Survey evidence of donor motivation indicates that donors report altruistic 
reasons to donate (Masser et al, 2008). Public service announcements using motivational 
interventions to promote altruism and to model pro-social behaviour vicariously tend to 
manipulate emotional appeals (Ferguson et al, 2007). These messages either emphasise the 
values of humanity or promote messages of societal duty to help others. Godin and 
colleagues (2011) performed a meta-analysis of the interventions to promote blood 
donation and reported that altruism-based interventions are the most effective strategies to 
increase blood donation.  
However, Godin and co-workers (2011) did not include in their meta-analysis the 
effect size of incentives. Only two studies on incentives were included in their review 
(Ferrari et al, 1985; Jason et al, 1986) and the authors concluded it was not possible to 
make any claim about the impact of incentives from a couple of studies. The only other 
review about the impact of incentives on the likelihood of giving blood is from Goette and 
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co-workers (2010). The results of this unsystematic, narrative review led the authors to 
conclude that incentives work well in increasing blood supply.  
The research reviewed to this point targeted the analysis of blood donation rates. 
The quality of the blood donation is a subject that has attracted much less attention in the 
literature. There are only two reviews strictly grounded on observational studies, which 
report a higher prevalence of transfusion-transmissible viruses in blood acquired from paid 
donors (Eastlund, 1998; Van Der Poel et al, 2002). In line with these findings, a more  
recent study from Lithuania assessing both regular and first-time blood donors found that 
blood from first-time paid donors was of poorer quality (Kalibatas, 2008).  
Thus, although Titmuss’ views about paying for blood shaped public discussion 
and policy making worldwide, the limited available evidence does not reflect the 
significance of his influence and there was never a clear empirical assessment of his 
premises. To date, there is no conclusive evidence of the impact of offering incentives for 
blood. I will contribute to the literature with first systematic review and meta-analysis to 
assess the impact of offering financial incentives upon the quantity and quality of blood 
supplied. 
 
3.2 Nonmonetary incentives and crowding-out   
As extensively discussed in chapter 2, Titmuss’s manifesto for altruistic blood donation 
marked the start of wide-scale discussions about perverse effects of incentivizing 
behaviour that became known as motivational crowding-out (Promberger & Marteau, 
2013). The Gift Relationship is an enduring reference in the discussion about incentives in 
the context of blood donation (Frey 1997; LeGrand, 2003; Promberger & Marteau, 2013). 
However, the discussion about detrimental effects of paying for blood has always been 
predominantly associated with financial incentives per se (cash) (Newman & Shen, 2012). 
The widespread idea that paying for blood could have unpredictable negative 
consequences raised the question of what comprises payment and where a distinction may 
lie between financial incentives as cash or lotteries and non-financial incentives as t-shirts, 
mugs, medical tests or days off work (Lacetera & Macis, 2013). The former tends to raise 
more opposition whereas the latter is more commonly accepted as a legitimate way to 
incentivize blood donation (e.g., Buyx, 2009; Mortimer et al, 2013; Sass, 2013). 
Interestingly enough, this intensive debate occurs without the hypothesis of crowding-out 
having ever been proved.  
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Some studies focus on blood donors’ altruistic self-identity and how the offer of 
monetary rewards could conflict with such identity and therefore have a negative effect on 
individuals’ altruistic motivations (Costa-i-Font, 2013; Lacetera & Macis, 2010a). 
Although I do not explicitly approach the matter of identity in my work, I consider that this 
debate falls within the larger question about whether economic and noneconomic 
motivations work as complements or substitutes in prosocial behaviour (Bowles & 
Polania-Reyes, 2012). The discussion about intrinsic motivation and crowding-out effects 
complements to a large extent the debate about donors’ altruistic self-identity and its 
(negative) interaction with financial rewards. Ultimately, the existence of crowding-out 
effects suggests the people were unwilling to trade-off their altruistic identity for their 
financial self-interest. Whether this altruistic self-identity is based on ‘pure’ motives or an 
image motivation may be irrelevant because both can be internalised and thus, become part 
of donors’ motivational orientations 
Most research about the impact of different types of incentives on blood donation 
comes from observational studies. Sanchez and colleagues (2001) analysed the preferences 
of 7489 donors who responded to an anonymous mail survey. They estimated that offering 
blood credits and medical testing would lead – respectively - to 58% and 46% of donors to 
return. A gift of small value would only motivate 20% of donors. Younger donors reported 
a higher preference for incentives than older donors. Using a similar design, Glynn and co-
workers (2003) showed that the incentives most likely to encourage return among 45,588 
donors were blood credits (61%), cholesterol screening (61%), and prostate-specific 
antigen (PSA) screening (73% of men). Younger donors (≤25 years old) were 4 to 5 times 
more likely to report a willingness to donate if offered compensatory incentives (tickets to 
events, discounts or lottery and/or raffle tickets, gifts) than donors older than 55. About 
10% of all donors reported they would be discouraged to return if offered compensatory 
incentives. More recently, in a survey to 467 blood donors in an Italian town, Lacetera and 
Macis (2010) found that donors reported they would stop being donors if given 10 Euros in 
cash, but not if a voucher of the same nominal value was offered instead. 
However, these observational studies share a self-selection bias limitation because 
these results are strictly based on the answers of current donors. The study by Costa-i-Font 
and colleagues (Costa-i-Font et al, 2013) is an exception to this pattern. The authors 
analyzed the attitudes toward payment for blood in large representative samples of 15 
European countries and concluded that those in favour of paid donations were less likely to 
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have donated blood, while those favouring non-monetary rewards were more likely to be 
donors.  
Hence, research about the impact of different types of incentives has mostly 
discussed around financial versus nonfinancial incentives but is restricted to studies 
examining self-reported data. I will contribute to this discussion, also by comparing the 
effectiveness of financial versus nonfinancial incentives, but this time based on evidence 
from randomised controlled trials.  
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Meta-analysis does not provide a test of hypotheses strictus sensus; even though the meta-
analysis on quantity of blood only includes randomised controlled trials, by aggregating 
evidence and reporting summary effects, it provides estimates based on observed patterns. 
Thus, no causality can be drawn from its results. Nevertheless, a meta-analysis provides a 
full grasp of the empirical literature and quantifies behavioural regularities. 
Having acknowledged the boundaries of meta-analysis, I reinstate that a 
fundamental aim of this study is to test Titmuss’ hypotheses about blood donation. He 
proposed two main hypotheses: (1) financial incentives are economically inefficient and 
(2) financial incentives will decrease blood quality by attracting new at-risk donors and 
alienating voluntary healthy donors.  
I will operationalise hypothesis 1 taking the likelihood of donation as a proxy for 
economic efficiency. With respect to Titmuss’ prediction about blood quality, it may be 
difficult to assess if changes in blood quality are driven by an alienation of healthy 
volunteers and/or an increase of donors with poorer health. Thus, I will separate the two 
topics involved in his prediction. On one hand, I will compare the overall quality of the 
blood donated when incentives are present versus absent (hypothesis 2). On the other hand, 
Titmuss proposed that the income level of donors could determine their willingness to 
donate blood upon the offer of an incentive.  He anticipated that incentives could attract 
more deprived donors which would have a higher need to exchange blood for money. I 
operationalise this assumption as hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Financial incentives will not increase the quantity of blood donation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Financial incentives will decrease blood quality. 
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H3: Financial incentives will increase the quantity of blood donated by low income 
individuals. 
 
Research after Titmuss motivated the following hypotheses. On one hand, many 
scholars assuming the reality of the crowding-out hypothesis, proposed that nonmonetary 
incentives could avoid the adverse effects of financial rewards (Lacetera & Macis, 2010; 
Lacetera et al, 2013; Costa-i-Font et al, 2013). I propose hypothesis 4 to test the validity of 
this assumption. The same line of reasoning that proposes nonfinancial incentives as more 
effective than cash (Sass, 2013; Lacetera et al, 2013; Costa-i-Font et al, 2011) also 
proposes that incentives should be ‘symbolic’ (Lacetera & Macis, 2010b), which suggest 
low incentive sizes (hypothesis 5).    
 
H4: The quantity of blood donated will increase when donors are offered nonfinancial 
incentives but not when they are offered financial incentives. 
 
H5: The quantity of blood donated will be negatively related to incentive size. 
 
Interestingly, there has been no debate about how the characteristics of the 
incentive offer (type and size) influence the quality of the blood donation. This discussion 
has been circumscrite to the likelihood to donate blood.  I am also interested in analysing 
the same hypotheses 4 and 5 about the impact of type and size of incentive in the quality of 
the blood donated. 
Based in the psychological literature about motivational crowding-out, I also 
predict that people with low baseline levels of intrinsic motivation are expected to respond 
positively to the offer of an incentive (Deci et al, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1985). I take donor 
experience (first-time vs. previous donors) as a proxy for donor motivation (Promberger & 
Marteau, 2013). Thus, I predict that incentives will be effective to increase blood donation 
only in first-time donors i.e., with low baseline motivation levels. 
 
H6: Financial incentives will increase the quantity of blood donated for first-time donors 
but not previous donors. 
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3.4 Method 
The Cochrane Review handbook was used to guide the methods employed in this review 
(Higgins & Green, 2011) – although neither this review nor the next review (chapter 4) 
were registered with Cochrane Collaboration. 
 
3.4.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The inclusion criteria were (a) published studies in which participants in one group were 
offered an incentive for blood donation and in another group were not, and (b) that 
reported data on one or both of two outcomes: the proportion of people providing blood; 
and, the quality of the blood provided. Incentives were defined as a good or service with a 
monetary value offered in exchange for blood. These could be described as compensation 
for resources spent in donation (most usually time) or as an explicit motivator. Exchanges 
of little or no monetary value such as certificates, medals or badges were excluded. An 
inclusion criterion for studies to be included in meta-analysis was an experimental design 
i.e., observational studies were not included in meta-analysis, only included in a narrative 
review.   
 
3.4.2 Data sources and searches  
Initial electronic searches were performed in MEDLINE (1950 to December 2011), 
EMBASE (1980 to December 2011) and PsycINFO (1985 to December 2011) using OVID 
SP, and CINAHL (1982 to December 2011) via EBSCO. The search strategies used both 
keywords and medical subject headings (Appendix B). I also searched for relevant 
systematic reviews in the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL, the 
Cochrane Library, December 2011) as well as the OVID SP databases (1985 to December 
2011), EconLit via EBSCO (1996 to December 2011), JSTOR Health and General Science 
Collection (1886 to December 2011 in Economics) and Google, using terms related to 
incentives and blood donation (search strategy in Appendix 1). The search strategy was 
repeated in 2013 to identify more recent papers.  
  
3.4.3 Data extraction  
Two review authors pre-screened all search results (titles and abstracts) against the 
selection criteria for possible inclusion, and those selected by both review authors were 
subjected to a full-text assessment. Both authors independently assessed the selected full-
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text articles for inclusion, resolving any discrepancies by consensus. Variables of interest 
included study participants, study design, incentive, outcome measure and results. 
 
3.4.4 Data synthesis and analysis 
For the meta-analysis, the effect size is reported using odds ratios (OR), with an OR 
greater than one favouring the intervention group. Pooled effect sizes were obtained with 
95% confidence intervals using a random effects model. Study heterogeneity was 
examined with subgroup analyses but not random-effects meta-regression due to the small 
final sample size. Data analysis was performed using the Cochrane RevMan 5.1 software 
for meta-analyses.  
 
3.4.5 Assessment of Risk of Bias 
Risk of bias was assessed by two authors in accordance with the guidelines of the 
Cochrane Consumers and Communication Review Group (Higgins & Green, 2011) which 
recommends the explicit reporting of individual elements that affect risk of bias, including: 
1. Sequence generation: classified as adequate if carried out using true randomization and 
not quasi-randomization, such as by day of week, date of birth or sequence; 
2. Allocation concealment: classified as adequate if allocation is concealed from the 
purveyor of risk information, researchers and the participant at least until the point of 
allocation to groups; 
3. Blinding: classified as adequate if participants, personnel and outcome assessors are 
blind to allocation.  
4. Incomplete outcome data: classified as adequate if attrition data are clearly reported and 
there is no evidence of differential drop out in the intervention and control groups; 
5. Selective outcome reporting: classified as adequate if data are provided for all outcomes 
specified in the study protocol, or where this may be unavailable, in the methods section;  
6. Other sources of bias, including baseline comparability: classified as adequate if groups 
are comparable at baseline or any differences at baseline are adjusted for in the primary 
analysis; and validation of measures, classified as adequate if there is evidence of 
reliability and validity reported in the study or published elsewhere. 
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3.5 Results 
The initial search yielded 1100 abstracts, which resulted in 89 full papers being assessed 
for eligibility (Figure 3.1). The large number of papers excluded at the screening stage was 
mostly due to the retrieval of clinical trials that assessed quality of blood donated but not 
based on the offer of incentives.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 PRISMA flow chart for blood donation review 
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65 
 
Seven papers, reporting eight experimental studies (Goette et al, 2009 presented 
two studies in the same paper), met the eligibility criteria for the meta-analysis. These 
papers were mostly about the quantity of blood donated. With respect to the quality of the 
blood donated, 13 observational studies were included but for which only a narrative 
appraisal will be performed.  
 
3.5.1 Quantity of blood donation 
The included studies assessed the impact on the likelihood of donating following the offer 
of a financial incentive. There are seven papers (Table 3.1) with data about quantity of 
blood donated included in eight experiments – a paper presented two experiments (Goette 
et al, 2009). However, it was only possible to pool data for the meta-analysis from six of 
the eight studies. Two studies did not report data in a form that could be extracted for 
meta-analysis (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Goette et al, 2009 Study 2). Requests to the authors 
for the data in an extractable form were unsuccessful.   
 Of the six experiments included in the meta-analysis, three were conducted in the 
US, one in Switzerland, one in Sweden, and the other in Argentina. Two involved strictly 
previous donors, two involved strictly first-time donors, one comprised both types of 
donors and the last one did not specify this information. The incentives offered were varied 
from coupons for entertainment events (Ferrari et al (1985), a t-shirt (Reich et al, 2006), 
cash (Mellström & Johannesson, 2008), free cholesterol test (Goette et al Study 1), 
nonspecific gift cards (Lacetera et al, 2012) and supermarket vouchers (Iajya et al, 2013). 
The value of the incentives was not always specified but is estimated between $3 and $23. 
These six studies involved 93,328 participants with an age range from under 20 to 65. The 
gender mix amongst participants ranged from 39% to 60% women.   
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Authors Country Participants & Setting Type of donor Groups 
Control Group Incentive Group 
Ferrari et al 
(1985) 
US Posters and bulletins posted 
around a US University 
campus with announcement 
about time and place of blood 
donation 
 
Both first-time 
and previous 
donors 
n=31  
Peer altruism Students 
were informed that 
their peers would be 
donating blood 
n=49 
Offer of coupons redeemable 
at local merchants for free or 
reduced-price merchandise 
and a raffle (tickets to 
Broadway play, college 
football game) 
Reich et al 
(2006)  
US Blood Centres in San 
Francisco and Arizona; 
Outcome second and third 
donations of first-time donors 
within 6 months 
Previous donors n=3,441 n=3,478 
Offer of a t-shirt 
Mellström & 
Johannesson 
(2008) 
Sweden Regional Blood Centre 
Gothenburg Sweden; Primary 
outcome health check for 
blood donation 
First-time donors n=89  n=85 
Offer of $7 
 
n=88 
Choice between $7 and 
donation to charity  
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Goette & 
Stutzer
2
 
(2008) 
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation 
Service of the Swiss Red 
Cross; individuals registered 
in the database invited to 
donate blood again  
 
Previous donors n=2,950 n=4,431 
Offer of a free cholesterol test 
 
n=1205 
Offer of a lottery ticket from 
Swiss State Lottery 
Goette et al 
(2009) Study 
1 
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation 
Service of the Swiss Red 
Cross  
 
First-time donors n=725 n=1,400 
Offer of a free cholesterol test  
Goette et al 
(2009) Study 
2
2
 
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation 
Service of the Swiss Red 
Cross 8269 previous donors  
 
Previous donors n=1,968 n=3,812 
Offer of a free cholesterol test 
Lacetera et al 
(2012) 
US The American Red Cross 
(ARC) conducted 14,029 
blood drives in US northern 
Ohio between May 2006 and 
October 2008 
Previous donors $5 N=10,846 
$10 N=12,515 
$15 N=12,607 
 
Total N=35,968 
$5 N=17,847 
$10 N=15,849 
$15 N=12,738 
 
Total N=46,434 
                                                 
2
 Papers shaded in red were not included in the meta-analysis because the authors did not provide the raw data of the studies 
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 The different amounts refer to 
gift cards redeemable for 
food, gasoline and general 
merchandise. 
Iajya et al 
(2013) 
Argentina 18500 individuals randomly 
selected from electoral lists 
under 65 years old 
Unclear N=2360 $5 N=2253 
$14 N=2336 
$23 N=3264 
 
Supermarket vouchers 
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Three experiments tested more than one incentive in the same study (Mellström & 
Johannesson, 2008; Lacetera et al,  2012; Ijaya et al, 2013).  As these observations are 
not independent, the results from only one incentive condition per study are included in 
the meta-analysis. For Mellström and Johannesson (2008) we include the results from 
the offer of the fixed incentive (and not the offer of a choice between an incentive and a 
donation to charity), thus making the intervention more comparable to other 
interventions in the review. In Lacetera et al (2012), three sizes of incentive were 
offered ($5, $10, $15). Similarly, Iajya and colleagues (2013) tested the impact of 
supermarket vouchers valued $5, $14 and $23.  I report the results from different meta-
analyses using the lowest, medium and highest values from each study. But I only 
present the meta-analysis forest plot (Figure 3.2) using the highest incentive because it 
provided the more conservative estimate. 
In Lacetera et al (2012) I could not access the raw data for the control group (no 
incentive). However, the authors had data from blood drives in which donors were not 
informed that gift cards would be offered upon donation – designated ‘surprise’ drives.  
Thus, I use data from these drives as a control because participants were unaware that 
there was a reward and, therefore, their behaviour cannot be attributed to the incentive. 
Two of the studies presented in Table 3.1 were cluster randomised trials, in 
which different incentive were offered in different blood drives (Goette & Stutzer, 
2008; Lacetera et al, 2012). Given that the former was excluded for the lack of access to 
raw data, only the latter was adjusted for its cluster randomization. The odd ratio was 
adjusted through the ratio estimator approach by Rao and Scott (1992 in Donner & Klar, 
2002). This simple approach requires that the observed sample frequencies (counts) in a 
given study be divided by the estimated design effect, after which standard statistical 
methods may then be applied as usual to the adjusted data. The study did not provide 
information about its estimated design effect so this was calculated following Donner 
and Klar (2002): for trials randomizing clusters of average size m to two or more 
intervention groups, this factor can be estimated approximately by 1+(m−1)ρ, where ρ 
is the sample estimate of the intracluster correlation coefficient (ICC). ICC was set at 
.05 assuming similarity between the clusters (blood drives) randomised in the studies. 
The raw data for Lacetera et al (2012) is shown at the bottom of Figure 3.2. For each 
incentive value, the overall sample size was divided by the number of blood drives in 
which that specific incentive was offered, providing the estimate for m, the average size 
of each cluster. The adjusted raw data is presented at the top of Figure 3.2. 
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In the six studies included in the meta-analysis (Figure 3.2), the likelihood of 
blood donation did not change with the offer of an incentive (OR=1.54 p=.19). This 
estimate is based on using the highest incentive value from both Lacetera et al (2012) 
and Iajya et al (2013), $15 and $23 respectively. Results are not altered by including 
any of the other incentive sizes from Lacetera et al (2012): $5 (OR=1.22 95% CI 0.91-
1.63 p=.19), $10 (OR=1.33 95% CI 0.94-1.89 p=.11) and from Iajya et al (2013): $5 
(OR=1.02 95% CI 0.11-1.23 p=.59), $14 (OR=1.13 95% CI 0.14-1.39 p=.31).  
There was evidence of between-study heterogeneity (I2=72% χ2=18.04 p=.003). 
There was no sign of a small-study effects (Egger’s test=1.51 p=.132) and Begg’s test 
for publication bias was not significant (z=.98 p=.327). Study estimates show no pattern 
by publication year. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Impact of financial incentives upon likelihood of providing blood [note: only 
data from one subgroup ($15) in Lacetera et al (2012) and one subgroup ($23) from 
Iajya et al, 2013) are entered into this meta-analysis]  
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 However, results from Ferrari et al (1985) and Mellstrom and Jonhassen (2008) 
(1) are susceptible to self-selection bias because the participants in these studies were 
not randomly recruited and (2) have very small sample sizes. These methodological 
limitations have been raised as explanations for the lack of evidence for a positive 
impact of incentives in blood donation (Lacetera et al, 2013). Nevertheless, even after 
removing these two studies from the analysis and keeping only the studies with 
adequate randomisation and large sample sizes, the overall estimate remains unchanged 
(OR=1.85 p=.26) (Figure 3.3). This estimate does not change if the incentive sizes from 
Lacetera et al (2012) and Iajya et al (2013) in the analysis are low (OR=.09 p=.93) or 
medium (OR=.91 p=.36).      
 
 
Figure 3.3 Impact of financial incentives upon likelihood of providing blood for high 
quality studies [note: only the highest subgroup ($15) in Lacetera et al (2012) and in 
Iajya et al (2013) ($23) are entered into this meta-analysis]  
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In both studies that could not be included in the meta-analysis, individuals in the 
experimental groups were offered a free cholesterol test as an incentive which had no 
impact on the likelihood of providing blood in either study (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; 
Goette et al., 2009 Study 2). In one study (Goette et al., 2009) a lottery was offered to a 
second experimental group. This had no main effect but amongst donors with a previous 
low rate of donation, it increased the likelihood of donation (by an estimated 9%), with 
no impact on those with previously high rates of donation.  
Taken together, these results support hypothesis 1, stating that financial 
incentives will not increase blood donation.  
Hypothesis 2 will be tested in the next section (about blood quality) and there 
was no information about the income level of donors and thus hypothesis 3 could not 
be tested.  
The number of included studies was too small to perform meta-regression 
analysis to test the remaining hypotheses. Nevetheless, I present data from subgroup 
analyses that shed light on the hypotheses proposed for this study. These estimates, 
however, are interpreted mostly as tendencies.  
Based on very small subgroup analyses, none of the incentive types seemed to 
be effective: cash OR=1.14 p=.67 95% CI .63-2.07 (n=1), vouchers OR=2.13 p=.11 
95% CI .85-5.31 (n=3) and gifts OR=.99 p=.92 95% CI .89-1.12 (n=2). Hypothesis 2 
proposed that the quantity of blood donated is higher when nonfinancial (but not 
financial) incentives are offered. Hypothesis 4 cannot be supported. 
Small incentives valued <=$5 ($3 Reich et al, 2006; Lacetera et al $5; Iajya et al 
$5) did not significantly increase blood donation (OR=0.99 95% CI 0.88-1.11 p=.87) 
and neither did medium size incentives valued ]$5, $15[ (OR=1.27 95% CI 0.45-3.60 
p=.65 including $7 Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008; Lacetera et al $10; Goette et al, 
2009 $13 and Iajya et al, 2013 $14). But also taking strictly the two experimental 
groups using higher incentives (Lacetera et al, 2012 $15 and Iajya et al, 2013 $23) the 
estimate is still not significant (OR=5.44 95% CI 0.39-75.67 p=.21). Hypothesis 5 
testing a preference for low incentives is not supported.  
Further subgroup analyses similarly showed no difference when participants 
were first-time donors (OR=1.16 p=.58) or when they were previous donors (OR=1.06 
p=.57). Hypothesis 6 is also not supported: incentives do not have a differential 
impact according to donors’ experience. 
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3.5.2 Assessment of risk of bias 
Table 3.2 presents the assessment of risk of bias for included experimental studies 
examining quantity of blood donated. The pattern of findings suggests a moderate risk 
of bias from a failure in any study to specify methods of randomization, and those 
assessing outcomes not being blind to group allocation. Nevertheless, I show that my 
result holds even when restricting the analysis to higher quality studies (Figure 3.3). All 
studies had adequate presentation of outcome data. Two studies were excluded from 
meta-analysis because they did not present their outcome data in a format that could be 
used to extract information for meta-analysis (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Goette et al, 
2009 Study 2) but the reporting of the data in each of these paper was properly 
presented. There was no evidence of selective reporting or other noticeable sources of 
bias.  
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Study Sequence generation Allocation 
concealment 
Blinding Incomplete 
outcome 
data 
Selective 
reporting 
Other sources of bias 
Ferrari et al 
(1985) 
Unclear -  
“10 female volunteers 
were instructed to 
randomly use one of 
two strategies” p.792 
Researchers 
aware of 
allocation to 
groups 
Only 
participants 
blind to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate “no difference existed 
between (…) conditions in sex and 
donation history” 
Reich et al 
(2006)  
Unclear - “each donor 
had an equal chance of 
being randomized into 
groups” p.1091 
Recruitment 
staff aware of 
allocation to 
groups 
Only 
participants 
blind to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate No baseline comparison 
Mellström 
& 
Johannesso
n (2008) 
Unclear – “participants 
were randomly 
allocated into three 
groups” p.848 
Unclear Unclear -  
participants 
blinded to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate 
Goette & 
Stutzer 
(2008) 
Quasi - cluster 
randomization per 
donation center and per 
day of week 
Adequate 
Allocation 
concealed to 
staff and 
Adequate 
Staff and  
participants 
blinded to 
Adequate Adequate Adequate control of baseline 
differences 
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participants allocation 
Goette et al 
(2009) 
Study 1 
Unclear – “treatments 
were randomly assigned 
to mail orders” p.527 
Unclear Participants 
blinded to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate control of baseline 
differences 
Goette et al 
(2009) 
Study 2 
Unclear – “randomly 
invited” p.527 
Unclear Participants 
blinded to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate control of baseline 
differences 
Lacetera et 
al (2012) 
Unclear – “randomly 
selected”p.17 
Researchers 
aware of 
allocation, 
unclear staff 
Participants 
blinded to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate control of baseline 
differences 
Iajya et al 
(2013) 
Adequate - Random 
numbers  
Unclear Participants 
blinded to 
allocation 
Adequate Adequate Adequate 
Table 3.2 Assessment of risk of bias for blood donation studies 
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3.5.3 Quality of blood donation 
Two experimental studies assessed the impact of offering financial incentives to 
existing donors upon the quality of blood provided as indicated by the rejection rate or 
donors deferred from donating (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Lacetera et al., 2012).  Lacetera 
et al (2012) reported that incentives (gift cards) did not change the proportion of 
rejected donations. The coefficient estimate for an adverse effect on quality was 
statistically significant for the $10 incentive but not for the $5 and $15. Goette & 
Stutzer (2008) found no effect on quality of donations following the offer of a lottery 
ticket but the offer of a cholesterol test increased the proportion of donations rejected 
(β=0.011 p<.05). 
In the category of observational studies, 12 descriptive studies presenting 13 
data sets were found (Table 3.3), comprising a total of 454,653 participants. Two 
reviews which specifically evaluated the risk of transfusion-transmitted infection by the 
introduction of financial incentives were the sources of most studies (Eastlund 1998; 
van der Poel, Seifried et al. 2002). Both reviews report a higher prevalence of lower 
quality blood i.e., higher infection rates in blood from paid donors. My search strategy 
identified an additional seven studies eligible for this review (Table 3.3; the papers 
published after 2001). Of these, two studies using Nigerian blood providers (Ejele, 
Nwauche et al. 2005; Erhabor, Ok et al. 2007) could not be retrieved and were therefore 
excluded from the review.  
I will not perform a meta-analysis using these studies for several reasons. 
Firstly, the observational research design of these studies may lead to spurious results. 
Secondly, the units of observation differ. Some studies report outcomes by number of 
individuals whereas others report outcome by units of blood. Because each individual is 
able to provide more than one unit of blood, unit measures may reflect higher infection 
rates. Lastly, these observational studies examining the quality of the blood donated are 
neither specific about features of the incentives offered (type of size) nor about the 
characteristics of the patients. In the words of van der Poel and colleagues (2002): 
“definitions of paid and unpaid donors have often been disputed. However, for the sake 
of this assessment (...) it is feasible to compare the categories just as given by the 
authors of the studies, acknowledging that some difference in remuneration of the two 
donor categories must have been present (...) the population categories compared are 
simply refereed to as paid or unpaid” (p. 288).  
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    % of poor quality blood 
Study Country n Sample Type Incentive Group No incentive Group 
Jeremiah et al. (2008) Nigeria 300 people 6.35 [12/189] 2.7 [3/111] 
Kalibatas (2008) – A Lithuania 25,469 units 4.86 [705/14,496] 2.74 [301/10,973] 
Kalibatas (2008) – B Lithuania 71,057 units 0.21 [132/62,398] 0.07 [6/8,659] 
Erhabor et al. (2006) Nigeria 1,500 people 0.77 [5/651] 0.24 [2/849] 
Kretschmer et al(2004) Germany 265,757 units 0.001 [2/179,426] 0.02 [15/86,331] 
Durosinmi et al (2003) Nigeria 16,080 units 2.1 [315/15,007] 0.28 [3/1,073] 
Strauss (2001) USA 51,847 units 0.07 [17/23975] 0.31 [86/27872] 
Dille et al (1997) USA 236 people 60 [30/50] 6.45 [12/186] 
Jha et al (1995) India 594 people 51.03 [99/194] 0 [0/400] 
Wu et al (1995) China 120 people 35 [28/80] 2.5 [1/40] 
Strauss (1994) USA 2,157 people 3.71 [46/1240] 6.98 [64/917] 
Dawson (1991) USA 9,836 Specimen 10.49 [390/3,718] 0.8 [49/6118] 
Singh et al (1990) India 9,700 units 0.24 [4/1700] 0 [0/8000] 
 
Table 3.3 Included observational studies for blood donation 
78 
 
 
 
Thus, it is not possible to perform subgroup analyses to test the corresponding 
hypothesis 4 and 5 with respect to blood quality.  
Making a qualitative appraisal of these studies, it is possible to identify that 
incentives could be given conditionally on blood quality or be unrelated to the quality of 
the blood provided. Three papers reported evidence on incentives being offered 
contingent on quality (Kretschmer et al, 2004; Strauss et al, 1994; Strauss, 2001) and 
suggest that financial incentives positively influenced blood quality while all other 
papers – in which incentives were offered regardless of quality – report mostly an 
adverse effect of incentives on the quality of the blood collected. This assessment is 
consistent with the reviews by van der Poel et al. (2002) and Eastlund (1998): offering 
financial incentives for blood decreases the quality of the blood supplied unless 
payments are contingent upon blood quality. The qualitative assessment of these 
observational studies in combination with the results from the two experimental studies 
that provided evidence on this matter (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Lacetera et al., 2012 
partially support hypothesis 2. Financial incentives seem to increase the likelihood to 
attract poorer quality blood.   
The only evidence about incentive type in the quality of the blood provided is 
based on a survey to blood donors. Sanchez et al. (2001) surveyed 7489 donors using an 
anonymous mail survey that inquired about demographics, donation history, infectious 
disease risks, and the potential appeal of incentives. The authors showed that donors 
attracted by cash were 60 percent more likely to have a risk for transfusion-
transmissible infections (p = 0.03), higher than individuals attracted by tickets to events 
or extra time off work. 
No assessment of risk of bias will be performed for the observational studies 
included in this section. Most tools for quality assessment for observational studies 
(Sanderson et al, 2007) stress the importance of detailed inclusion criteria and 
appropriate source population i.e., precise definition of patient characteristics. Given 
that the studies included are poor in the description of donors and are vague in the 
definition of paid versus unpaid donors, I consider this evidence as strictly exploratory 
and suggestive of the effects of incentives in the quality of the blood donated.   
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3.6 Discussion 
In a recent influential paper in Science, Lacetera and colleagues (2013) claim that “in 
light of the recent evidence, it is time to re-examine policy guidelines for increasing and 
smoothing blood supply, including whether incentives can play a role (...) debates on 
ethical issues around giving rewards for donations should be encouraged. But there 
should be little debate that the most relevant empirical evidence shows positive effects 
of offering economic rewards on donations” (p.928). This bold claim is based on the 
author’s personal narrative appraisal of the literature and their own work, particularly 
two field studies (Lacetera et al, 2012; Iajya et al, 2013).   
 However, from the studies that met the eligibility criteria, I found no impact of 
offering financial incentives on the quantity of blood given. Offering tangible patient 
financial incentives does not increase the likelihood to donate blood. And this estimate 
remains unchanged if only high quality studies are included. Therefore, financial 
incentives are economically inefficient – supporting one of Titmuss main assumptions. 
This null effect offers no support for motivational crowding-out if operationalised as a 
lower blood supply when incentives are offered.  
 The studies were heterogeneous both in terms of the interventions and the 
populations studied. The incentives offered included t-shirts, cholesterol tests, money, 
gift cards, lottery tickets and their value varied from $3 to $23, studied in populations 
from different countries. However, the overall estimate was robust to several sensitivity 
analyses – incentive size and study quality. 
The small number of included studies limited the meaningfulness of subgroup 
analyses to explore the impact of several potential effect modifiers. My results cannot 
be taken as solid evidence for the lack of differential impact between financial and 
nonfinancial incentives. Survey studies (e.g., Costa-i-Font et al., 2013; Lacetera & 
Macis, 2010a) suggested that non-monetary incentives could be more effective than 
monetary payments to increase blood donation by avoiding crowding-out effects. 
Further research is needed to examine the behavioural effects of financial versus 
financial incentives in actual blood donation rates. 
It could be argued that the size of the incentives offered was not sufficient to 
motivate behaviour. Lacetera et al (2012, 2013) defend that higher incentives could be 
effective to increase the likelihood to donate blood and endorse that their two field 
studies demonstrate this effect. However, my results showed that incentives of low 
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(=<$5), medium (>$5+;$15) and high value ($15+) were equally nonsignificant in 
increasing blood donations.  
A closer look at the papers by Lacetera and colleagues shows their claim is 
incorrect. When adjusting Lacetera et al (2012) estimates for the cluster nature of the 
studies, no incentive size (including the higher value of $15) is significant. In their 2013 
study (Iajya et al, 2013) there was in fact a tendency for higher incentives reaching 
significance. Nevertheless, I argue that this propensity should not be taken as a sign that 
financial incentives work to promote blood donation.  
Iajya et al (2013) mentioned that Argentina has an average of 12.4 donations per 
1000 persons (9 per 1000 in the specific region of the study) which are below the 38 per 
1000 persons in developed countries (p. 215). But these authors actually report worse 
outcomes in their study: a donation rate of 5 donations per 1000 under the offer of $14 
voucher and 11 donations per 1000 under the offer of a $23 voucher. The donation rate 
changed from 0% (in the control group and $5 voucher) to 0.4% with the offer of a $14 
voucher and 0.8% with the offer of a $23 voucher. Statistical significance should not 
override discussions about the meaningfulness of the differences found. Stutzer et al 
(2011) developed a nonfinancial intervention prompting students to make an active 
decision about blood donation and reported a 7.6% increase in the donation rate – far 
above the 0.8% donation rate with a $23 voucher. The effect of higher incentives may 
have been significant but reflect negligible increases.  
The available studies did not provide information about the income level of 
donors and because of this limitation in research, hypothesis 3 could not be tested. It 
remains unclear if low income patients are more likely to be attracted by financial 
incentives.  
Previous blood donation experience is also commonly mentioned as a possible 
effect modifier of the impact of incentives but my limited subgroup analysis showed no 
differences between first-time and previous donors.   
 With respect to blood quality, only two experimental studies met the inclusion 
criteria. One study reported no impact of a gift card on the quality of blood provided. 
The other study reported poorer quality donations when the incentive offered was a 
medical test but not when the incentive was a lottery ticket. The included observational 
studies suggest that offering financial incentives for blood increases the chances of 
transfusion-transmissible infections unless payments are contingent upon blood quality. 
I consider these results a partial support for Titmuss’ hypothesis about the impact of 
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incentive in blood quality. Detrimental effects in the quality of the blood donated were 
Titmuss’ main apprehension about offering incentives and a synthesis of the available 
evidence suggests this may be a valid concern – unless quality control is explicitly 
imposed.  
 The strength of this review is that it is the first to our knowledge that attempts to 
examine the evidence for Titmuss’ influential hypotheses concerning the adverse effects 
of using incentives to encourage blood donation. I have revealed the paucity of 
experimental evidence, as well as different conclusions to earlier, unsystematic reviews. 
In contrast to the narrative review by Goette et al (2010), the results of my meta-
analysis do not corroborate their conclusions that incentives increase blood donation. 
And using a more systematic methodological approach than Godin et al (2012), my 
review identified a larger number of studies, which allowed drawing more reliable 
conclusions about the non-significant effect of incentives.   
   
3.6.1 Limitations 
The main limitations of this work are related to the shortage of reliable evidence. To 
evaluate the quantity of blood donation, the analysis was restricted to six individual 
estimates (only four from higher quality studies). Some methodological limitations and 
their consequent risk of bias in the included studies should to be taken into account 
when drawing any conclusions from this review. The assessment of risk of bias 
suggested a moderate risk from lack of detail both in the methods of randomization, and 
blindness of outcome assessors to group allocation. All studies were powered to detect 
small effects of incentives with the exception of Ferrari et al (1985) and Mellström and 
Johannesson (2008) – the studies removed from the sensitivity analysis using only high 
quality studies. But despite these limitations, there is some degree of confidence in the 
result about the likelihood to donate blood: performing the analysis strictly with higher 
quality studies did not change the result, which suggests that the overall estimate is 
reliable. 
For the quality of blood donated, the number of individual studies was superior 
but the reliability of the evidence was weaker. The heterogeneity of the observational 
studies mixing estimates for donor and units of blood as well as the poor definition of 
inclusion criteria are also limitations of this review. 
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3.6.2 Implications for practice and research 
I found support for Titmuss’s hypothesis that incentives are economically inefficient: 
offering incentives did not increase the quantity of the blood donated and introduced 
additional costs. The fact that incentives had no impact on the quantity of blood is one 
reason against its use in practice. Titmuss’ concerns about blood quality were mostly 
related to first-time donors and how the offer of incentives could decrease blood quality 
by attracting more at-risk donors. The two experimental studies that reported on blood 
quality both involved previous donors, thus providing at best a partial test of this 
hypothesis. The observational studies provided no information on the experience of the 
blood donors involved. 
 I found no support for a motivational crowding-out effect, operationalised as a 
decrease in blood supply in the presence of incentives. It remains unknown, however, 
whether incentives had some crowding out effect on who donated rather than how many 
donated. For example, incentives may have alienated voluntary donors and attracted 
new, incentive-driven donors without affecting the overall number of donors.  
Moreover, no studies were found that assessed the impact of incentives upon 
subsequent likelihood of donating when incentives were no longer offered – following 
the psychological tradition of crowding-out measurement. But the long-term effects of 
financial incentives in the behaviour of blood donors and negative externalities from 
incentivising blood donation in social behaviour should also be examined – because 
these were the main crowding-out effects feared by Titmuss.  
   
 
 
 
  
83 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Incentives to Comply with Health Care: A Review 
 
I conducted a comprehensive systematic review and the first meta-analysis of 
experimental studies offering financial incentives to increase health compliance. 
Included under the concept of health care compliance are appointment keeping, 
adherence to medical treatment (including medication), cancer screening, TB screening, 
STI screening and immunisation.  
Electronic and hand searches were performed in the main databases from inception to 
2013. Eighty five papers were included in the qualitative review and 20 randomized 
controlled trials (N=151,875) met the inclusion criteria for the meta-analysis. 
Financial incentives increase health care compliance (OR=3.06 CI 95% 2.04-4.57; 
OR=1.42 95% CI 1.13-1.79 just considering high quality studies) but between-study 
heterogeneity was high. Contrary to expectation, the characteristics of the incentive 
schemes had no significant effect. No significant impact was found for the type of 
incentive, the incentive size or the timing at which the incentive was delivered. 
Heterogeneity was mostly explained by the different health context in which incentives 
are used. The only significant effect modifier other than the health context was the 
socioeconomic status of patients: the offer of an incentive increased the likelihood of 
compliance in 2.5 times in low income individuals compared to less deprived people. 
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4.1 Compliance with episodic health care: A gap in incentive research 
Both chapter 3 (on blood donation) and chapter 4 (this chapter on compliance) comprise 
the secondary data analyses of my thesis, allowing for the concomitant test of several 
hypotheses about financial incentives in health behaviour. The previous systematic 
review and meta-analysis for blood donation showed that incentives did not 
significantly increase donation rates. Several sensitivity analyses corroborated the 
robustness of this conclusion but subgroup analyses for hypotheses related to incentive 
type and patient characteristics were based on a very small number of papers and were, 
therefore, less conclusive. This current review on compliance with health care includes 
a larger pool of studies (85 papers for the systematic review and 20 in the meta-
analysis) and will enable a more rigorous test of some hypotheses about incentive 
features.  
As previously discussed in earlier chapters, my analysis of health care 
compliance includes several ‘discrete event’ or time-limited health behaviours: cancer 
screening, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) screening, tuberculosis (TB) screening, 
immunisation, attending medical appointments and treatment adherence (medication or 
other). Despite the variety in health settings, performing these behaviours imply 
enduring an immediate present cost (e.g. waiting time, side-effects, anxiety with test 
results) to increase the likelihood of future benefits (e.g. better health, longer life 
expectancy). Abstinence from smoking and drug use, exercise or healthy eating habits 
are also important health guidelines but are more habitual behaviours which imply the 
withdrawal of immediate rewards to achieve future benefits – raising the question that 
incentives may have a substantial different impact in these contexts and may not be 
directly comparable. Moreover, research has been more prolific in the analysis of these 
lifestyle habitual behaviours (Charness & Rabin, 2009) which highlights the greater 
need to draw attention to these one-shot or short-term health behaviours. Patient 
noncompliance in these settings also entails significant detrimental effects to personal 
health and overall health expenditure (Carlsen et al, 2011; Neumman, 2012)   
 This work will contribute to the literature by quantifying the impact of patient 
financial incentives to promote compliance with health care. The only meta-analysis 
with a pooled estimate was performed in the area of drug abstinence with clinical 
patients (Lussier et al, 2006), reporting a strong positive effect. Yet this evidence is still 
not conclusive to inform if financial incentives are effective for the general (nonclinical) 
population or across a wider range of health behaviours. Despite the growing use of 
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financial incentives in practice to increase low compliance rates, no research has 
examined the effectiveness of such interventions and so far there is no information 
about possible effect modifiers per type of incentive and patient characteristics. I tackle 
this research gap providing meta-analysis and meta-regression estimates for the impact 
of financial incentives to promote compliance with health care in the general 
population. 
Several previous systematic reviews have been performed (Table 4.1). However, 
most reviews that analysed the use of explicit financial incentives in health were general 
reviews about health interventions, of which incentives were one of the strategies. These 
global reviews were mostly analysing the effects of incentives in treatment adherence 
(Volmink & Garner, 1997; McDonald et al, 2002; Haynes et al, 2002; Schroeder et al, 
2004; Welch & Thomas-Hawkins, 2005; Bosh-Capblanch et al, 2008) and one about 
cancer screening (Marcus & Crane, 1998). Two of these reviews produced quantitative 
estimates about the impact of different health interventions (Roter et al, 1998; Stone et 
al, 2002) but not specifically about incentives.    
  Exclusively about the impact of financial incentives, there are six reviews 
(Giuffrida & Torgerson, 1997; Kane et al, 2004; Lussier et al, 2006; Jochelson, 2007; 
Sutherland et al, 2008; Michalcuzk & Mitchell, 2009). These are narrative reviews (with 
the exception of Lussier et al, 2006) and only provided qualitative accounts of the effect 
of incentives, all suggesting a positive impact. Kane and colleagues (2004) concluded 
that incentives are effective to change ‘simple’ behaviours like attending medical 
appointments or immunisation but to a lesser extent more ‘complex’ life-style 
behaviours such as increasing exercise frequency, smoking cessation or drug abstinence. 
In this work, I am restricting the analysis to what Kane calls ‘simple’ behaviours and 
thus I hypothesise that incentives will have a significant positive impact.  
These authors (Kane te al, 2004) also reported a frequency analysis in which 
negative incentives (e.g., sanctions) were effective in 90% of the cases, vouchers 80%, 
cash 73%, free medical charges 67%, lotteries 60% and gifts 57%. This suggests that 
penalties are more effective than rewards and, within rewards, vouchers and cash are the 
most effective incentives. According to them, free medical charges are effective in 
about two thirds of the cases – but as I will show next, these are the most frequent 
incentives used in the literature.  
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          Type of Incentive  
Type of review Type of analysis Search strategy           Cash-based Goods-based 
          Cash Lottery Copay Gift Voucher Lottery 
Giuffrida & Torgerson (1997) √ √  √ √ √ Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Volmink & Garner (1997) √      Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Roter et al (1998) √ √     Not Cochrane Meta-analysis Not systematic 
Marcus & Crane (1998) √      Not Cochrane Narrative Not systematic 
McDonald et al (2002) √    √  Not Cochrane Narrative Not systematic 
Haynes et al (2002) √      Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Stone et al (2002) √  √    Not Cochrane Meta-analysis Systematic 
Kane et al (2004) √ √  √ √ √ Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Schroeder et al (2004) √      Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Welch  & Thomas-Hawkins (2005) √    √  Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Lussier et al (2006) √   √ √  Not Cochrane Meta-analysis Systematic 
Jochelson (2007)  √  √ √  Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Bosh-Capblanch et al (2008) √      Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Sutherland et al (2008) √ √  √ √  Not Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Michalcuzk & Mitchell (2009) √      Cochrane Narrative Systematic 
Table 4.1 Summary of systematic reviews and meta-analyses including the analysis of patient financial incentives 
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The few randomised controlled trials that tested the impact of different 
incentives have only focused the comparison of cash versus vouchers of an equal value 
(Deren et al, 1994; Kamb et al, 1998; Malotte et al, 1999; 2004; Tulsky et al, 2004; 
Vandrey et al, 2007). In all these cases, cash was more effective than vouchers in 
promoting compliance. Mallote and colleagues (1999) compared $10 cash, $10 fast 
food voucher and $10 grocery voucher and showed that cash was significantly more 
effective than either voucher type. All these field studies suggest a discrepancy with the 
review from Kane et al (2004). Promberger and colleagues (2012) showed that grocery 
vouchers were more acceptable than cash or vouchers for luxury items (about a 20% 
difference) but behavioural data from past field studies (Deren et al, 1994; Kamb et al, 
1998; Malotte et al, 1999; 2004; Tulsky et al, 2004; Vandrey et al, 2007) does not seem 
to support these self-reported preferences.  
Lussier and colleagues (2006) produced the only piece of evidence quantifying 
the effect size of patient financial incentives. The estimated average effect size from 30 
studies was 0.32 (95% CI 0.26–0.38). By target behaviour, their results showed that 
incentives targeting attendance produced average effect sizes of 0.15 (95% CI 0.02–
0.28), while those that targeting medication compliance produced an average effect of 
0.32 (95% CI 0.15–0.47). However, this meta-analysis was restricted to substance abuse 
patients and it is not unequivocal if incentives would have the same effect in the 
different one-shot health behaviours I am analysing.  
Moreover, these authors (Lussier et al, 2006) also showed that more immediate 
voucher delivery and greater monetary value of the voucher were associated with larger 
behavioural changes. Again, it is not clear if these results hold in the particular health 
behaviours examined in this work. About the delivery schedule (immediate versus 
delayed) of the incentive, there is no additional evidence apart from Lussier et al (2006). 
With respect to the value of incentive, there is a single study testing the impact of 
different incentive sizes for STI screening. Mallote et al (1998) compared the offer of 
$5 cash versus $10 cash but showed no significant difference between the incentives. 
Notwithstanding the included health settings sharing the common underlying 
feature of immediate costs, different barriers to compliance have been reported for each 
context (Table 4.2). This diversity in barriers can help to understand potentially 
different impacts of incentives per health care contexts – regardless of my prediction of 
an overall significant positive impact (H1 below). 
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Context Main Barriers to Compliance 
Appointment keeping Memory lapses; competing activities  
(Stubbs et al. 2012; Parikh et al. 2010) 
Medication/ Treatment 
adherence 
Complexity of medication schedule; Pain and side-effects; 
Memory lapses 
(Campbell et al. 2012) 
Cancer screening Lack of screening recommendation or health insurance; 
Anxiety and fear of screening results 
(Weller et al. 2009;  Guessous et al. 2010); 
TB screening Low of perceived risk; high social deprivation and low 
socioeconomic status of more at-risk individuals 
Tulsky et al (2000; 2004)  
STI screening Stigma and embarrassment; fear of sexual partners’ reaction 
(Bokhour et al. 2009; Waller et al. 2009)  
Immunisation Misconceptions or  lack of information and knowledge  
(Brown et al. 2010; Mortensen, 2010; Hollmeyer et al. 2009) 
Table 4.2 Main barriers to compliance per health care context  
 
Taking the example of a £5 voucher, it is expected that this incentive will 
increase the likelihood to comply with health care when the anticipated utility of 
receiving the incentive is higher than the utility of non-adherence (e.g., staying home) or 
the costs of performing it (reported barriers). But the utility provided by this £5 voucher 
may be higher than the effort to keep track of appointment dates but not greater than the 
perceived cost of painful screening tests or medication side-effects. I will provide 
estimates of the effect size of incentives for each health context in analysis. 
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4.2 Hypotheses 
I propose several hypotheses to examine the effectiveness of patient financial 
incentives. Eight main hypotheses will be examined. This set of hypotheses covers the 
main effect of financial incentives (H1) and predicted key effect modifiers (Conrad & 
Perry, 2009) as incentive size (H2), type of incentive (H3-H5), delivery schedule (H6),  
patient socioeconomic status (H7) and previous compliant behaviour (H8). These 
hypotheses are motivated and informed by the literature review discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
The first hypothesis is related to the main effect of patient incentives in health care 
compliance. According to the theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter 2, both from 
standard economics (Laffont & Mortimer, 2009) and operant conditioning (Standdon & 
Cerutti, 2003), patient financial incentives are predicted to increase health care 
compliance. Hypothesis 1 does not express an expectation of motivational crowding-out 
– to be measured by a decrease in behaviour rates once incentives are offered - given the 
instrumental (and not pleasurable) nature of complying with health guidelines. Some 
variability is expected in the effect size of incentives between health care contexts 
(given the significant variety in underlying barriers) but I predict the overall effect 
across health contexts to be positive.  
 H1: Financial incentives will increase health care compliance. 
 
Assuming that people interpret health settings as money markets and not social markets 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004) patients should be sensitive to incentive size. Hypothesis 2 is 
also on track with standard economic and operant conditioning, assuming that that the 
larger the incentive, the higher the likelihood to comply with health care.  
H2: There is a positive monotonic association between health care compliance and 
incentive size. 
 
Cash-based incentives (money) are assumed to be preferred to goods-based incentives 
(vouchers, gifts) due to a higher fungibility of money, which can be exchanged by any 
good and thus maximising utility (Thaler, 1990). This hypothesis is concordant with H1 
in the sense that no motivational crowding-out effects are expected. Crowding-out is 
mostly associated to the offer of monetary incentives and less to vouchers or gifts 
(Promberger & Marteau, 2013). Again, as I do not predict incentives to crowd-out 
health care compliance, I follow standard economics predictions in this point. Also, this 
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prediction is in line with the limited previous research. The few randomised controlled 
trials that tested the impact of different incentives have only focused in the comparison 
of cash versus vouchers of an equal value (Deren et al, 1994; Malotte et al, 1999; 2004; 
Kamb et al, 1998; Tulsky et al, 2004; Vandrey et al, 2007). In all these cases, cash was 
more effective than vouchers in promoting health behaviour. 
H3: Cash-based financial incentives will increase health care compliance more than 
goods-based incentives. 
 
In a context as health compliance which requires an immediate cost, certain incentives 
as cash or vouchers are likely to be more effective than prize draws because they 
provide a guaranteed benefit (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995). Certain incentives provide a 
sure compensation compared to prize draws (Weber & Chapman, 2005).   
H4: Certain incentives will be more effective than prize draw incentives to increase 
health care compliance. 
 
According to time preferences research (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991) and operant conditioning (Martin & Pear, 2007), financial 
incentives offered concurrent or immediately after compliant behaviour are more likely 
to promote behaviour change, compared to incentives offered after some time delay 
(e.g., incentives is mailed to participants only at the end of the study). The only similar 
evidence in health settings supporting this hypothesis is from Lussier et al (206) but in a 
context of drug abuse.  
H5: Incentives delivered immediately after behaviour are more effective to promote 
health care compliance than incentives offered after a time gap. 
 
Based on loss aversion from Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) I expect that 
negative incentives (e.g., withdrawal of welfare benefits) will be more effective to 
increase health compliance than positive incentives (rewards). 
H6: Negative incentives will increase health care compliance more than positive 
incentives. 
 
Within the general (nonclinical) population, the offer of incentives is predicted to be 
particularly effective if offered to low income or socially deprived individuals. 
Diminishing marginal utility of income suggests that poorer individuals would be more 
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motivated by financial incentives – which would contribute proportionally more to their 
overall wealth (Layard et al, 2008).  
H7: Financial incentives will increase health care compliance more for low 
(compared to higher) income individuals. 
 
Another patient characteristic I predict to be important is past compliance behaviour. 
Particularly in the psychological literature about motivational crowding-out, there is the 
hypothesis that incentives are only detrimental to people with high baseline motivation. 
People with low baseline levels of intrinsic motivation are expected to respond 
positively to the offer of an incentive (Deci et al, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 1985). I take the 
compliance with health care in the past as a proxy for patient motivation (Promberger & 
Marteau, 2013). Thus, I predict that incentives will be effective to increase health care 
compliance in previous non-compliers. 
H8: Financial incentives will increase health care compliance for previous non-
compliers but not previous compliers.  
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4.3 Method 
This review and meta-analysis followed a similar methodology as described in the 
previous chapter. 
 
4.3.1 Literature search and data sources 
Electronic searches were performed in MEDLINE, EMBASE, ECONLIT, JSTOR, 
TROPHI (Trials Register of Promoting Health Interventions), Clinicaltrials.gov, 
Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, PsycInfo, CINAHL, ERIC, Business 
Source Complete, Dissertation databases (ETHOS, DART-Europe, PROQUEST 
Dissertations and Theses), RAND Corporate, Association for Policy Analysis and 
Management; SSCI; Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS); Open-SIGLE 
database; NIH crisp.cit.nih.gov; Current Controlled Trials. Google and Yahoo 
searches and hand-searches on the main Health journals were also performed, in 
addition to the reference search from relevant papers. Experts’ mailing lists (Health-
incentives@Jiscmail.ac.uk; BPP@Jiscmail.ac.uk) were contacted as well as 
individual author contacts in the UK and US. Searches were performed from 
inception to 2012 (for complete search strategy see Appendix 2). The search strategy 
was repeated in 2013 to identify more recent papers. 
 
4.3.2 Study selection 
Cochrane Review handbook was used to guide the methods used in this review (Higgins 
& Green, 2011). This review was not registered with Cochrane Collaboration but 
followed the guidelines established by this organisation. Inclusion criteria were a) 
interventions to promote health care compliance including: cancer screening, STI and 
TB screening, immunization, medication adherence and medical appointment keeping; 
b) baseline reference or control group (for meta-analysis requirement of experimental 
design); c) at least one of the interventions is the offer of a financial incentive; d) studies 
in developed countries. Studies were excluded in case of a) the size of incentive was not 
stated (for meta-analysis only) b) no control group or pre-post treatment comparison; c) 
multi-component interventions in which incentives are included; d) free syringe 
exchange programs; e) developing countries; f) incentives targeting providers of health 
care; g) study not written in English language. 
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4.3.3 Data extraction  
Two review authors pre-screened all search results (titles and abstracts) against the 
selection criteria for possible inclusion, and those selected by both review authors were 
subjected to a full-text assessment. Two review authors independently assessed the 
selected full-text articles for inclusion, resolving any discrepancies by consensus. 
Variables of interest included study participants, study design, incentive, outcome 
measure and results. 
 
4.3.4 Data analysis and synthesis  
In the meta-analysis, odds ratio (OR) was used as the estimate of effect from individual 
studies because it is the most appropriate metric to combine trials with binary outcomes 
(Egger et al, 2001). I used a random-effects model given the variety in contexts of 
medical compliance and types of incentives offered. The random-effects method 
assumes statistical heterogeneity with individual studies varying around an average 
treatment effect with a normal distribution. This estimate, however, gives more weight 
to smaller studies which may produce an overestimation of the overall effect size of 
incentives because smaller studies tend to have more beneficial estimates. This will be 
controlled for with Egger’s test and meta-regression. Study heterogeneity will be 
examined with sensitivity and subgroup analyses and random-effects meta-regression. 
Data analysis was performed in STATA 11 according to Sterne (2009).  
 
4.3.5 Assessment of Risk of Bias 
Risk of bias was assessed for the papers included in the meta-analysis in accordance 
with the guidelines of the Cochrane Consumers and Communication Review Group 
(Higgins & Green, 2011) which recommends the explicit reporting of individual 
elements that affect risk of bias, including:   
1. Sequence generation: classified as adequate if carried out using true randomization 
and not quasi-randomization, such as by day of week, date of birth or sequence; 
 2. Allocation concealment: classified as adequate if allocation is concealed from the 
purveyor of risk information, researchers and the participant at least until the point of 
allocation to groups; 
3. Blinding: classified as adequate if participants, staff and outcome assessors are blind 
to allocation; 
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4. Incomplete outcome data: classified as adequate if attrition data are clearly reported 
and there is no evidence of differential drop out in the intervention and control groups; 
5. Selective outcome reporting: classified as adequate if data are provided for all 
outcomes specified in the study protocol, or where this may be unavailable, in the 
methods section; 
6. Other sources of bias, including baseline comparability: classified as adequate if 
groups are comparable at baseline or any differences at baseline are adjusted for in the 
primary analysis; and validation of measures, classified as adequate if there is evidence 
of reliability and validity reported in the study or published elsewhere. 
 
 
4.4 Results 
After the initial literature search, 1,172 records were screened after duplicates were 
removed (Figure 4.1). One hundred and fifty two full-text papers were assessed for 
eligibility, of which 85 papers were included in the qualitative review and only 20 in the 
quantitative review. Tables 4.3-4.8 detail the studies included in our analysis.   
 
4.4.1 Systematic Review 
Papers reporting interventions using incentives have been sharply increasing over time 
with three papers between 1970-1979, 12 between 1980-1989, 26 between 1990-1999 
and 44 between 2000-2012 (N=85). Most studies were developed in the United States 
(95%). Randomised controlled trials represent 61% of studies (5% cluster randomised 
trials), 29% are quasi-experimental studies and 10% are observational cross-sectional or 
case-control studies. Most studies (Figure 4.2) offered incentives to promote treatment 
adherence (31%), followed by appointment keeping (25%) and cancer screening (19%). 
Less frequent were studies targeting immunization rates (13%), STI screening (8%) and 
TB screening (5%).  
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Figure 4.1 PRISMA flow chart for health care compliance review   
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Figure 4.2 Studies per health care compliance settings  
 
The most frequent incentives offered (Figure 4.3) were cost deductions 
(introducing free coverage and decreased copayments). As initially mentioned, the most 
traditional approach to changing behaviour using incentives in health settings has been 
this indirect application also via supply-side prices. The offer of tangible incentives is 
less common and has become more frequent in recent years. Nevertheless, explicit 
offers of cash already represent over 25% of the patient incentives used, above vouchers 
(17%) and lotteries (12%). Penalties and gifts were seldom used.  
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The analysis of incentive size is presented in Figure 4.4. The size of the 
incentives offered was adjusted to 2012 prices ($US). There is a balanced distribution in 
the amounts offered to patients. Overall, the incentives used were small, with roughly 
50% up to $10 (£7) and 90% of the incentives under $30 (£20). Cost deductions were 
not only the more frequent type of incentives used but also the incentives with the 
highest size, particularly in the context of free screening tests (free mammography) and 
immunisation (free vaccination).      
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Different incentive sizes offered 
 
The main reasons for the considerable reduction from the number of included 
papers in the qualitative review (N=85) to the meta-analysis (N=20) were the lack of an 
experimental design and the unspecified amount of the incentive (Figure 3.1). Most of 
the excluded interventions were reported changes in health insurance cost-sharing plans 
(e.g., Trivedi et al, 2008), particularly for medication adherence. The amount of the 
incentive is a potentially important effect modifier and thus justifies it as an exclusion 
criterion. These exclusion criteria, nevertheless, prevented us including into the analysis 
the prominent RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The RAND HIE was a 
randomised controlled trial which assigned thousands of people to different kinds of 
insurance cost-sharing plans and followed their health behaviour from 1974 to 1982. 
The overall conclusion is that cost-sharing reduced the uptake of health care, compared 
to free plans (Manning et al, 1987; Foxman et al, 1987; Leibowitz et al, 1986; Lurie et 
al, 1989; Brook et al, 1985). The RAND HIE is an example of an intervention testing 
copayments versus free plans and this was the approach used by several other papers 
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(e.g., Meeker et al, 2011; Chernew et al, 2008; Maciejewski et al, 2009; Atella et al, 
2006). At a glance, this stream of research concludes that increased copayments reduce 
the uptake of health care whereas decreased copayments promote compliance with 
medical recommendations. A recent narrative review on this topic corroborates this 
conclusion (Eaddy et al, 2012). When the baseline status is cost-sharing and the 
intervention is patient exemption, this is a positive incentive with negative 
reinforcement (elimination of cost). But when the baseline status is a free plan and a 
copayment is introduced, this is the case of a negative incentive or punishment 
(introduction of cost). Despite of the interest originated by Prospect theory with loss 
aversion and the hypothesis that penalties are more effective than rewards, it is not 
possible to test this difference using cost-sharing studies. Research in this area is strictly 
based on quasi-experimental pre-post design studies and there are no experimental 
studies comparing increased fees with exempting patients from payment. Therefore, this 
evidence will not be included in the meta-analysis. Furthermore, strictly speaking, cost 
deduction are not tangible incentives and thus not rigorously within the boundaries of 
the topic of this thesis.  
There is an additional relevant point raised by these cost-sharing studies. Some 
studies examine the impact on behaviour of free health care at the point of use whereas 
other report reimbursement of expenses at a later stages. In both cases, positive 
incentives are introduced but time discounting predicts that immediate free coverage 
will be more effective to increase health behaviour than insurance plans with 
reimbursement practices (Cooper & Vistnes, 2003). A reimbursement implies that 
patients have to bear the cost of health care in the first instance and be compensated at a 
later stage. Research from a behavioural economics perspective about the uptake and 
use of health insurance has been lately expanding (Baicker et al, 2012) and calling 
attention to these apparently minor, but potentially decisive, differences.     
The hypotheses formulated above are intended to be tested in the meta-
analysis, particularly with meta-regression. However, hypotheses 6 and 8 will be 
excluded due to lack of evidence. Regarding hypothesis 6, there are only two other 
studies using penalties to change health behaviour, both related to child immunisation. 
The penalties applied were the withdrawal of welfare benefits (negative punishment). 
Minkovitz and co-workers (1999) examined the impact of a monthly penalty but 
reported no effect: the incentive group had 62% of immunised children after two years 
compared to 63.5% in control group. However, control over the immunisation rates was 
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performed only every six months which may have decreased the impact of the penalty. 
Kerpelman and colleagues (2000) found that immunisation was higher in the 
intervention group (72.4%) compared to the control group (60.6%) (χ2=13.4, p<.001). 
The authors did not report the value of the penalty. Both studies are excluded from the 
meta-analysis because no information was given about the size of the incentive. 
With respect to hypothesis 8, there is a single study that reported the difference 
in the effectiveness of incentives between patients who were previously compliers or 
non-compliers (Stoner et al, 1998). This study is also only included in the qualitative 
review because the authors do not provide the raw data and information about the 
incentive size. The results from this study show that the offer of a voucher for free 
mammography was only effective to promote screening in previously non-compliant 
women (OR 4.80 CI 1.83-12.58) but not in previously compliers (OR=1.77 CI 0.70-
4.48 n.s.).  
 The next tables detail the characteristics of the studies included in the qualitative 
review. The studies related to TB screening are presented in Table 4.3 (p.96), studies on 
immunisation are displayed in Table 4.4 (p.97), studies on cancer screening in Table 4.5 
(p.99), studies on treatment adherence in Table 4.6 (p.102), studies on appointment 
keeping in Table 4.7 (p.109) and studies on STI screening are presented in Table 4.8 
(p.114).  
Grey shaded papers in Tables 4.3-4.8 were the included studies in the meta-
analysis that will be presented in the next section. Only experimental studies will be 
included in the meta-analysis.  
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Chaisson 
et al 
(1996) 
Tuberculin 
skin test 
(PPD) 
Quasi-
experiment 
seq. design 
501 participants; mean 
age=36; 69% males; 75% 
Black 
Voucher fast food 
restaurant $4 
Food voucher incentive increased 
compliance  from 35% control group to 
48% voucher (p=.004) 
Malotte 
et al 
(1999) 
Return 
appointment 
for TB skin 
reading 
RCT 1078 participants; age range 
18-30; 78% males; 82.5% 
unemployed 
$10 cash or $10 
grocery coupon or 
$10 fast food 
coupon 
Control group return 49.3% compared to 
94.9% cash, 85.7% grocery coupon and 
82.6% fast food coupon (significant 
difference between cash and other 
incentives)  
Malotte 
et al 
(1998) 
Return 
appointment 
for TB skin 
reading 
RCT 1004 patients; age range 18-
30; 68% males; 53.5% 
African American 
$5 or $10 cash 93% of those receiving $10 incentive and 
85.8% of those receiving $5 returned 
compared to 33% control group 
Perlman 
et al 
(2003) 
Screening 
chest X-rays 
for TB 
Quasi-
experiment 
seq. design 
177 patients; mean 
age=40.5; males 65%; 
employed 22% 
$25 cash Adherence 83% incentive group versus 
34% prior to incentive (p<.001 OR=9.1 CI 
3.9-22) 
 
Table 4.3 Included studies about tuberculosis (TB) screening 
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Birkhead 
et al 
(1995) 
Child 
immunisation 
Cluster RCT 6181 children median 
age=14 Low SES 83% 
Medicaid 
Food voucher monthly 
instead of bi-monthly; 
unclear amount  
Children at incentive sites were almost 
three time likely to have been immunised 
than control 
Ives et al 
(1994) 
Flu 
vaccination 
RCT 1989 patients; Age 
range 65-79 years 
Free immunisation: 
unclear previous cost 
66% of incentive group compared to 54% 
of controls received immunisation (χ2=138 
p=.0001) 
Kerpelma
n et al 
(2000) 
Child 
immunisation 
RCT 2500 children; Mean 
age=3; 51% males; 
85% Black 
Sanction on families; 
unclear amount 
Complete immunisation higher in 
intervention group (72.4%) than control 
(60.6%) (χ2=13.4, p<.001) 
Mayoryk 
& Levi 
(2006) 
Flu 
vaccination 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
627 hospital employees Cash bonus plus 
double amount if 80% 
uptake  (unclear $)  
Employee flu vaccination 32% during 
2004-2005 (pre-incentive) and 84.2% 
during 2005-2006 (incentive) 
Minkovitz 
et al 
(1999) 
Child 
immunisation 
RCT 2246 children; age 
range 3-24 months; 
51% males 69% Black 
Monthly penalty 
during 2 years but 
controlled with a six 
month delay 
No effect – Incentive group overall 62% 
immunised children compared to 63.5% in 
control group 
Moran et 
al (1996) 
Flu 
vaccination 
RCT 797 participants; mean 
age=65; 66% females; 
Lottery for one of 
three coupons of $50 
The lottery incentive led to a significant 
modest increase in influenza immunisation 
102 
 
 
w/ health risk factors (draw max 3 months 
after) 
(20% vs. 29%) (OR 1.68 CI 1.05-2.68 
p=.03) 
Nexoe et 
al (1997) 
Flu 
vaccination 
RCT 585 participants over 65 
years old; 40% males 
Free vaccination 
(usual cost $40-$60) 
The flu vaccination rate was 49% for usual 
pay and 72% for free vaccination  
Satterhwai
te (1997) 
Flu 
vaccination 
RCT 2791 patients over 65 
years old 
Free flu vaccine (usual 
cost $20) 
Free flu vaccine 2.65 more likely to be 
taken (χ2=173, p<.001).  
Stitzer et 
al (2010) 
Hepatitis B 
vaccination 
RCT 26 participants mean 
age 45; 81% males; 
73% Black 
Cash payments began 
at $20/visit and 
increased by $5 each 
month to a max $50 -
Total $265 
No effect - total injections received not 
different per group: 91% in incentive 
group vs. 78% in control group p=.219 
Yokley & 
Glenwick 
(1984) 
Child 
immunisation 
RCT 715 children; mean age 
37.3 months; males 
50%; 64% White 
Three lotteries of 
$100, $50 and $25; 
Lotteries drawn after 2 
months study start 
Monetary intervention group had higher 
frequency of children being inoculated 
(27%) than controls (12%) χ2=36.53 
p<.001.  
 
Table 4.4 Included studies about immunisation 
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Breen et 
al (1997) 
Breast 
Cancer 
screening 
Observational 
cross-sectional 
Control n=1565 
Incentive n=1373; white 
women; 65-74 years old 
Reimbursement of 
mammography cost 
with co-pay of 20%; 
previous average cost 
$91-20%≈$73) 
5 sites with control (C) and incentive (I) 
groups; Three sites were responsive to 
incentives (61% vs. 69 % p=.031; 44% vs. 
60% p<.001; 53% vs. 60% p=.032). In two 
sites ns. (65% vs. 65%; 52% vs. 57%) 
Freedma
n & 
Mitchell 
(1994) 
Colorectal 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 146 patients; mean 
age=58.4; 68% females; 
66% Black 
Prepaid postage to 
send test 
Control group return rate lower (57%) than 
incentive group (71%) 
Grady et 
al (1988) 
Breast self-
examination 
RCT 153 participants mean 
age=45; 88% White 
Instant lottery costing 
$1 after each 
menstrual cycle for 6 
months 
Women in the external reward reported a 
higher rate of examination (73%) than those 
in no-reward group (54%) 
Kiefe et 
al (1994) 
Breast 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 119 women; mean age 
70.9; 77% Black; 
<10,000 income 
$50 free 
mammography  
44% in the voucher group and 10% in the 
control group obtained a mammography  
Kelaher 
& 
Stellman 
Breast 
Cancer 
Screening 
Observational 
cross-sectional 
2419 women eligible for 
Medicare; 1872 not 
eligible 
Reimbursement of 
mammography cost 
(still with a co-
Eligible Medicare women increased 
screening from 47.7% in 1990 to 63.3% in 
1993. Non eligible women 53.3% in 1990 to 
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(2000) payment of $11.63) 60.8% in 1993 (OR 1.2 CI 0.9-1.4) 
Klassen 
et al 
(2002) 
Breast 
Cancer 
screening 
Observational 
case-control 
576 women; age range 
45-55 <$10,000 44% 
Free mammography 
unclear initial cost  
84%  of cases compared to 61%  of controls 
reported having been screened in the 
previous year (p=.0000) 
Marcus 
et al 
(1992) 
Screening 
follow-up to 
abnormal 
Pap Smears 
RCT 2044 women; age range 
>50% 20-29; no 
insurance 69% 
Transport incentives 
around $2-$2.90 
Women in the incentive condition were 
almost one and a half times more likely to 
return for screening follow-up (OR 1.48 
1.06-2.06) 
Marcus 
et al 
(1998) 
Screening 
follow-up to 
abnormal 
Pap Smears 
RCT 1453 women; 57% <30 
years; Hispanic 84%; not 
insured 71% 
Reduction 2/3 fixed 
cost of follow-up: $20 
first year $25 second 
year  
63.9% women in control group and 71.2% 
women in incentive groups returned to 
follow-up (p<.05) Incentive OR 1.5 CI 
1.09-2.05 
Mayer & 
Kellogg 
(1989) 
Breast 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 96 women (control 
n=47); age>35; 89% 
white; Mid SES 
$50 free 
mammography 
Appointment making was significantly 
higher among the incentive group (81%) 
than the control group (59%) χ2=4.86 p<.05 
Meeker 
et al 
(2011) 
Colorectal, 
breast and 
cervical 
cancer 
screening  
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
441066 participants; 
mean age 54.6; 42.5% 
males 
Free coverage; 
introduction of first-
dollar coverage for 
preventive care 
Differences in plans with policy change: 
Lipid screen +0.053; Mammography 
+0.023; Pap smears +0.078; FOBT +0.041 
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Miller & 
Wong 
(1993) 
Colorectal 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 325 patients; age 50-65; 
72.5% females 
Prepaid stamped 
FOBT 
Pre-stamped tested were returned more 
(74%) than unstamped tests (61%) 
Skaer et 
al (1996) 
Breast 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 80 women; mean age 
52.4; 95% <$15,000 
Free mammography – 
unclear cost 
In the control group, 17.5% received a 
mammography compared to 87.5% in the 
voucher group (p<.0001) 
Slater et 
al (2005) 
Breast 
Cancer 
screening 
RCT 145,467 women; mean 
age 49.7 (40-64) 
$10 cash Significant effect of incentive: Mail 
(control) vs. Mail +Incentive 0.52 (CI 0.32-
0.72).  
Schilling
er et al 
(2000) 
Cervical and 
breast cancer 
screening;   
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
383 participants >52 
years old; below Federal 
Poverty Level 
Full coverage- 
Unclear previous cost  
Breast cancer screening from 21% to 52% ; 
Pap smear from 25% to 55%; Routine 
check-up from 41% to 61%; Cholesterol 
check from 28% to 61%  
Stoner et 
al (1998) 
Breast 
Cancer 
Screening 
RCT 187 women; mean age 
59.4; <$20,000 32.5% 
Free mammography – 
unclear cost 
Voucher effect on baseline noncompliers 
(OR 4.80 CI 1.83-12.58) and previously 
compliers (OR=1.77 CI 0.70-4.48 n.s.) 
Table 4.5 Included studies about cancer screening 
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Atella et 
al (2006) 
Adherence to 
medication 
Hypertension 
Observational 
cohort study 
6-year period 1997-
2002; 38,393 patients 
No co-payment on drug 
prescriptions (previous 
€1.5 per prescription) 
Estimated mean adherence before 0.6395 
and after no-copayment 0.7355 
Bock et al 
(2001) 
TB treatment Observational 
Case-Control 
107 patients; Median 
age=37; African 
American 87.5% 
$5 coupon per TB 
treatment 
Incentivised patients more likely to 
complete treatment in 32 weeks (60%) or 
52 weeks (89%) compared to historic 
controls (19% and 52%) 
Barnett et 
al (2009) 
HIV 
medication 
RCT 66 patients; mean 
age=43; 59% males; 
employed 4.5% 
Escalating amount per 
session total max $1172 
in vouchers for 
groceries/ goods 
Cap openings DV- 77.6% incentive and 
55.5% control (p<.001). During 4 week 
follow-up, 66% incentive and 53% control 
(p=.07) 
Capelli 
(1990) 
Fluid 
adherence in 
hemodialysis 
(below 
weight 
criterion) 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
49 patients; mean 
age≈52; ≈67% females; 
78.5% Black 
Lottery; each of the 34 
patients contribute $1 
per compliant session to 
group draw 
Sessions within weight criteria: Baseline 
66.7% and Incentive 100% (return to 
baseline 87.5%) 
Chernew 
et al 
Adherence to 
medication 
Quasi-
experiment 
Control n=144604; 
Incentive n=73674; 
Generics $5 to zero; 
brand-name drugs $25 
DV Medication Possession Ratio (MPR); 
Increased adherence from 1.86 percentage 
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(2008) (hypertension
diabetes and 
steroids) 
pre/ post 
design 
mean age range 37.4-
44.7; 52% females 
to $12.5 (Preferred 
drugs) and  $45 to 
$22.5 (non preferred 
drugs) 
points (p=.134) for steroids to 4 percentage 
points for diabetes medication (p<.001): 7-
14%  reduction in non-adherence 
Davidson 
et al 
(2000) 
TB treatment Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
384 patients; mean 
age=40; 75% males; 
83.8% unemployed 
Basic incentive of $15 
increased to $30 after 
first 2 months & $20 
end 3rd month (kind) 
Additional incentives significantly related 
to adherence: AOR 1.01 (CI 1.00-1.02) 
Doshi et 
al (2009) 
Lipid-
lowering 
medication 
adherence 
Quasi-
experimental 
5604 patients; aged 60-
85; 98% males; low 
SES 
Copayment increase 
from $2 to $7 
Co-payments decreased medication 
adherence between 12%-19% (p=.0001) 
Foxman et 
al (1987) 
Use of 
antibiotics 
RCT RAND 
Health 
Experiment 
Free plan n=1935; 
Cost-sharing n=3830; 
US national sample 
Free plan vs. cost 
sharing (coinsurance 
rate could be 25%, 50% 
or 95%)  
All incomes: higher use on antibiotics in 
free plan OR=1.80 (CI 1.75-1.86)  
Hagihara 
et al 
(2001) 
Adherence to 
hypertension 
medication 
Observational 
cohort study 
1236 patients; mean age 
59.43; 40% males 
Change from a 90% 
coverage to full 
coverage at 70 years old 
Compared to 90% coverage (OR=1) a full 
coverage had OR=2.62 (CI 1.24-5.43 
p=.01) for 70-75 and 1.55 (CI 0.58-3.94 
p=.86) for 76+ 
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Hart et al 
(1979) 
Fluid 
adherence in 
hemodialysis 
(below 
weight 
criterion) 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
10 male patients Within 2% of dry 
weight=5 tokens; within 
5%=2 tokens; unclear  
amount; in-kind 
Significantly lower weight change F(6, 
54)=6.00 p<.01); Mean weight (pounds) 
baseline ≈167 and experimental period 162 
Hynd et al 
(2008) 
Medication 
adherence 
Observational 
study 
Unclear sample 24% increase in various 
medications 
Significant decrease in medication 
dispensing (3.2%-10.9%)  
Iwata & 
Becksfort 
(1981) 
Adherence to 
oral hygiene 
programme 
RCT 21 patients; all patients 
over 18 years old 
Fee reduction (refund 
after 5 visits) if  plaque 
index 10% or better; 
Reduction 25% fee; 
Usual cost  $120 ($30 
incentive) 
In incentive condition, 88% met the final 
criterion of 10% plaque index compared to 
7% in control group (F=1,58)=237.82 
p<.001.  
Kominski 
et al 
(2007) 
TB treatment 
 
RCT 398 patients; mean age 
15.4; 48.6% females; 
78% students 
Gifts paid by parents 
e.g., money  or going 
out; unclear amount and 
schedule 
In usual care (control) 148 adolescents 
(75.8%) completed treatment compared to 
150 in the incentive group (73.9%) 
Leibowitz 
et al 
Prescription 
drug use 
RCT RAND 
Health 
Free plan n=1259; 
Cost-sharing plan 
Free plan vs. cost 
sharing (coinsurance 
Prescription number per capita: Free Plan 
M=5.43 significantly higher than any cost-
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(1985) Experiment n=2601 rate could be 25%, 50% 
or 95%)  
sharing Plans M=4.2   
Lund et al 
(1977) 
Complete 
dental 
treatment 
 
RCT 98 students 7th grade $0.25 to $1 per each of 
3 treatments; Bonus 
prize of $3 if  treatment 
completed 
Less controls completed treatment (61.5%) 
than incentive group (76%) 
 
Lurie et al 
(1989) 
Attendance to 
eye 
examination 
RCT RAND 
Health 
Experiment 
Total enrolled 3,958; 
two thirds participants 
18-44 years old 
Free plan vs. cost 
sharing (coinsurance 
rate could be 25%, 50% 
or 95%)  
90% had eye examination in free plan 
compared to 76% in cost sharing plans  
Maciejew
ski et al 
(2010) 
Adherence to 
medication 
(multiple 
health 
conditions) 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
Participants 638,796 
enrolees from 
employers plus 108,504 
self-insured 
Free generics (before 
$10.74-$11.38) and 
reduced brand-name 
from $33.70-$34.39 to 
$30.50-$30.74 
DV Medication possession ratio (using 
claims data); For generics, average percent 
change of +2.61 p<.0001; for brand-name 
average   -0.57 ns 
Malotte et 
al (2001) 
Completion 
of TB 
treatment 
RCT 169 patients; mean 
age=42; 82% males; 
71% Black 
$5 each visit 3.6% patients in the control completed care 
compared to 52.8% in the incentive 
(AOR=29.7) 
Manning 
et al 
Demand for 
medical care  
RCT RAND 
Health 
Free plan n=1893; Cost 
sharing n=3916 
Free plan vs. cost 
sharing (coinsurance 
Likelihood of any use Free plan 86.7% 
(SE=0.67); Cost sharing 73.4% (SE=1.37); 
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(1987) Experiment rate could be 25%, 50% 
or 95%)  
Morisky 
et al 
(2001) 
Completion 
of TB 
treatment 
RCT 794 adolescents; Mean 
age 15.2; 49% male; 
77.8% Hispanic; 
90%<= High School  
Gifts paid by parents 
e.g., money  or going 
out; unclear amount; 
one incentive early 
treatment and one for 
completion 
No effect - Completion of care (6-month 
medication adherence) did not vary 
significantly across study groups: 77.8% in 
control group and 76.4% in incentive 
Motheral 
& 
Henderso
n (2009) 
Medication 
adherence 
Quasi-
experimental 
pre-post 
design 
Unclear sample $10 to $15 increase in 
co-payment 
No effect – increased copayment was not 
associated with changes in adherence 
Nair et al 
(2009) 
Adherence to 
diabetes 
medication 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
225 patients in all 
observation periods; 
Mean age 49 years old; 
53.4% women 
Change of a 3 tier plan 
with $10, $20 and $40 
co-pays to a generic 
$10 co-pay (Reduction 
$10-$30) 
Pre-period 67.34% mean adherence 
compared to 75.08% 1st year (diff 7.74 
p<.001) and 72.77% 2nd year (diff from 
1st -2.31 p=.088) 
Sedjo & 
Cox 
(2008) 
Adherence to 
medication 
(Statins) 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
13,319 patients; Mean 
age 63.33 SD=12.02; 
45% female 
Mean pre-period 
copayment $14.6 
SD=$9.11; Co-payment 
Adjusted mean adherence increase of 
3.51% for co-payment decline $15+; 
1.81% for co-payment decline of $10.01-
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design reduction from $0 to 
$15+ 
$15; -0.21% for co-payment decline of 
$5.01-$10; -1.71% for co-payment decline 
$0.01-$5; -3.22% for $0 co-payment 
decline 
Sonnier 
(2000) 
Fluid 
adherence on 
haemodialysis 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
Total 6 patients; 4 men 
and 2 women; mean age 
43; two thirds  
Caucasian 
$3 for 3%-4% weight 
criteria. Less money 
($1.50) for weight gains 
3.3%-4.3%; $0.50 for 
3.5%-4.5% 
No effect - Reward group n=3 patients: 
Baseline period 4.05 SD=0.84; Incentive 
period 4.017 SD=0.81 
Sorensen 
et al 
(2007) 
Adherence to 
HIV HAART 
medication 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
66 patients; mean 
age=43.3; 53% males; 
95% unemployed; past 
adherence<80% 
Escalating amount per 
each session total max 
$1172; vouchers 
Medication caps as main DV (MEMS). At 
baseline control 52% and voucher 50% ns. 
During intervention, voucher 78% and 
control 56% (p<.0001) 
Tulsky et 
al (2000) 
Adherence to 
TB 
medication 
RCT 118 patients: median 
age 37; 86% male; 52% 
African American;  
Homeless 50%; 
$5 at each 2 weekly 
visits 
Completion of treatment was significantly 
higher (p=.01) in the monetary arm (44%) 
than control (26%) 
Volpp et 
al (2008) 
Adherence to 
Warfarin 
medication 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
10 participants Pilot 1 
and 10 participants 
(Pilot 2); Age>=21 
Lottery expected value 
$5 (Pilot 1) and $3 
(Pilot 2) 
Pilot 1: INRs out of range decreased from 
35% to 12.2%; Pilot 2: INRs out of range 
decreased from 65% to 40.4% 
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design 
Zeng et al 
(2010) 
Adherence to 
medication 
(diabetes) 
Observational 
case-control 
Cases n=71 Mean age 
51; 57.7% female;  
Controls n=639 Mean 
age 58; 47.4% female 
Change into tier 1 with 
flat co-payment of $10 
(average co-pay before 
$15.3)  
DV: Proportion of days covered (PDC) 
>=80%; Case group 75.3% before and 
82.5% after reduced co-payment 
 
Table 4.6 Included studies about treatment adherence   
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Carey et 
al (2005) 
Sexual risk 
reduction 
workshop 
Quasi-
experiment 
sequential 
design 
107 participants; mean 
age=27; 69% African 
American 
$30 cash Control group attended the workshop 
less (9%) than incentive group (38%) 
(χ2=12.88 p<.001) 
Carey & 
Carey 
(1990) 
Therapy for 
mentally ill 
chemical 
abusers  
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
53 patients; mean 
age=33.2; 72% males; 
87% Caucasian 
$3 per week gift 
certificate fast food or 
credit bowling; 
Attendance higher during the incentive 
(32%) than baseline (9%) t(52)=2.47, 
p<.02. 
Diaz & 
Perez 
(2009) 
Drug 
prevention 
programme  
Cluster RCT 211 children ages 12-13; 
Parents medium/ low 
SES 
€10 voucher after 7 
incentivised sessions 
For the 7 incentivised sessions, controls 
attendance lower (M=0.0833 
SD=0.509) than incentive attendance 
(M=0.5522 SD=1.787). 
Hankin 
et al 
(1980) 
Use of 
ambulatory 
psychiatric 
care 
Observational 
study 
55.000 patients Increased copayment 
$2 to $10 per visit 
Small decline in propensity to enrol in 
care and slight decline in utilisation rate 
(no raw data provided) 
Helmus 
et al 
(2003) 
Group 
counselling 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
20 patients; mean 
age=43.7; 75% males; 
95% Caucasian 
$2.50 gift certificate 
to local retail store 
twice weekly 
Improved rates of attendance in 
experimental phase (65%) compared to 
baseline (45%). 
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design 
Laken & 
Ager 
(1995) 
Prenatal 
appointment 
RCT 205 women; mean age 
23; 56% Black; Hispanic 
7%; 34% White 
$5 gift certificate 
mailed within 1 week 
for each 7 prenatal 
appointments 
No difference between groups in missed 
prenatal appointments. 39% of women 
missed one to seven appointments 
Melniko
w et al 
(1997) 
First prenatal 
appointment 
RCT 104 women; mean 
age=25; 55% Hispanic 
Taxi voucher or Gift 
Baby blanket - unclear 
value 
Control group attended less (66%) than 
taxi voucher group (82%); No 
improvement in the baby blanket gift 
group (54%) 
Parrish et 
al (1986) 
Child medical 
appointments 
RCT 99 parents; majority low 
SES; 51% disabled 
children 
$10 monthly lottery 
for vouchers 
ToysR'Us, McDonald 
or bus tokens 
Parents in the control group went to 
initial evaluations 42% and incentive 
61% (χ2=7.22 p<.01). 
Pilote et 
al (1996) 
First 
appointment 
for TB 
treatment 
RCT 244 participants; median 
age 39-40; 81%males  
$5 cash 84% of subjects in the monetary 
incentive completed their first follow-up 
vs. 53% in the control group 
Post et al 
(2006) 
Depression 
therapy 
appointments 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
50 patients; mean age=46 
85% females; 96% 
African American 
$10 cash per weekly 
appointment 
Overall aggregate adherence was 79% 
during baseline and 86% during 
incentive period 
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design 
Powers 
et al 
(2009) 
Return to post-
operative care 
Observational 
Case-control 
Incentive n=69; Control 
n=100; Mean age 6; 
60.5% males; Medicaid 
88.5%; 
$10 check mailed after 
appointment 
No effect - The use of $10 incentive did 
not improve post-operative care (65% 
incentive vs. 66% control) p=0.92 
Reiss et 
al (1976) 
First dental 
visit 
RCT 35 families, 29 of them 
Black; mean income 
$5,000 
$5 cash (had to mail a 
signed coupon to 
receive the money) 
23% of families in the control group 
attended compared to 67% in incentive 
group 
Reiss & 
Bailey 
(1982) 
First dental 
visit 
RCT 125 families with 
children 5-15 years old 
$5 (choice of cash or 
gifts or credit toward 
parent dental care) 
The control group families were less 
responsive (37.5%) than incentive 
families (84%) to initial dental visit 
(χ2=13.65, p<.008). 
Rice & 
Lutzker 
(1984) 
Dental clinic 
appointments 
RCT 128 patients Free appointment ($8) 
or reduced fee (50% 
$4) 
Attendance was 70% in the control 
group, significantly lower than the free 
appointment 97% ($8) (χ2=7.68 df=1 
p=.01); not different from reduced rate 
87% (X2=2.45) 
Rhodes 
et al 
(2003) 
Counselling 
sessions 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
50 patients; Mean age 47 
range 22-72; 52% males; 
80% Black; drug addicts 
Lottery of 100 tokens: 
1 $100, 1 $50, 1 $25, 
2 $10, 3 $5 , 46 $2.5 
Participants attended 66% during 
baseline, no different from intervention 
period (71%) t(49)=-1.224 ns 
116 
 
 
Study 1 design and 46 zero - expected 
value $3.5 
Rhodes 
et al 
(2003) 
Study 2 
Counselling 
sessions 
Quasi-
experiment 
pre/ post 
design 
52 patients; mean 
age=49; 48% males; 87% 
African American 
$3.25 cash or lottery 
for 100 tokens EV 
$3.25 
For cash: at baseline, 64% of patients 
attended compared to 74% during 
incentive. For lottery:  baseline 63.5% 
and incentive 71% 
Simon et 
al (1996)  
Use of 
outpatient 
mental 
services 
Observational 
case-control 
Unclear sample Introduction of a 
payment of $20 per 
visit 
16% of likelihood of service use 
Smith et 
al (1990) 
Post-partum 
appointment 
RCT 534 poor adolescents; 
mean age=15.7; 12% 
Caucasian 
Coupon for milk for 
the infant or jewellery 
gift for mother; 
unclear amount 
The milk coupon group had a higher 
compliance with 37% compared to 22% 
in the control group. For the gift 
jewellery group, 23% attendance ns. 
Stevens-
Simon et 
al (1997) 
Peer-support 
groups for 
adolescent 
mothers 
RCT 286 adolescent mothers; 
Age <18 years old; 44% 
White; 89% primigrav 
$7 per weekly session 58% of those offered monetary 
incentives participated in peer-support 
groups compared to 9% of those not 
receiving the incentive 
Stevens-
Simon et 
Postpartum 
appointment 
RCT 240 adolescents; Mean 
age 17.5; 53.4% White; 
Gift Gerry “Cuddler” 
– unclear price 
 82.4% in the incentive group compared 
to 65% in the control group returned for 
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al (1994) 75% primigravida postpartum appointment (χ2=9 p<.003) 
Sigmon 
& Stitzer 
(2005) 
Counselling 
sessions  
RCT 102 patients; Mean age 
41; 58% males; 39% 
Caucasian 
Lottery; Max $170 in 
12 weeks; Increasing 
draws for first 5 
sessions; Reset to one 
if session missed 
Patients in the no-incentive condition 
attended on average 52%+-5% of the 
required sessions whereas those in the 
incentive condition attended 76%+-4% 
p<.004 
White et 
al (1998) 
First visit TB 
clinic  
RCT 61 released inmates; 
Mean age 33; 98.4% 
males; 50% Hispanic 
$5 cash Rates of visit were not different from 
those receiving $5 plus standard 
education (25.8%) to those receiving 
just standard education (23.3%) p=.82 
 
Table 4.7 Included studies about appointment keeping   
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Authors Target Study design Participants Incentive scheme Findings 
Chacko 
et al 
(1987) 
Return visit 
for  
gonorrhoea 
screening 
Quasi-
experiment 
sequential 
design 
519 participants 
age range 15-24 
70% males almost 
all Black 
Four lotteries of $50, $20 
and 2x$15; 3 draws 
scheduled 2 weeks apart. 
Max gap to draw= 18 
days 
No difference in the overall test-of-cure rate 
as a function of lottery: 31% returned in the 
baseline period compared to 33% in the 
intervention period  
Currie et 
al (2010) 
Chlamydia 
screening 
Observational 
cross-sectional 
Phase I control 
n=2786; Phase II 
incentive n=866; 
Median age=20 
$10 cash Australian 
Dollars 
Chlamydia screening rate during Phase 1 
(control) was 22.9% and during Phase 2 
(incentive) 42.4% 
Haukoos 
et al 
(2005) 
HIV testing Quasi-exp pre/ 
post design 
372 participants; 
median age=32; 
34% females 
$25 cash HIV testing in control group 8% and incentive 
23% (OR=3.4 95% CI 1.8-6.6) 
Kissinge
r et al 
(2000) 
Return to 
Chlamydia 
screening 
Quasi-exp pre/ 
post design 
962 women; mean 
age=21; 96.3% 
African American 
$20 for a 1month and 
4month follow-up visits 
Women who were offered incentive were 1.9 
times more likely to return to any visit (CI 
1.2-2.9) 
Low et al 
(2007) 
Chlamydia 
screening 
RCT 838 participants 
ClaSS study UK 
£10 voucher  In the incentive group 17.4% responded to 
screening compared to 16.5% controls ns. 
P=.565 
Malotte Chlamydia RCT 285 patients $20 cash or $20 grocery Cash: Screening 10.75% control group vs. 
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et al 
(2004) 
& 
Gonorrhoea 
screening  
previous STD; 
mean age=22; 
91.4% Black 
voucher 15.1% incentive group; Voucher: Screening 
12.65% control group vs. 11.3% incentive 
group 
 
Table 4.8 Included studies about STI screening  
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4.4.2 Meta-analysis  
Twenty papers were selected for this meta-analysis (N=151,875 patients) after screening 
for the inclusion criteria.  Three of the included papers offered more than one incentive 
scheme: $10 cash, $10 grocery coupon and $10 fast food coupon (Malotte et al. 1999), 
$5 cash vs. $10 cash (Malotte et al. 1998) and $20 cash vs. $20 grocery voucher 
(Malotte et al. 2004). As these different experimental conditions are not independent, 
one incentive scheme was randomly chosen in each study (lowest in random number 
generation): $10 grocery coupon (Malotte et al. 1999), $5 cash (Malotte et al. 1998) and 
$20 cash (Malotte et al. 2004).  
Most studies were performed in the US (n=18) with exception of Low (2007) 
and Diaz and Perez (2009). About two thirds of the studies offered incentives to 
participants with a low socioeconomic status (n=14)
3
. The majority of the studies 
incentivised patients to keep medical appointments (n=7) (Reiss et al, 1976; Reiss & 
Bailey, 1982; Parrish, 1986; Pilote et al, 1996; Stevens-Simon et al, 1997; White et al, 
1998; Diaz & Perez, 2009). There were very few included studies targeting cancer 
screening (Grady et al, 1988; Slater et al, 2005), STI screening (Malotte et al, 2004; 
Low et al, 2007) and TB screening (Malotte et al, 1998, Malotte et al, 1999). Regarding 
the incentives offered, these ranged from $1 (Grady et al, 1988) to an escalating 
schedule of payments over $1000 (Barnett et al, 2009). Cash was the most common 
financial incentive used (n=9), followed by vouchers (n=7) and lotteries (n=4).  
There were four cluster randomised controlled trials within the included 
studies, all randomizing families of children (Reiss et al, 1976; Reiss & Bailey, 1982; 
Yokley & Glenwick, 1984; Diaz & Perez, 2009). Odd ratios were adjusted through the 
ratio estimator approach by Rao and Scott (1992 in Donner & Klar, 2002) – following 
the same procedure as chapter 3.  
Figure 4.5 shows the forest plot with a random-effects model. There was an 
overall positive impact of incentives (OR=3.06 CI 95% 2.04-4.57) supporting H1 
about the positive increase in health care compliance when financial incentives are 
offered.  
                                                 
3
 The socioeconomic status of participants was either clearly stated in the study (e.g., low income 
patients) or inferred from participants’ characteristics (e.g., inner-city, deprived areas). 
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Figure 4.5 Forest plot for health care compliance 
NOTE: Weights are from random effects analysis
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The data did not support a publication bias (Begg’s test=1.73 p=.084). However, 
between-studies heterogeneity was high and significant (Tau2=.52; χ2=261.29 df=19 
p<.001; I
2
 =86%) and a small-study effect was confirmed with Egger’s test (z=2.13 
p=.006) i.e., the tendency for the smaller studies in a meta-analysis to show larger 
treatment effects. 
While the random-effects model takes account of variation in effect sizes, it 
simply incorporates this variation into the weighting scheme—it makes no attempt to 
explain this variation. Thus, additional subgroup analyses and meta-regressions are 
needed to identify and explain the possible sources of the high between-studies 
variation. Subgroup random-effects analyses per health care setting showed 
homogeneous subgroups (Figure 4.5). Treatment adherence was the exception due to a 
severe outlier (Malotte et al. 2001) but its removal would eliminate the statistical 
heterogeneity in this subgroup (OR=2.34 CI 95% 1.36-4.05 I2=0% p=.983). Incentive 
interventions to promote TB screening show a high effectiveness (OR=8.51 CI 95% 
4.35-16.67) as in the case of appointment keeping (OR=4.19 CI 95% 2.25-7.81) and 
treatment adherence (OR=3.84 95% CI 1.45-10.13). Subgroup effect sizes are smaller 
for immunisation (OR=1.85 95% CI 1.26-2.73), cancer screening (OR=1.43 95% CI 
1.07-1.92) and the estimate is not significant for STI screening (OR=1.01 95% CI 0.74-
1.39).  
The subgroup analyses related to the proposed hypotheses are presented in Table 
4.9 below.  Results suggest that there was a negative effect of incentive size (adjusted to 
2012 prices): incentives <=$5 OR=4.50 (95% CI 2.37-8.55), >$5-10$ OR=5.05 (95% 
CI 1.25-20.39) and >$10 OR=1.59 (95% CI 1.15-2.20). Although there seems to be a 
slight improvement from incentives above $5, the estimate for incentives >$5-10$ has a 
wider confidence interval and very high heterogeneity (I
2
=94.2%). The estimates for the 
lower (<=$5) and higher incentives (>$10) have narrower confidence intervals and the 
latter has high reliability with no significant between-study heterogeneity.   
Cash appears to be more effective (OR=3.94 95% CI 1.84-8.46) than vouchers 
(OR=2.24 95% CI 1.04-4.85) and lotteries (OR=1.90 95% CI 1.37-2.65). The data also 
suggest a tendency for incentives to be offered immediately to be more effective 
(OR=3.26 vs. 2.11).  
The effect size of incentives when offered to patients of a low socioeconomic 
status is more than double than the effect size for more affluent patients (OR=3.98 95% 
CI 2.16-7.34 versus OR=1.5 95% CI 1.06-2.13). The analysis also included the effect of 
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the recipient and location simply as background variables – thus not included in my 
main hypotheses. Results suggested a slightly higher effectiveness of incentives offered 
for the compliance with health guidelines for children (OR=3.05 95% CI 1.99-4.68 
versus adults OR=2.57 95% CI 1.59-4.17) and offered to patients in the United States 
(OR=2.97 95% CI 1.92-4.58 versus Europe OR=1.88 95% CI 0.43-8.12).  
 
 
Odds Ratio (95% CI) Nº studies 
Incentive size <=$5 4.50(2.37-8.55) N=9 
 >$5-10$ 5.05(1.25-20.39) N=6 
 >$10 1.59(1.15-2.20) N=5 
Incentive scheme Cash 3.94(1.84-8.46) N=9 
 Vouchers 2.24(1.04-4.85) N=7 
 Lottery 1.90(1.37-2.65) N=4 
 Immediate delivery 3.26(1.69-6.25) N=12 
 Delayed delivery 2.11(1.39-3.20) N=8 
SES Low SES 3.98(2.16-7.34) N=14 
 Otherwise 1.50(1.06-2.13) N=6 
Recipient Children 3.05(1.99-4.68) N=5 
 Adults 2.57(1.59-4.17) N=15 
Location USA 2.97(1.92-4.58) N=18 
 Europe 1.88(0.43-8.12) N=2 
Table 4.9 Subgroup analyses for health care compliance 
 
 Meta-regression analyses in Table 4.10 tests if these differences are significant 
in explaining the heterogeneity found in the overall estimate. Four meta-regression 
analyses were performed by category of moderators (Table 4.10) taking in consideration 
the recommendations that there should be a limited number of covariates per meta-
regression analysis (Thompson & Higgins, 2001). The meta-regression coefficients are 
taken as the evidence for the hypotheses proposed for effect modifiers. Hypothesis 2 
about incentive size was not confirmed. In fact, the data suggests a negative effect of the 
size of the incentive. Incentives higher than $10 are less effective than incentives equal 
or inferior to $5 using the more liberal 10% significance level (B=-.892 p=.09). 
Hypothesis 3 about cash being more effective than goods-based incentives, hypothesis 
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4 about the incentive certainty and hypothesis 5 about the incentive immediacy are also 
not supported (B=-.571 p=.159, B=-.404 p=.406 and B=.030 p=.953).  
From the set of hypotheses proposed, hypothesis 7 is the only one clearly 
supported. The offer of financial incentives strongly increases health care compliance 
for low income patients compared to other participants (B=-.898 p=.023). This variable 
explains about 30% of the variability found in the impact of financial incentives. 
As already discussed in the qualitative review, there are not enough studies 
available in the literature to test hypothesis 6 (about the effect of negative incentives) 
and hypothesis 8 (about previous compliance behaviour).   
 
 
Table 4.10 Meta-regression analyses for health care compliance 
 
The meta-regression analyses showed the health care setting was the most 
important moderator of the effectiveness of patient incentives, explaining an 
overwhelming proportion of the heterogeneity found in the data (adjusted R
2
=90.5% 
F(5,13)=9.64 p<.001). Compared to STI screening (baseline category), financial 
incentives are effective to increase TB screening (B=2.13 p<.001), appointment keeping 
(B=1.4 p=.001), treatment adherence (B=.86 p=.048). The coefficient for immunisation 
is significant at .1 significance level (B=.675 p=.08). According to the results of this 
Hypothesis Coefficient (SE) p-value 95% CI
2 Incentive Size (baseline <=$5)
>$5-$10 .046(.532) .933 -1.078 1.169
$10+ -.892(.496) .090 -1.938 .155
3 Incentive Type (0=cash) -.571(.388) .159 -1.390 .247
4 Incentive Certainty (0=lottery) -.404(.473) .406 -1.402 .595
5 Incentive Delivery (0=immediate) .030(.506) .953 -1.055 1.116
7 Patient Income (0=low) (AdjR2=29.4%) -.898 (.359) .023 -1.656 -.139
Health setting (AdjR2=90.5%)
Appointment keeping 1.401(.346) .001 .653    2.150
Treatment adherence .865(.397) .048 .007 1.723
Immunization .675(.355) .08 -.092 1.442
Cancer screening .413(.325) .226 -.289 1.116
TB screening 2.133(.347) .000 1.382 2.883
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review, patient financial incentives are not effective to promote cancer screening (B=.41 
p=.226) and STI screening. 
 However, differences in the incentives offered in each health setting may be 
acting as confounding variables. I examined this question doing a simple aggregation of 
health settings according to the significance of the impact of incentives (Table 4.11). 
Given the small numbers of papers per group, I performed nonparametric tests 
comparing (i) the average incentive size offered in the studies, (ii) the proportion of 
cash-based incentives and (iii) proportion of studies with samples mostly composed by 
low income participants. I used these variables as comparators in concordance with 
meta-regression results, which suggested these three factors as the most influential. 
Results showed that the studies included in the health settings where incentives were 
effective, offered smaller incentives ($9.46 versus 47.86 p=.037) and were 
predominantly interventions targeting low income participants (92.4% of the studies 
p=.007).       
 
Health settings Incentive size ($) % Cash %low SES 
Incentives were effective  
(Nstudies=13) 
9.46  69.2% 92.3% 
Incentive were not effective 
(Nstudies=7) 
47.86 57.1% 28.6% 
 
Mann-Whitney U 
test p=.037 
X
2
=.292 
p=.474 
X
2
=8.802 
p=.007 
Table 4.11 Differences in the incentive offered and patient income per health settings 
 
4.4.3 Assessment of risk of bias 
Risk of bias was substantial in many studies included in the meta-analysis. Details about 
the method used for randomization were described in only two studies (Slater et al, 
2005; Low et al, 2007 both using generation of random numbers). Allocation 
concealment was unclear in all trials as well as the blinding of participants and 
supporting staff. With respect to baseline comparability, three in 20 studies (Barnett et 
al, 2009; Malotte et al, 2004; Moran et al, 1996) provided an adequate comparison. 
None of the four cluster trials (Reiss et al, 1976; Reiss & Bailey, 1982; Yokley & 
Glenwick, 1984; Diaz & Perez, 2009) adjust their estimates according to the group-level 
nature of the data. Four of the 20 included studies were first-authored by the same 
126 
 
        
scholar (Malotte et al, 1998; 1999; 2001; 2004) which can be considered a violation of 
data independence. On a positive note, there were no studies with incomplete data 
reporting or selective presentation of results.  
The difference in the quality of trials and their associated risk of bias is reflected 
in the smaller effect size estimates (OR=1.42 95% CI 1.13-1.79 vs. OR=3.65 95% CI 
2.19-6.09 p=.045 B=-.81 p=.045) of higher quality studies (Slater et al, 2005; Low et al, 
2007; Moran et al, 1996; Malotte et al, 1999). The data did not support a publication 
bias (Begg’s test=1.73 p=.084) but a small-study effect was confirmed with Egger’s test 
(z=2.13 p=.006).  
I present a funnel plot in Figure 4.6 below as a visual representation of a small-
study bias. Funnel plots are simple scatterplots of the treatment effects estimated from 
individual studies (horizontal axis) against a measure of study size (vertical axis). 
Standard error in the y axis is used as the measure of study size (Harbord et al 2009 in 
Sterne, 2009). Treatment effects in the x axis are plotted on a log scale. Interpretation of 
funnel plots is facilitated by the inclusion of diagonal lines that represent 95% 
confidence limits around the average estimate and delimit the expected distribution of 
studies in the absence of heterogeneity or biases. This funnel plot shows high dispersion 
in the estimates, suggesting two distributions of studies.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Funnel plot 
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This visual insight is confirmed with test for funnel plot asymmetry (Hardbord et 
al, 2009 in Sterne, 2009), which examine whether the association between the estimated 
effect of incentive interventions and sample size is greater than chance. The Harbord's 
test for small-study effects confirmed a bias introduced by small studies (2.251 p=.04). 
Therefore, more reliable estimates are given by larger studies (lower standard error) 
reporting lower effect sizes for incentive interventions. Very high effect sizes fall 
outside the 95% confidence interval - these lines are not strict 95% limits and thus are 
referred to as pseudo 95% confidence limits (Sterne, 2009).  
This difference is visually present in Figure 4.7, the funnel plot adjusted for 
sample size, comparing studies with sample sizes below and above N=200. Larger 
studies are clustered around the null effect and smaller studies spread across a wide 
range of effect sizes. This means that the more conservative estimate from larger studies 
(N>200) (OR=1.42 95% CI 1.13-1.79) is likely to be more representative of the ‘true’ 
effect of incentives to promote compliance than the unadjusted estimate (OR=3.06). 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Funnel plot adjusted for sample size 
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4.5 Discussion 
I presented the first piece of evidence quantifying the impact of patient financial 
incentives to increase health care compliance in the general population. Results from a 
random-effects meta-analysis showed an overall positive impact of financial incentives: 
patients offered a financial incentive are about 40% (OR=1.42 95% CI 1.13-1.79 
assuming a conservative estimate) more likely to comply with health care 
recommendations (supporting hypothesis 1). Contrary to initial predictions, most 
characteristics of the incentive schemes had no significant impact. Incentive size was 
the only incentive feature marginally significant at a .1 level, with a negative impact in 
the likelihood to comply with health care. In addition, the socioeconomic status of 
patients was the single effect modifier initially hypothesised that significantly explained 
at a 5% significance level the variability found in the impact of incentives (hypothesis 
7). Low income patients (by comparison to more affluent patients) were 2.5 times more 
likely to comply with health care when offered a financial incentive. I discuss below the 
results in greater detail. 
Firstly, the tendency for a negative effect of incentive size is concordant with 
an emerging literature on behavioural economics showing there is a complex 
relationship between incentives and behaviour (e.g., Pokorny, 2008; Ariely et al, 2009) 
– although it is still unclear the exact profile of this relationship. In the health settings 
under consideration, it seems that people want to get paid but not too much. A possible 
explanation for this tendency is that higher incentives increase perceived risk by 
signalling a potential threat e.g., a painful cancer screening procedure or a harmful 
vaccine. An alternative justification is that, under the offer of small incentives, people 
maintain their perception of autonomous behaviour, whereas higher incentives draw 
attention to the external control of patients’ decisions. This pattern in the results 
suggests that increasing the incentive size much over $10 (£5) could eventually crowd-
out health behaviour.  
Interestingly, this effect is not consistent with the results from Lussier et al 
(2006) in their meta-analysis, showing a positive monotonic effect of incentive size for 
drug abstinence. This difference may be indicative of the moderator role of the type of 
population: clinical (with diagnosed addiction problems) populations are more sensitive 
to the magnitude of rewards and punishments (Garavan & Weierstall, 2012). Or it is 
also possible that this difference corroborates the division between behaviours that 
require an immediate cost (as the behaviours examined in this work) and behaviours 
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that require an immediate withdrawal of reward (as drug abstinence, smoking cessation 
or healthy eating that were excluded from the analysis), more responsive to the size of 
compensatory rewards. 
A different explanation of this adverse effect of incentive size is unrelated to 
the amount of the incentive. It could be a question of reverse causation: health settings 
in which patients are known to be more resistant to comply may drive health providers 
to offer larger incentives, that are ultimately not effective because of baseline complex 
barriers associated with the specific nature of the health settings e.g., fear of painful 
cancer screening.    
Secondly, the socioeconomic status of patients was the single effect modifier 
significant at the conventional significance level. The higher impact of incentives in 
patients facing high economic deprivation may raise different points of view. On one 
hand, it puts forward the possibility that incentives could be used as a policy tool to 
tackle health inequalities (Oliver & Brown, 2012). This is a particularly important 
question because there is a call for tailored health interventions that acknowledge the 
specificities of different social groups (Michie et al, 2009). Interventions to promote 
health behaviour have been shown to adversely increase health inequalities, because 
often rely on assumption of knowledge promotion and goal setting, that may not 
necessarily fit the needs of deprived, poorly educated individuals (idem). But to others, 
this may imply that low income people feel coerced to comply with health organisations 
when incentives are offered (Parke et al, 2011) and, exactly because incentives have 
such a great impact in low income people, they should not be offered. 
Both incentive size and patient socioeconomic status appeared to be associated 
with the substantial variability explained by the health setting under analysis. Although 
not subject to a priori hypotheses, the health setting in which incentives were offered 
explained about 90% of all heterogeneity found in the effectiveness of incentive offers. 
Incentives were shown to highly increase the likelihood to comply with TB screening 
and to lesser extent, appointment keeping and treatment adherence – there was a 
marginal positive impact for immunisation. However, patient financial incentives were 
not effective in promoting cancer and STI screening. Analysing the differences between 
the health settings in which incentives were and were not effective, results showed that 
a significant impact was found in health settings with average offers under $10 and 
mostly targeting low income participants. This simple analysis should be interpreted as 
an observed pattern and not a robust statistical because of the small number of studies 
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included and the absence of causality in meta-analysis results. Nevertheless, it seems to 
corroborate the impact of patient deprivation and low value offers in effectiveness of 
incentive interventions in health compliance.  
The disparity in the impact of incentive interventions per health behaviour 
could also suggest that incentives are more effective and/or appropriate in addressing 
some barriers to compliance than others. Financial incentives may not be sufficiently 
motivating to overcome intricate barriers involving fear, anxiety or lack of trust in the 
health services – barriers typically reported for low compliance with STI and cancer 
screening (Guessous et al, 2010; Waller et al, 2009), contexts which were found here to 
be resistant to incentive offers. Low rates of appointment keeping are usually caused by 
simple and uncomplicated reasons like time constraints or memory lapses (Paige & 
Mansell, 2013), which may be easily surmounted by by the offer of an incentive – as 
my results strongly support for this setting of appointment keeping. This rationale poses 
an important cost-effectiveness question though. If it is the case that financial incentives 
are effective only in health settings where minor barriers to compliance have been 
identified, it is reasonable to assume that alternative nonfinancial interventions for 
simple barriers such as reminders or opportunistic screening (which have been proven 
effective e.g., Michie et al. 2008) should be preferred.  
The fact that none of the hypotheses about the characteristics of the incentive 
scheme were confirmed at the conventional level of significance raises the question 
about the predictive validity of the behavioural science underlying most of the 
hypotheses. Are standard incentive interventions enough? A result showing a positive 
effect of incentives without a significant impact from incentive scheme features is 
concordant with standard economic theory and there seems to be no need to resort to 
behavioural economics. 
This is not how I interpret these results. On one hand, the negative effect of 
incentive size clearly points to the need for explanations outside the realm of standard 
economics. On the other hand, the fact that no significant differences were detected may 
expose a true effect or it may be indicative of too much heterogeneity within each type 
of incentive category. For instance, let us assume that people have a strong preference 
for both cash and incentives offered with certainty. If most cash incentives were offered 
in the form of lotteries and most incentives offered with certainty were vouchers or 
coupons, treatment effects can be cancelled if one of the preferences is not dominant. 
Considering the variety of settings and populations included, this is a plausible 
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justification. And these subtleties cannot easily be disentangled in meta-analysis. I will 
further examine this question in the next chapter. 
An alternative explanation is that incentives people may consider most 
appealing – e.g., cash payments or thrilling lotteries – may not be considered suitable 
for health settings. Previous individual randomised controlled trials testing the 
difference between cash-based and goods-based incentives have shown that cash is 
more effective (Deren et al, 1994; Malotte et al, 1999; 2004; Kamb et al, 1998; Tulsky 
et al, 2004; Vandrey et al, 2007). But most of these studies were performed in the 
context of TB screening – usually targeting low income men – for which cash may be 
the best offer. Meta-regression estimates include studies that have offered cash not only 
to promote TB screening but also other health care behaviours for which the target 
population may not find cash an appropriate offer. Research on the public acceptability 
of incentives (Promberger et al, 2012) has shown that cash may be not considered 
acceptable in all circumstances and, for this reason, be less effective than expected in 
changing behaviour.  
On a different note, no difference was found between immediate (versus 
delayed) incentives (hypothesis 5). This result also contradicts the work of Lussier and 
colleagues (2006) on drug abstinence, showing a higher impact of incentives delivered 
immediately after behaviour. Similarly to the discussion made for incentive size, it is 
not clear if the lack of effect found here is due to incentives being offered to the general 
population with tends to have lower discount rates than clinical patients (MacKillop et 
al, 2011) or the type of behaviour in analysis. Assuming this indifference between 
immediate versus delayed incentives as a true effect, this may be useful to health 
organisations which are not always able to deliver incentives on-site. Incentives may 
only be offered after clinical results are available or only after some proof of 
compliance has been be delivered – and according to my results, postponing incentive 
deliver may not make a difference.  
It was not possible to test in the meta-analysis the effectiveness of negative 
versus positive incentives (hypothesis 6), despite the centrality of this debate in the 
literature (Marteau et al, 2009; Promberger et al, 2011), mostly influenced by the 
concept of loss aversion from prospect theory. There were only two other studies using 
penalties to change health behaviour, both related to penalties imposed to parents for 
lack of child immunisation. One study showed that no effect of this sanction (Minkovitz 
et al, 1999) but the other study (Kerpelman et al, 2000) found a significant impact of the 
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penalty. There are no studies directly comparing the impact of rewards versus penalties 
in health contexts. Cost-sharing studies (e.g., Meeker et al, 2011; Chernew et al, 2008; 
Maciejewski et al, 2009; Atella et al, 2006) provide numerous examples of the impact 
of increasing or decreasing copayments but (i) do not directly compare these different 
types of incentive in the same study and (ii) are mostly based on observational data.  
In addition, there was not sufficient data to analysis the difference between 
patients with different baseline adherence levels (hypothesis 8). There was a single RCT 
examining this difference (Stoner et al, 1998) and showed that the positive impact of 
incentives was mostly due to its effect on previously non-compliant patients. Incentives 
had no impact for patients already engaged with health care services. Nevertheless, this 
is still an isolated piece of evidence. 
As a background variable, it was also analysed the impact of study location. It 
could also be expected that incentives would have a higher impact in the US compared 
to the Europe because in the US most studies offered incentives to decrease or eliminate 
the costs of medical compliance that patients had to incur, whereas in Europe, 
incentives were offered as means to increase compliance to services that were already 
free of charge. Subgroup analyses showed a difference in this predicted direction.  
 
4.5.1 Limitations 
A possible limitation of this work is the variability of health contexts included and 
incentives offered, which may hinder the argument for an overall estimate. However, 
with several subgroup and meta-regression analyses, I believe to have sufficiently 
addressed the heterogeneity of the data and uncovered reliable results. One of the main 
pitfalls of meta-analysis is data dredging (Thompson & Higgins, 2002). This can only 
be avoided by pre-specification of covariates that will be investigated as potential 
sources of heterogeneity and this was done by proposing several a priori hypotheses to 
be tested. 
Another important point to stress is the considerable risk of bias that 
characterized many of the included studies. Studies at lower risk of bias provided a 
significantly smaller estimate for the impact of incentives which can be considered a 
more reliable effect size that the overall estimate (OR=1.42 95% CI 1.13-1.79 versus 
OR=3.06 95% CI 95% 2.04-4.57) and thus, the expected overall impact of incentives is 
likely to be smaller than the estimate not adjusted to study quality. Nevertheless, even 
based on a conservative estimate, incentives are likely to increase compliance by 42%. 
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Directly related to the point above mentioned, is the question of the boundaries 
in the definition of health care compliance. Although it can be considered that other 
behaviours could fit under the umbrella of health care compliance – defined as 
following medical guidelines - the included health behaviours share an immediate and 
relatively low cost to be borne in the present to achieve future health benefits. Contrary 
to smoking cessation (which requires an immediate withdrawal of a present reward) or 
exercise activities (which represent a present cost but more effortful and prolonged), the 
health contexts we analysed fall within a coherent category of health care compliance. 
This is a particularly compelling argument because no significant heterogeneity was 
found within-studies per health setting.  
 
4.5.2 Implications for future research 
The assessment of risk of bias exposes the need for well-designed, high powered 
randomised controlled trials to provide more accurate estimates of how much incentives 
change health. Future studies should also address the role of psychological 
characteristics in the response to incentives. There is a residual variability in the results 
that remains to be explained and it is likely that the idiosyncrasies of patients such as 
attitudes towards incentives (Promberger et al, 2011), sensitivity to rewards (Cooper & 
Gomes, 2008) or time preferences (Scharff & Viscusi, 2011) are important in 
understanding the effectiveness of financial incentives.  
The fact that incentive schemes characteristics such as type, size and delivery 
schedule did not reach significance as moderators of incentive effectiveness does not 
necessarily imply that these should be overlooked. On the contrary, more research is 
needed to understand if these features are truly irrelevant or if, to date, studies have not 
been sufficiently informed by behavioural research to make a difference. In the next 
chapters 5 and 6 I will further examine some of hypotheses that were not supported here 
using as research contexts STI screening and cancer screening – the two health settings 
for which no significant impact of incentives was found in the meta-regression. In both 
cases, a particular attention will be given to the development of the incentive schemes to 
clarify if the characteristics of the incentive offers are more effective when theoretically 
grounded.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Vouchers versus Lotteries in Chlamydia Screening 
 
In this cluster randomised trial (N=1060), I tested the impact of financial incentives (£5 
voucher vs. £200 lottery) framed as a gain or a loss to promote the uptake of Chlamydia 
screening – the leading STI in the UK. Compared to a control group (1.5%), the lottery 
increased screening to 2.8% and the voucher increased screening to 22.8%. Incentives 
framed as gains were marginally more effective (10.5%) that loss-framed incentives 
(7.1%) (p=.069) to increase Chlamydia screening.  
This study makes an innovative application of prospect theory to sexual health 
behaviour and health interventions. By comparing the impact of a small voucher with a 
larger lottery – framed as a gain or a loss - I test the predictive validity of prospect 
theory to change behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
examine these questions. Furthermore, it mimics the standard outreach approach used in 
student halls in the UK thus providing an estimate of the effect size for similar 
interventions if implemented – with and without the offer of an incentive. 
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5.1 Incentives as a common tool to promote Chlamydia screening 
The systematic review and meta-analysis in chapter 4 showed – overall – a positive 
effect of incentives but no significant impact of the characteristics of the incentive 
schemes offered to patients. These results are consistent with standard economics and 
there has been no particular need to resort to the standpoint of behavioural economics. 
However, this chapter and the following (Chapter 6) examine the robustness of these 
results when incentive interventions are theoretically grounded. I show in the next two 
field studies that the type, size and timing of the incentive do matter. This leads me to 
propose that the lack of effect from incentive features in the meta-analysis for 
compliance may be due to a heterogeneous combination of positive and adverse effects 
of incentive offers cancelling each other – adverse effects which can be identified and 
explained by behavioural science. I will pick up on this premise in the general 
discussion (chapter 7).  
 The present study tests a 2x2 factorial design intervention based on prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) to increase the 
uptake of Chlamydia screening. Chapter 4 also exposed the small number of 
experimental studies that tested the impact of incentives to promote STI screening and, 
from the limited available evidence, found no support for the use of financial incentives 
in this context. I examine the impact of two financial incentives - a voucher (£5) versus 
a lottery voucher (£200) – the two most common types of financial incentives used in 
the field by health organizations to promote Chlamydia screening (Zenner et al, 2012). I 
will provide a direct comparison of the same type of incentive (voucher) offered with 
certainty or uncertainty. These incentives will be framed either as a potential gain or a 
loss to participants, introducing a variation in the incentive offer that has been seldom 
used in health interventions. Reinstating one core motivation of this work, I will test if 
changing the salience and framing of the incentive offer changes its impact on 
behaviour. 
This study makes an innovative application of prospect theory to health 
interventions. By comparing the impact of a small voucher with a larger lottery – both 
framed either as potential gains and losses - I will be testing the predictive validity of 
prospect theory to change behaviour. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
operationalising prospect theory concepts in the design of behavioural field 
interventions. Furthermore, it mimics the standard outreach approach used in student 
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halls in the UK thus providing an estimate of the effect size of similar interventions if 
implemented – with and without the offer of an incentive. 
Chlamydia screening was the research context chosen for this study because 
Chlamydia is the most common STI in the world and has been the leading STI in the 
UK since 2000 (Low et al. 2013). The National Chlamydia Screening Programme 
(NCSP) was introduced in England in 2003 for sexually active young people under 25 
years old. However, the uptake of screening tests has been low, despite being offered 
free of charge to individuals. Only 10% to 20% of young people who are eligible to 
perform the test actually do it (Zenner et al, 2012), forgoing the opportunity of early 
detection and leading to a waste of public resources. Screening rates of young people 
outside the UK are also low (Berry et al, 2010; Low et al, 2012) which amplifies the 
relevance of this work outside UK borders. The largest proportion of cases in the UK is 
found among young people aged 18-25 years old living in London (Health Protection 
Agency, 2009) and these cases account for two thirds of all Chlamydia diagnoses in the 
country. Chlamydia is often referred to as the 'silent infection' as it tends to have no 
symptoms but, if left undiagnosed, can cause severe reproductive, skin and visual 
problems.  
Most interventions to date have tried to promote the screening uptake by 
increasing awareness to the incidence of the disease or by targeting practitioners with 
educational packages but the effectiveness of these interventions has been negligible 
(Ginige et al, 2007; Guy et al. 2011). The common causes reported by individuals for 
low screening rates are fear of stigma and embarrassment about performing a sexual 
health test - particularly regarding what other people might think - and anxiety about 
having to inform partners in a case of a positive result (Duncan et al, 2011; Mills et al, 
2006; Richardson et al, 2010). The offer of a financial incentive may also mitigate the 
embarrassment of performing STI screening because the presence of an incentive allows 
for external attributions of behaviour (Sabini et al, 2001; Burger and Caldwell, 2003). 
Incentives, as a salient external stimulus, may justify behaviour and act as a public 
validation for STI screening. 
Financial incentives have increasingly been used by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
in the UK to tackle the problem of low screening rates of Chlamydia (Health Protection 
Agency, 2009). With the purpose of evaluating the impact of incentives in Chlamydia 
screening in the UK, Zenner and colleagues (2012) examined observational data 
comparing the screening rate of PCTs offering incentives with control PCTs matched by 
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socio-demographic characteristics (population size and deprivation level) and baseline 
screening coverage (2007-2009). Forty-six of the 152 PCTs in England had used a total 
of 65 incentive schemes to increase Chlamydia screening coverage. The majority of 
incentive offers (62%) were prize draws ranging from a £50 voucher to a £500 holiday 
trip. The remaining schemes used smaller incentives as vouchers or coupons, which 
ranged in value from £5 to £10. Most incentives were delivered through outreach work 
(55%). Results showed that differences in average percentage point changes in 
screening coverage were significant (0.43%, CI 0.04%-0.82% p=.03), due to voucher 
schemes (2.35% p<.0001) but not lotteries and draw prizes (0.16% p=.4). Furthermore, 
the impact of vouchers was more accentuated in females (3.18% p<.0001) than males 
(1.55% p=.001).  
Nevertheless, while the observational evidence from Zenner and colleagues 
(2012) suggested that these schemes seem to make a difference, no causal inferences 
can be made from these results. Other observational studies (Currie et al, 2010; Martin 
et al. 2012) also report a positive impact but there is scarce experimental work to 
corroborate this evidence. Experimental evidence in the UK is restricted to a couple of 
papers. Low and co-workers (2007) found no impact of offering a £10 incentive when 
inviting a random sample of young people to perform screening. Dolan and Rusidill 
(forthcoming) also found no effect of offering £5 or £10 voucher incentives for kit 
return to young people who had requested a screening kit online. The authors reported 
high levels of kit return (because these participants were already motivated to perform 
the test) but no improved return for participants offered an incentive. The remaining 
experimental study on Chlamydia screening was developed in the US (Malotte et al, 
2004). Participants were offered either $20 cash or a $20 grocery voucher but only cash 
was effective. These experimental studies raise the question about the generalisability of 
Zenner and colleagues’ (2012) results.  
In general, most incentive schemes ran so far, although showing some degree of 
effectiveness, have no clear theoretical motivation. The development of theoretically 
driven schemes, particularly if tested in the field, may improve our understanding of 
which types and framing of incentives work, and enhance our ability to promote health 
behaviour change. According to Zenner et al (2012), the most common incentives used 
are small vouchers valued £5-£10 and lotteries ranging from £50 to £500. Thus, I will 
be testing the relative impact of a voucher (£5) versus a lottery voucher (£200). The 
comparison of a £5 voucher with a £200 lottery cannot be taken as a direct test of 
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overweighing of small probabilities (Kanheman & Tversky, 1979) because this would 
require two lotteries with similar expected value but different probabilities. 
Nevertheless, my work will shed light on the impact of a small certain versus a higher 
uncertain incentive of the same type – a voucher. 
Very few interventions have used incentives in the form of lotteries to promote 
health care compliance but these have generally reported positive results in various 
health settings (Sigmon and Stitzer, 2005; Volpp et al. 2008). The exception was the 
offer of lotteries in a STI context where no significant increase was found for 
Gonorrhoea screening (Chacko et al. 1987). This may indicate that STI screening is 
particularly resistant to financial incentives and to lotteries in particular. The 
observational data from Zenner and colleagues (2012) found that vouchers (but not 
lotteries) had a positive impact, suggesting a preference for certainty in this context 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1986).  
Another feature of prospect theory, loss aversion, will be examined by framing 
the incentive offer either as a potential gain or as a potential loss. The concept of loss 
aversion is related to the fact that people are more sensitive to losses than gains of an 
equal value. The same outcome is valued differently if framed as the prospect of a gain 
or a loss in relation to some reference point. This idea, initially developed in the context 
of financial gambles, became very influential in health communication research 
(Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012). Message framing aims to provide a theoretically 
grounded development of effective health messages, mostly based on results from 
prospect theory (Rothman et al, 2006). Messages emphasizing the costs of not behaving 
in a healthy manner are designated as loss-framed whereas communications 
highlighting the benefits of engaging in healthy behaviour are referred to as gain-framed 
(Rothman & Updegraff, 2010). Heavily influenced by the predictions of loss aversion in 
the case of risky financial decisions, research on health messages often assumes that 
loss-framed messages are more effective in promoting behaviour change (Rice, 2013). 
The evidence is mixed, however, and there is no clear support for the superiority of 
loss-framing.  
Studies tend to divide the analysis by illness prevention versus illness detection: 
examples of preventive behaviour are smoking cessation, safe sex or sunscreen use, 
whereas detection is related to STI screening or cancer screening. There is some 
consensus that gain-framed messages are more likely to encourage prevention 
behaviours (Kiene et al, 2005; O’Keefe & Jesen, 2008, 2009; Gallagher & Updegraff, 
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2012) but results with respect to illness detection are not conclusive. Some studies 
support the use of loss-framed messages to increase screening (O’Keefe and Jensen, 
2009; Rothman et al. 1999, 2006; Kiene et al, 2005) but more recent papers fail to find 
any association (Alk et al, 2011; Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012). Regarding Chlamydia 
screening, Urban and co-workers (2006) evaluated the impact of gain versus loss-
framed messages in the intention to obtain screening and reported no difference between 
the two types of messages. This study was based on self-reported intention to screen and 
thus it is yet to be shown the impact of framing on actual Chlamydia screening rates. 
But if research on the framing of health outcomes is extensive, the framing of 
incentive messages is under-researched. Patients can be offered the possibility to gain a 
reward for screening and bear a loss in the absence of screening. And this is a different 
application of framing effects compared to previous research which has mostly framed 
outcome information, that is, what is framed is the result of people behaving or not in a 
healthy manner. Despite the existence of some studies about incentive framing in other 
settings (Etchart-Vicent & l’Haridon, 2011; Madhavan et al, 2012), suggesting that loss-
framed incentives are stronger motivators, within health research there is scarce 
evidence.  
A couple of studies compare the different impact of offering successive gains 
with deducting successive losses from an initial endowment but most evidence comes 
from smoking cessation interventions (Gine et al, 2010) - which may not be directly 
transposable to STI screening.  In a study by Romanowich and Lamb (2013), 
participants could either gain $75 per day or lose $75 per day (initial 
endowment=$375). Loss-framed participants were more likely to achieve at least one 
day abstinence and tended to reduce the amount smoked more than gain-framed 
participants. But in opposition, Roll and Howard (2008) found a positive effect from 
gain-framed incentives in smoking abstinence and an adverse effect from loss-framing.  
These limited and contradictory results call for further clarifying studies. 
Moreover, although both these studies are informative about the impact of incentive 
framing, both cases involve real gains and losses, not strictly framing effects.  
This study makes an innovative application of Prospect theory to sexual health 
behaviour and health interventions. By comparing the impact of a small voucher with a 
larger lottery – framed as a gain or a loss – I make an attempt to test the impact both the 
certainty effect and loss aversion from prospect theory to change health behaviour. I 
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contribute to the literature by examining these questions in combination and providing 
evidence from the field.  
  
5.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this study are the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The uptake of Chlamydia screening will be higher in incentive groups. 
This hypothesis is derived from standard economics and operant conditioning (Gneezy 
et al. 2011; Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer, 2012) in that ceteris paribus an incentive will 
increase the likelihood of behaviour occurence.  
 
Hypothesis 2. A £5 voucher will increase the uptake of Chlamydia screening more 
than a £200 lottery.  
The certainty effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) and previous observational studies 
using incentives in sexual health (Chacko et al. 1987; Zenner et al. 2012) suggest a 
small certain incentive will be more effective than a prize draw.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Loss-framed incentives will be more effective than gain-framed 
incentives to increase the uptake of Chlamydia screening.  
This hypothesis is derived from prospect theory and the concept of loss aversion 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992).  
 
  
5.3 Method 
 
5.3.1 Sampling and sample size calculations  
The study was approved by the LSE Ethics Committee. This study followed CONSORT 
guidelines for cluster RCTs (Campbell et al. 2004). Participants in this study were 
individuals aged 18-24 years living in student halls in London (n=1060) as the core 
target population of the National Chlamydia Screening Programme in the UK. Four 
halls from three different Universities agreed to participate in this study. To avoid 
treatment contamination (i.e., students becoming aware of different incentives being 
offered to others), each hall was randomly selected to receive a different type of 
incentive.  
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Due to the clustered nature of the sample, power calculations were necessary to 
evaluate the design effect of the study. The design effect is the amount by which the 
sample size should be multiplied. This amount depends on how much more alike 
individuals are within a given cluster (=hall) than those from different clusters, 
designated by intraclass correlation coefficient or ICC (Wade and Koutoumanou, 
2011).The lower the coefficient, the more individuals from different clusters are similar. 
There is no objective measure for the ICC in this study and there are no similar previous 
studies to serve as benchmark. I establish ICC at .01 because participants, although 
living in different halls, are all undergraduate students under 25 living in London with 
no significant age difference between halls (95% of students within the 18-24 range, 
mean 20.19 SD=2.9) and a similar mix of socio-demographic characteristics (gender 
and ethnicity). The average number of individuals per cluster was 265 resulting in a 
design effect of 3.641
4
. This would correspond to n=73 per hall in a design with simple 
randomisation which has, at a .05 significance level, 80% power to detect around a 10% 
uptake difference between groups.  
Regarding the gain versus loss framing of the incentive offered, there was a 
simple randomisation within-hall by room number (coin flip determined even 
numbers=loss framing; odd numbers=gain framing). In each hall, only one type of 
incentive was offered (£5 voucher or £200 lottery) but this was framed as a gain to half 
the students and as a loss to the remaining half. In the leaflet distributed to students (see 
procedure below) this difference is not easily detected even if students discussed the 
offer of the incentive among each other because the salient features (type and size of 
incentive) remained the same (Appendix 3).  
Although this study has four experimental conditions (2 framing x 2 type of 
incentive) and control group, only the type of incentive (voucher or lottery) required 
cluster randomisation between-halls. Therefore, the four halls were randomly selected to 
test the offer of the voucher, the lottery or no incentive. As there were three intervention 
arms and four halls, two halls needed to have the same intervention. Random number 
generation allocated the halls to interventions: the lowest number would be the control 
group, the second lowest number was attributed the lottery and the two highest numbers 
corresponded to the voucher offer.  
 
                                                 
4
 Design effect=1+(average number of individuals per cluster-1)xICC) 
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5.3.2 Procedure  
The National Chlamydia Programme in the UK works mostly through opportunistic 
screening i.e., when young people register with the NHS or visit their GP for different 
reasons. Students living in halls are mostly approached through a proactive strategy by 
outreach organisations that offer free screening on site (Jenkins et al. 2012). Zenner and 
colleagues (2012) confirmed that most incentives schemes were offered through 
outreach work (55%) and thus this is also the strategy used in this study.  
Chlamydia information leaflets were placed under each student’s individual 
room door. All leaflets include the standard NHS Chlamydia information that appears in 
NHS informational brochures related to the infection. Experimental groups received 
additional information about the incentive offer. The students were invited to pick up a 
test in their hall’s reception, perform the test in their rooms and return it to the reception 
on the same or next day. The test consisted in proving a urine sample in a plastic cup. 
This direct delivery method and home testing has been proven more effective than 
inviting participants to perform the test in a clinical context (Tebb et al, 2004; Cook et 
al, 2007) because it transmits a sense of control and privacy to patients. 
The dependent variable used in this study was the return of the screening kits. 
Although the pick-up rates could already suggest some difference between the 
experimental groups, the main measure of the effectiveness of a screening programme is 
the final completion rates of the tests. Thus, I will only be reporting on the return of the 
screening kits. 
  
 
5.3.3 Incentive scheme 
Individuals set budgets for spending and allocate expenses in various categories e.g., for 
food, accommodation, clothing (Thaler, 1999). There is evidence that these categories 
are not fungible as people usually make strict budget allocations (Hastings and Shapiro, 
2013). When the budget for personal luxury (e.g., special dinners, expensive clothing) 
reaches its maximum, people usually do not transfer funds from regular accounts (e.g., 
household expenses, transportation). Therefore, we expect the offer of unexpected gift 
cards to be appealing to students, which usually live with a limited budget.  
The incentives offered were HMV gift cards under the forms of a £5 voucher or 
a £200 lottery. HMV is a retailing company in the area of entertainment with a range of 
products including audio, books, Blue-ray discs, CDs, computer software and hardware, 
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DVDs, video games, posters, as well as an increasing range of clothing and fashion 
items. The £5 voucher value was chosen as the small incentive to correspond to the 
relatively effortless task of this type of screening. The £200 lottery was selected to be 
sufficiently engaging for students. Participants were not informed of the likelihood to 
win the lottery (e.g., how many students would be included in the drawn) which may 
carry limitations in its comparison with the voucher as there are no comparable 
expected values. Nevertheless, in real settings involving prize draws e.g., National 
Lottery, Lotto, people are hardly ever informed of their probability to win the prize. 
Hence, although the effectiveness of the voucher and the lottery cannot be compared on 
grounds on their expected value, it compares small certain versus higher uncertain 
incentives and hold a high external validity because it reflects the reality of public 
health interventions.  
Participants in the voucher groups received the incentive on-site upon return of 
the screening kit. Students performing screening in the lottery group were enrolled in a 
prize draw and told the results would be announced the next day. Through random 
number generation, participants were randomly attributed an ID number in an excel 
sheet and the winner selected through the random return function. The winner was 
informed by email and sent the £200 voucher by post.  
 
 
5.3.4 Study Design  
This study used a 2 (framing: gain, loss) x 2 (type of incentive: certain, uncertain) 
design with a control group (Table 5.1). Halls of residence were randomised to receive 
one of these four incentive offers (four experimental groups) or no offer of incentive 
(control group). Copies of the leaflets delivered are presented in Appendix 3. The offer 
of incentive was framed as following for the ‘gain’ interventions:  
- “If you pick up the screening test and return it, you will gain a £5 HMV voucher” 
(certain small gain)  
- “If you pick up the screening test and return, you will gain the chance to participate in 
a £200 HMV voucher lottery” (uncertain high gain)  
In the ‘loss’ interventions, students were informed that:  
- “If you don’t pick up the screening test and/ or don’t return it, you will lose a £5 HMV 
voucher” (loss of a certain small gain)  
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- “If you don’t pick up the screening test and/ or don’t return it, you will lose the chance 
to participate in a £200 HMV voucher lottery” (loss of an uncertain high gain).  
 
 Incentive Frame 
Gain Loss 
In
ce
n
ti
v
e 
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
C
er
ta
in
 
Receive £5 HMV 
voucher if returns the test 
Loses £5 HMV voucher if doesn’t 
return the test 
U
n
ce
rt
a
in
 Participate in a lottery to 
win £200 HMV voucher 
if returns the test 
Loses the possibility to participate in 
a lottery to win £200 HMV voucher 
if doesn’t return the test 
Table 5.1 Incentive scheme for the Chlamydia screening trial 
 
 
The leaflets include an image of the voucher that could be received upon 
screening performance, in an attempt to elicit feelings of perceived ownership and an 
endowment effect. Previous research has shown that perceived ownership can be 
increased by the mere touch with imagery of an object (Peck & Shu, 2009). I present the 
image of the voucher and its value in the leaflets distributed to students expecting to 
increase the psychological salience of the offer (Ariely et al, 2005; Yechiam & 
Hochman, 2013a,b).   
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Incentive versus control  
Chlamydia kit return was significantly higher when financial incentives were offered – 
regardless of the type of incentive - confirming Hypothesis 1. Those who received an 
offer of a financial incentive were more likely to return the kit than those who did not 
receive an incentive offer (χ2=20.040 df=1 p<.001): only 1.5% of the students from 
control group returned the kits that they had picked up compared to 8.9% of students 
that were offered incentives.  
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5.4.2 Voucher versus Lottery  
Offering a voucher was more successful at leading to test kit returns than offering an 
opportunity to take part in a lottery. This result confirms hypothesis 2, which 
predicted the voucher to be more effective than the lottery. There was a significant 
difference in the proportion of Chlamydia kits returned according to the type of 
incentive (χ2=75.541 d.f. =1 p<.001), with a higher return of Chlamydia kits when a £5 
voucher was offered (22.8%) compared to a £200 lottery (2.8%).  
 
5.4.3 Gain versus loss framing  
The effect of framing the incentive offer as a potential gain or loss was confirmed at .1 
level of significance. Gain-framed incentives were marginally more effective than loss-
framed incentives (10.5% vs. 7.1%; χ2=2.589 df=1 p=.069). This result does not 
confirm Hypothesis 3 which predicted that loss framed incentives would be more 
effective to increase kit return. Although the sample size does not allow a formal 
interaction test, a frequency analysis of returned kits per type of incentive vs. framing 
does not suggest an interaction (Figure 5.1). For both types of incentives there was a 
slightly higher return in the case of gain framed messages but not significant in either 
case (Voucher (χ2=.128 df=1 p=.425; Lottery (χ2=1.192 df=1 p=.206).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Uptake of Chlamydia kits per type of incentive vs. framing 
 
5.4.4 Gender distribution and kit return  
Halls had different gender proportions (χ2=84.811 df=3 p<.001) with a higher female 
proportion in the halls in which incentives were offered. This was controlled for in the 
regression analysis. Gender makes no statistically significant difference in whether a kit 
was returned in the control group (male 1.1% vs. female 2% χ2=0.463 p=0.661) but 
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proportionally more men than women returned screening kits when an incentive was 
offered (male 17.6% vs. female 8.3% χ2=10.302 p=0.002).  
 
5.4.5 Logistic Regression Model 
I performed a logistic regression model to examine the determinants of Chlamydia 
screening uptake (Table 5.2). The offer of a financial incentive was a significant 
predictor (B=2.719 p=.001).  
 
Screening uptake Β SE β z P>z Lower 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
Incentive (0=no incentive) 2.719 .795 3.42 0.001 1.159 4.279 
Type (0=voucher; 1=lottery) -1.180 .327 -3.61 0.000 -1.822 -.539 
Framing (0=loss; 1=gain) .117 .162 0.72 0.471 -.201 .436 
Hall -.103 .205 -0.50 0.616 -.507 .300 
Gender (0=male; 1=female) -.264 .151 -1.75 0.080 -.560 .031 
Constant -1.921 .437 -4.39 0.000 -2.778 -1.064 
LR chi2(4) =89.11 Prob>chi2=0.0000; Loglikelihood=-197.14929; PseudoR2=0.1843 
Table 5.2 Logistic regression analysis of Chlamydia screening kit return 
 
The type of incentive was also a factor influencing the uptake of screening (B=-
1.180765 p<.001). The negative sign of the coefficient reflects the higher effectiveness 
of the voucher compared to the lottery. The impact of the cluster randomisation was 
controlled by introducing student hall as covariate and this variable did not have a 
significant effect. Gender was marginally significant (p=.08) exhibiting a tendency for 
male students (compared to females) being more likely to perform screening upon the 
offer of a financial incentive.  
 
5.5 Discussion 
This study tested the impact of financial incentives to promote Chlamydia screening in 
18-24 years old undergraduate students in a naturalistic setting – student halls of 
residence. The incentive offered was a HMV voucher either in the form of a £5 voucher 
or a £200 lottery voucher. Incentive messages were framed as either a gain (e.g., If you 
pick up the screening test and return it, you will gain a £5 HMV voucher) or a loss (e.g., 
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If you don’t pick up the screening test and/ or don’t return, you will lose a £5 HMV 
voucher).  
Results showed that the offer of an incentive was effective in increasing the 
return rate of Chlamydia screening kits (8.9% of students returned their kits versus 1.5% 
for those with no incentive offer). This finding corroborates hypothesis 1 and past 
observational studies (Currie et al, 2010; Martin et al. 2012; Zenner et al, 2012).  
Results also showed that a £5 voucher was more likely to result in a returned test 
kit (22.8%) than offering students a £200 lottery (2.8%). This confirms hypothesis 2 and 
the work of Chacko et al (1987) in the United States, also failing to find any effect of a 
lottery to promote STI screening. The preference for vouchers over lotteries is 
consistent with Zenner et al (2012) which reached a similar conclusion using 
observational data. I propose that, in the case of an activity which requires an immediate 
effort and discomfort like a STI screening test, a certain reward is more effective.  
It could be argued that an uncertain gain of £200 may not be sufficiently 
motivating for students to perform a STI screening test. However, a comparison with 
other studies which have offered lotteries to promote health behaviour (e.g., Yokley and 
Glenwick, 1984; Moran et al, 1996; Rhodes et al, 2003; Volpp et al, 2008) lead me to 
question this possibility because lotteries as low as £5 have been showed to be effective. 
Moreover, there could have been an the influenced of an immediacy effect because 
lottery incentive was offered delayed i.e., the next day and young people who are 
particularly driven by immediate rewards (O´Brien et al, 2011; Worthy et al, 2011). 
However, meta-regression results in chapter 4 did not show a significant different 
impact between immediate versus delayed incentives.    
Interestingly, my study does not support other UK experimental study (Low et 
al, 2007) which found no effect for a £10 voucher to promote Chlamydia screening. 
This divergence could be due to population specificities and methodological 
differences: Low et al (2007) send an invitation for screening by post to young people 
not living in student halls. However, it could also be the case that this difference is 
explained by incentive size. My meta-regression results in the previous chapter (chapter 
4) showed a marginal negative effect for incentives $10+ compared with lower 
incentives. The £5 voucher incentive offered in this study corresponds to $8 and £10 
voucher translates into $16. I will return to this question in the next chapter.  
There was a marginal difference between gain versus loss incentive framing but 
in the opposite direction of initial predictions, with gain framing being slightly more 
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effective than loss framing (10.5% vs. 7.1% respectively). This result did not support 
hypothesis 3, a hypothesis based on loss aversion from prospect theory. Our results 
contradict some studies on smoking cessation (Gine et al, 2010; Romanowich & Lamb, 
2013) but, in their case, there was an actual initial endowment and thus, an actual loss. 
In my study, students could forego a gain but would not suffer from a real loss. The 
voucher image it may not have been successful in creating a psychological sense of 
ownership. While some research suggest that mere imagery and touch is enough (Peck 
& Shu, 2009), others (Morewedge et al, 2009; Reb & Connolly, 2010; Knetsch & 
Wong, 2009) propose that the endowment effect only occurs in the case of actual 
physical possession of the object, more than simply by eliciting a psychological 
ownership. Another possible, simpler, explanation is based on the review by Alk et al 
(2011) showing that health message framing is more effective at producing changes in 
attitudes and intentions than actually altering health behaviour.  
An alternative justification is that smoking cessation is not directly comparable 
to STI screening. In fact, one of the fundamental distinctions made in this work in the 
introductory chapter is between intermittent behaviours (in which STI screening is 
included) versus habitual behaviours (in which smoking is included). One of our 
fundamental premises for this distinction was that the utility from the offer of a 
financial incentive could be different in a context of habitual addictive behaviours that 
provide an immediate gratification (smoking) compared to behaviour that involve an 
immediate cost (screening). A sequence of loss-framed incentives may be more 
effective to tackle habitual addictive behaviours than a single potential loss motivates 
people to engage in behaviour that already involves perceived costs. 
It could be the case that loss-framing is mostly effective when framing outcomes 
that people want to avoid (which has been the focus of most past research on framing 
effects) but not when framing potential offers or benefits. In this case, framing an 
incentive offer as a potential gain may create a positivity effect that makes gain-framing 
more effective. Incentive offers have been shown to increase positive mood (Meloy et 
al, 2006) for which gain-framed messages are congruent and not a conflicting or 
mismatching stimuli like loss-framed messages. A fairly similar effect has been 
reported in the negotiation literature: negotiation offers framed as gains to the other 
party lead to better outcomes than loss framed offers (De Dreu et al, 1994). In a certain 
way, when health providers offer financial incentives to promote health behaviour, there 
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is an implicit negotiation of the terms by which patients accept to comply with health 
care.  
The work by Hanrick et al (2007) raises another argument. They showed that 
gains loom larger than losses for small amounts of money up to €10. Accordingly, a 
gain-framed £5 incentive should be more appealing than a loss-framed £5 is upsetting. 
However, this result should not occur for the £200 lottery unless people do no code the 
lottery value by its overall payoff but estimate its expectd value.  
Young men were particularly motivated by the offer of an incentive: there was a 
significant gender difference in kit return when the £5 voucher was offered (male 17.6% 
vs. female 8.3%). This evidence contradicts Zenner and co-workers (2012) which found 
the opposite result using observational data. It is remains unclear if my results are 
specific to the incentive used (men may prefer HMV vouchers to other type of incentive 
offered in previous studies) or reflect a more general tendency. My data is consistent 
with previous experimental studies offering incentives in the context of STI screening 
(Gift et al, 2004) and research showing that men have a greater sensitivity to reward 
than women (Segal and Podoshen, 2005; Silverman, 2003). Although men tend to have 
higher risk-taking levels than women (Weaver et al, 2012) suggesting that the lottery 
could have a greater appeal for males, no significant difference was found between the 
sexes for this particular incentive.  
 
5.5.1 Policy Implications  
My results combined with a few other previous studies (Chacko et a, 1987; Zenner et al, 
2012) indicate that certain incentives, even if small in size, are a better strategy than 
prize draws to promote Chlamydia screening in young people. And given that STI 
screening mostly targets young people, the incentive offer should be compatible with 
the age range e.g., entertainment gift-cards, clothing vouchers. Research about the 
public acceptability for incentive use (Promberger et al, 2011) also suggests vouchers as 
acceptable offers to a young student population. 
However, an overview of all studies that have offered financial incentives to 
promote Chlamydia screening (Kissinger et al, 2000; Malotte et al, 2004; Low et al, 
2007; Currie et al, 2010, 2012) shows that roughly only about half the interventions 
were successful, strongly suggesting that are not a universal remedy in this context. 
At the population level, the differences found in a pilot study may represent a 
considerable increase in screening coverage but pose, nevertheless, the questions of 
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sustainability and cost-effectiveness. On one hand, the macro-level implications of 
increasing screening rates with such an intervention should be analysed. My results 
show an absolute risk reduction (ARR) of 7.4% by offering financial incentives, 
corresponding to 219 young people needed to be incentivised to avert one future case of 
Chlamydia – assuming a 6.2% prevalence rate from Roberts et al (2007). For the lottery 
intervention, ARR is 1.3% and the number needed to incentivise is 1271. For the 
voucher intervention, the ARR is 21% and the number need to incentivise is 76. This 
suggests that a significantly lower number of young people would need to be invited if 
offered a voucher compared to a lottery or no incentive. And the cost per returned test 
according to Robinson et al (2007) is estimated to be £18.55 in the voucher group 
whereas under the lottery prize, the cost per returned test is £27.85. The cost per 
returned test using lotteries can be reduced by increasing the number of people entering 
the prize draw. If the same £200 lottery was offered to 2000 young people, the cost per 
returned test would have been £17.12.   
 
5.5.2 Limitations and future research  
The main limitation of this study is the clustered nature of the data which increases the 
uncertainty about the independence of observations. Nevertheless, I provided effect size 
calculations and controlled for the impact of hall variation in the regression analysis. A 
higher number of clusters (in our case, student halls) could have minimised the impact 
of cluster randomisation in the data. Future studies should address this sampling 
limitation and design more robust interventions with individual-level randomisation.  
With respect to the incentives offered, it is possible that a cash incentive could 
have been more effective (Mallote et al, 2004). There were restrictions from the ethics 
and academic committees which limited incentives to vouchers and of reduced amount: 
initially I proposed a £2000 lottery voucher to approximate the expected value from a 
£5 voucher which was rejected. HMV vouchers were chosen as an incentive potentially 
attractive to most students but we cannot exclude the possibility that other gift cards 
could be more appealing. Future studies should examine more thoroughly the 
moderating effect of the type of incentive. Even if the evidence to date suggests that 
small certain incentives are more adequate than prize draws to promote Chlamydia 
screening, it is still necessary to establish which specific type of incentive (clothing gift-
cards, food vouchers, electronic gadgets etc) is more successful.  
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A potential confounding aspect may have been present in the framing of 
incentive offers. I presented the image of the voucher in the leaflet in an attempt to 
create an endowment effect or psychological ownership towards the voucher (Peck & 
Shu, 2009) and thus increase loss aversion (Ariely et al, 2005). However, the voucher 
image was present in both the gain and loss-framed messages. The manipulation may 
have successfully at creating a loss aversion effect in both conditions or, if the 
manipulation was unsuccessful, no true loss aversion condition was created. Future 
research should attempt to manipulate loss aversion in a more tangible way whenever 
possible e.g., by giving incentives to subjects in advance but that could only redeemable 
upon performing screening.  
The overall low kit return (8.9%) even with an incentive could be explained by 
our procedure: inviting students to voluntarily perform Chlamydia screening, most of 
which had no prior information about the disease, may be an unproductive strategy. 
Nevertheless, this procedure is consistent with the common outreach approach from 
health organisations in the UK. Every year, students living in University halls are 
offered free Chlamydia screening in a similar way. Our study suggests this approach 
should be reconsidered given the very low kit return in the control group (1.5%) which 
can be taken as a proxy of the success that outreach strategies have in student halls 
without any offer of financial incentives. But, within the existent outreach approaches, 
this direct contact with student in halls of residence may nevertheless be a good 
strategy. A direct approach may facilitate engagement with the screening process.  
Administrative services from student halls did not have extensive information 
about the students living in their facilities. They did not have information about student 
income levels (or the socioeconomic status of their families) and no record of past 
Chlamydia screening. This information could not be retrieved at Universities or Health 
Centres given the variety of academic affiliations of the students. Thus, research 
question 3 about past (screening) behavior and income level could not be examined in 
this study. Furthermore, it was not feasible to collect this missing information or any 
other supplementary data on individual differences directly with the students due to a 
risk for self-selection bias. Students could have been contacted by email before or after 
the intervention to complete an online survey measuring potentially important 
psychological constructs as risk attitudes or time preferences; however, only a particular 
group of students (e.g., those who were planning to take the test) could have agreed to 
answer the survey. This would have eliminated the purpose of randomization and would 
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have transformed the study, at best, into a quasi-experiment, assuming that there would 
be enough students per experimental condition answering the survey. 
Future research should also address the long-term unknown effects of offering 
incentives to change sexual health behaviours, particularly in young people. The offer of 
incentives for young people to engage in health behaviour may have potentially 
negative effects in the way they shape their future relationship with health services, by 
instigate an expectation of conditional rewards. This remains to be answered.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Segregating Gains in Colorectal Cancer Screening 
 
In this randomised controlled trial, I test the impact of segregating incentives 
(separating a single payoff in two rewards) to increase the uptake of colorectal cancer 
screening. Incentivising colorectal cancer screening provides a naturalistic setting to test 
how people prefer the distribution of gains (incentives) in a temporal sequence of 
events. Screening was framed as a multistep process and I test the effect of one €10 
incentive (offered upon completion of screening) versus two €5 incentives (offered at 
the beginning and the end of screening). This field experiment makes a pioneering 
contribution to the literature by providing the first experimental test of preference for 
sequences of outcomes – and in a critical public health setting. Eligible participants 
were patients aged 50-74 (N=2478) with no screening history within the past two years 
in a Portuguese public health centre. Patients were randomly allocated to receive an 
offer of €10, two offers of €5 or no incentive (control group). Compared to the control 
group (53%), the uptake of screening was 41% for participants offered one incentive 
(B=-.220 p=.02) and 61% for patients offered two incentives (B=.150 p=.04). These 
results suggest a preference for segregated gains in sequences of temporally distant 
outcomes. Furthermore, this evidence suggests a motivational crowding-out effect of a 
single offer of €10 that is avoided when smaller incentive offers (€5) are given. 
Theoretical contributions and policy implications are discussed. 
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6.1 Colorectal cancer screening as a sequence of events 
In the last empirical chapter of my thesis (this chapter 6), I test the impact of 
segregating incentives (separating a single payoff in two incentives) to increase the 
uptake of colorectal cancer screening. This study makes a ground-breaking contribution 
to the literature as the first study testing preferences for sequences of outcomes in the 
field. Incentivising colorectal cancer screening provides a real setting to test how people 
prefer the distribution of gains (incentives) in a temporal sequence of events. 
Unlike most other cancer screening procedures, in which patients go to health 
care facilities to perform screening e.g., mammography, Pap smear or ultrasound, in the 
case of colorectal cancer patients are responsible for performing the test at home in a 
more lengthy process. The most common procedure is a faecal occult blood test (FOBT) 
characterised by patients (i) picking up a screening kit or receiving it by post, (ii) 
collecting stool samples at home over several days and (iii) return the results to the lab.  
The complexity and duration of this screening process depends on national guidelines 
but despite some variability in the process across countries, there are usual several 
stages which enable us to frame this procedure as a sequence of events and support the 
generalisation of our results. 
Therefore, in this study, screening was explicitly framed as a 3-step sequence 
process and I test the effect of offering one €10 incentive (upon completion of 
screening) versus two segregated €5 incentives (offered at the beginning and the end of 
screening). According to Varey and Kanheman (1992), a compelling heuristic for the 
evaluation of extended episodes is to focus on a few selected points as a proxy for the 
whole event and a focus on the beginning and end experiences are the common 
moments chosen by people – supporting my choice for the segregation of the single €10 
incentive into an initial €5 offer upon engagement in screening and a final €5 offer upon 
the conclusion of screening. 
This study is original in the literature for its combination of methodological 
robustness and theoretical contributions. On one hand, I provide field data from a large 
randomised controlled trial (N=2478) about the impact of patient incentives to promote 
colorectal cancer screening – the first study ever examining the offer of tangible patient 
financial incentives to tackle this critical public health problem. In a review of the 
literature, Stone and colleagues (2002) showed that the large majority of interventions 
to promote colorectal cancer screening have been (i) educational, with the dissemination 
of information about the disease and benefits from screening and (ii) through reminders, 
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prompting patients to undergo screening. Of both interventions, only the latter was 
shown to have a significant impact. In addition to reminders, Stone and colleagues 
identified financial incentives as the only other patient-centred effective intervention. 
However, they have seldom been used (Holden et al, 2010), strictly in the United States 
and of a different nature of the incentives examined in my work.  
There are only a couple of studies offering incentives to promote colorectal 
cancer screening and both use incentives under the format of prepaid postage for the 
return of screening tests by post. Miller and Wong (1993) reported a 61% return rate for 
the control group (no prepaid postage) and 74% for the incentive group (prepaid 
postage) (p=.02). Freedman and Mitchell (1994) reported a 57% uptake rate for the 
control group and 71% for the incentive group but these differences were not 
significant. Nevertheless, incentives in the form of prepaid postage (which are cost 
reduction or barrier elimination incentives) are not directly comparable to the tangible 
positive reinforcers that I have been examining in this thesis. This argument is based on 
the distinctions drawn between positive and negative reinforcement related to the 
behaviour modification literature (Chapter 2 page 29-30). Positive reinforcement is 
implemented by providing rewards that increase pleasure whereas negative 
reinforcement decreases cost .From an economic perspective, both are positive 
incentives in the sense that both increase utility. However, from a behaviour 
modification perspective, positive reinforcement (offering a voucher or money) is 
psychologically different and expected to be more effective than negative reinforcement 
(reducing or eliminating costs) (Martin & Pear, 2007).   
On the other hand, I provide the first behavioural evidence about preferences for 
sequences of outcomes. The limited existing evidence about preferences for sequences 
of outcomes is based on a few papers from surveys and lab studies (Thaler & Johnson, 
1990; Linville & Fischer, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; Morewedge et al, 
2007) in which the dependent variable is a stated preference measure i.e., self-reported 
choice between different hypothetical options. There is no behavioural evidence from 
the lab or the field. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first experimental test 
of preferences for sequences of events, providing field evidence of the impact of 
segregation of gains to change (health) behaviour. Furthermore, unlike the previous 
studies on this subject, my design is not within-subjects i.e., participants usually chose 
between integrating or segregating gains. This study has a between-subjects research 
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design, implying that the main effects of integration versus segregation will be tested 
independently.   
In addition to being a field test of preference for segregated gains, it also offers 
indirect evidence about the impact of incentive size. Meta-regression in chapter 4 
suggested a negative effect of incentive size, with incentives $5 and under being 
marginally more effective than incentives $10 and above. These results are in line with 
other studies from behavioural economics showing a negative or nonmonotonic 
relationship between incentive size and behaviour (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Ariely 
et al, 2009; Pokorny, 2008). Offering the same overall payoff (€10) divided in smaller 
units (€5x2) tests if the ‘optimal’ incentive offer is around $5(€5) because even though 
patients in the ‘two incentive’ group receive €5 each time, they know the overall payoff 
will be €10.  
Meta-analysis and meta-regression in Chapter 4 also identified cancer screening 
as one of the health contexts resistant to the offer of financial incentives but for which 
very few experimental studies were available. In the qualitative review, from the 18 
papers on cancer screening, 61% were about breast cancer screening, 22% on cervical 
cancer screening and 17% on colorectal cancer screening (but no paper on colorectal 
cancer was included in the meta-analysis because incentive size was not disclosed in 
any study). Colorectal cancer is the second most frequent form cancer in Europe and 
first in many countries for ages 45-74 (Ferlay et al, 2007). Colorectal cancer is one of 
the forms of cancer (along with breast and cervical cancer) where consensus has 
gathered about the effectiveness of early screening, which has been shown to 
significantly reduce mortality and incidence rates (Hewitson et al, 2007; Diaz & 
Slomka, 2012).  
However, colorectal cancer has significantly lower screening rates compared to 
breast and cervical cancer screening.  Data from population-level screening programmes 
in Europe show that breast and cervical cancer screening reach on average of 80%-85% 
coverage but colorectal cancer typically has a lower uptake of around 50% or less 
(Breen et al, 2001; Moss et al, 2012; Szczepura et al, 2008; Smith et al, 2012). 
Screening related barriers – fear of the screening procedure and discomfort dealing with 
stools - are strong determinants of poor screening rates (Kininiemi et al, 2011; Jones et 
al, 2010ab). Jonas and colleagues (2010) estimated the mean willingness to pay to avoid 
performing colorectal cancer screening (colonoscopies) as $263. The faecal occult 
blood test (FOBT) I will be using  here is not painful or cause physical discomfort like a 
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colonoscopy so I assume the WTP to avoid performing the FOBT would be much less. 
This implies that the disutility of performing FOBT should be lower and a financial 
incentive may more easily provide a compensatory gain. Nevertheless, can a relatively 
small incentive of €10 overcome these strong negative barriers? My hypothesis is that it 
can (hypothesis 1 below), assuming that small segregated incentives accompanying the 
screening process will provide a hedonic gain above the objective total payoff of the 
incentive. 
 
6.2 Preferences for sequences of outcomes 
Whereas the literature provide clear hypotheses about temporal preferences for a single 
event, it is less clear about the evaluation of joint outcomes (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993). In a choice between one benefit now versus later, people typically exhibit 
preferences for immediate rewards (Abdellaoui et al, 2010). There is a consistent 
tendency for positive time preferences (Read et al, 2002): individuals are impatient and 
crave immediate consumption, preferring gains sooner rather than later. And this effect 
holds either assuming exponential or hyperbolic time discounting (Frederick et al, 
2002). However, most studies examining time preferences examine how people evaluate 
simple prospects consisting of one outcome obtained at a certain point in time 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). Translating these results into the evaluation of a set of 
outcomes would suggest that people should invariably want to start with the best 
outcome and leave the worst outcome to last e.g., declining rather than increasing 
standard of living, deteriorating rather than improving health states.   
But if choices are explicitly framed as a sequence of events, people seem to 
exhibit a different pattern of preferences. A temporal sequence is a series of outcomes 
spaced over a defined period of time. In the case of a sequence of gains, studies show a 
negative time preference for gains (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991), suggesting a 
preference for ‘happy endings’ or improving outcomes. People report preferring 
increasing consumption (Senik, 2008) and rising wage profiles above flat or decline 
over time (holding total value constant) (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Duffy & 
Smith, 2010). Ross and Simonson (1991) asked participants (n=202) if they would 
prefer to first lose $15 and then win $85 or the reversed order: 73% of participants 
preferred to lose money first. When deciding between alternative scheduling of two 
events, one to be spent with an irritating person and the other with a pleasant person, 
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90% of people chose the irritating person first and the pleasant a week after 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).  
The literature in this area proposes a number of possible reasons for this 
preference for improving outcomes. Loewenstein (1987) proposed a savouring and 
dread hypothesis. Savouring and dread contribute to preferences for improvement 
because, for gains, improving sequences allow decision makers to savour the best 
outcome until the end of the sequence. Anticipatory utility is one of the reasons for 
saving the best for last (Caplin & Leahy, 2001). With losses, getting undesirable 
outcomes over quickly eliminates dread.  
Similarly, a recency effect is also consistent with overweighting the last event in 
forming an overall evaluation of an experience (Read & Powell, 2002). An experience 
that ends on a positive note tends to be evaluated more positively than an experience 
where the positive note occurred earlier. 
Loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) also has some similarities with this 
explanation. Inherent to loss aversion is the idea that people give more weight to 
outcomes below a reference point (losses) than to outcomes above a reference point 
(gains). It is often assumed that the reference point is influenced by the last outcome. 
Thus, improving sequences could be represented as a series of gains from a series of 
shifting reference points. 
 Another possible explanation is based on the concepts of adaptation and 
contrast. Tversky and Griffin (1990) examined the impact of a salient hedonic event, 
positive or negative, on the evaluation of a subsequent event. They proposed and 
demonstrated that an earlier event has a dual contribution to the utility associated with a 
later event: an endowment effect and a contrast effect. The endowment effect represents 
the direct contribution to one’s happiness or satisfaction. The contrast effect represents 
the indirect contribution of an event on the evaluation of subsequent events. A positive 
(negative) outcome makes people happy (unhappy) but it also makes future events 
appear positive (negative) events appear less positive (negative).  
Preferences for one event (e.g., now versus later; near future versus far future) 
and two events have received the most attention in the literature (Linville & Fischer, 
1991; Jarnebrandt et al, 2009; Ross & Simonson, 1991; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; 
Milkman et al, 2012). However, preferences for three outcomes being evaluated jointly 
are not as clear (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). In addition to the desire for 
improvement over time, individuals also exhibit sensitivity for a global evaluation of 
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events, like a gestalt perspective related to how evenly the good and bad moments are 
arranged over a total time interval. Loewenstein (1987) analysed preferences for mixed 
outcomes in the case of three meal choices. In the first case, he compared preferences 
for the distribution of two regular home dinners and French restaurant dinner over three 
weekends. Results showed a clear preference (84% of participants) for dinning in the 
French restaurant in-between to the two home meals. In the second case, the three 
possibilities were eating at home, French restaurant and Lobster dinner (in increasing 
order of desirability) over three weekends. Results showed a slight preference (57%) for 
dinning out in the first and last weekend (and eating at home in-between the two 
restaurant dinners) than leaving the restaurant dinners for last – which would be more 
consistent with a preference for improving outcomes. 
The preference for spreading seems to be anchored in the fact that segregated 
outcomes cover the time interval in the sequence more evenly. Models of habit 
formation and loss aversion do not fully capture the global properties that people find 
attractive in spreading outcomes. Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) developed a 
theoretical model that attempts to account for both preferences for improvement and 
uniformity. The model defines improvement over time as the sum of deviations from 
the cumulative sequence that would be obtained by spreading total utility evenly over 
time. Evenness of spread is represented by the sum of the absolute value of these 
deviations. These authors propose that “there is a general strong preference for 
improvement moderated by a penalty for deviation from global uniformness and a small 
premium for sequences that start (and finish) well” (p.351).  
Thaler and Johnson (1990) put forward that studies evaluating preferences for 
joint outcomes show evidence indicative of a hedonic editing hypothesis (1990), 
through which people edit the choices in a way that would make the prospects appear 
most pleasant. This research area may have direct implications for the offer of 
incentives in a multistage health process. If the health compliance process is simple e.g., 
one-shot flu vaccine, patients should be informed that the incentive will be given at the 
end: vaccine (cost) followed by the incentive (gain), benefiting from people’s 
preference for improving outcomes. However, if compliance is more complex and 
lengthy – as is the case for colorectal cancer screening - the overall available incentive 
amount should be distributed in such a way that it accompanies patients to the 
completion of the screening pathway. Therefore, I predict that:  
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Hypothesis 1: Segregated incentives are more effective in increasing the uptake of 
screening than a single incentive of the same amount 
 
One of the main limitations of this hypothesis lies in the possibility that time 
preferences are a confounding factor. An immediate gratification effect and not a 
preference for segregated gains could also support this hypothesis 1. Potential 
differences between incentives groups could be attributed to a positive time preferences 
(€5 now versus €10 later) and not a gain-savouring hypothesis (Linville & Fischer, 
1991) because patients in the ‘two incentives’ group receive an incentive earlier in the 
process. To control for the impact of immediate gratification, this study should include a 
third experimental group, which would receive a single €10 incentive at step 1 and 
nothing in the remaining steps. But such a group would pose a couple of problems. 
Firstly, a theoretical problem: there is evidence to support that, in a sequence of events, 
people prefer to start with costs and finish with gains (Ross & Simonson, 1991). The 
preference for immediate rewards only seems to hold for single outcome events. 
Secondly, a practical problem: if people receive an incentive at the beginning of the 
screening process, there are fewer guarantees that they will complete the test. Although 
several studies have shown that a noncontingent incentive given in advance does not 
necessarily lead to drop-outs (e.g., Dolan & Rudisill, forthcoming), it introduces a 
greater uncertainty about the future behaviour of patients. 
A study from Thaler and Johnson (1990) suggests that the preference for 
segregated gains dominates the preference for immediate gratification in the case of 
multiple events. The authors analysed the evaluation of separate gains that included a 
temporal order. They proposed that the process of segregating gains is facilitated by 
having events occur on different days. These authors presented participants (N=65) with 
the following scenario. There is a pair of events: (i) win a $25 lottery and (ii) win a $50 
lottery and these events happen on the same day for Mr. A or two weeks apart for Mr. 
B. Who is happier? 63% of participants answer Mr. B. Participants seemed to prefer to 
spread out the arrival of pleasant events over receiving the total amount immediately, 
presumably because segregated gains have an overall higher hedonic value. 
 
6.3 Segregation of gains and crowding-out effects 
As I have extensively discussed in previous chapters, behavioural research has exposed 
situations in which incentives may backfire, mostly identified in contexts where people 
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want to behave altruistically, are engaged in enjoyable activities or want to fulfil their 
duty as citizens (Deci et al. 1999; Bowles et al, 2008; Mellström & Johannesson, 2008). 
The meta-analysis in chapter 4 showed an overall positive of incentives to increase 
compliance and thus these results do not suggest a crowding-out effect of incentives - 
interpreted as a decreased likelihood to comply when patients are incentivised. 
However, meta-regression showed no effect of incentives specifically to promote cancer 
screening, although no study about colorectal cancer screening was included in the 
analysis.  
Colorectal cancer screening is a functional behaviour as many other health 
behaviours i.e., a means towards an end (better health, longer life expectancy) and not 
pleasurable in itself. Therefore, it apparently falls outside the boundary conditions of 
intrinsic motivation. However, some people may consider cancer screening a kind of 
citizenship behaviour, particularly if considered a request by their personal GP. 
Colorectal cancer screening is performed by people aged 50+ and older people tend to 
have a closer and trusting relationship with their doctors compared to younger people 
(Wrede-Sach et al, 2013). The introduction of financial incentives may undermine 
confidence in this relationship by introducing a commercial element (Baron & Spranca, 
1997). If patients consider an invitation to perform screening as a type of citizenship 
behaviour, particularly when requested by their GP with whom they may have 
established a relational or psychological contract, crowding-out effects may be expected 
according to the economics literature (Frey, 1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
There is a possibility that segregation of gains may actually prevent motivational 
crowding-out by keeping incentive size psychologically smaller. Results from my meta-
regression in chapter 4 suggested a negative effect of incentive size, with incentives 
<=$5 being marginally more effective than incentives $10 and above. These results are 
in line with other studies from behavioural economics showing a negative or 
nonmonotonic relationship between incentive size and behaviour (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000; Ariely et al, 2009; Pokorny, 2008). Offering the same overall payoff (€10) 
divided in smaller units (€5x2) may avoid a crowding-out effect, if the ‘psychologically 
optimal’ incentive offer is around $5(€5). This is not a binary comparison of the 
valuation of rewards with different magnitudes (e.g., Vlaev et al, 2011) but a between-
subjects test of the independent framing effects of segregated versus integrated gains. 
The only additional piece of evidence shedding light on the role of incentive size in 
colorectal cancer screening also suggests a negative effect. With a Norwegian sample 
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(n=627), an estimation model by Aas (2009) showed that the offer of financial 
compensation for screening would lead to an uptake rate of 47% for €25 but 39% for 
€125. According to these results, an incentive of €125 (5 times the €25 incentive) would 
lead to a decrease in screening by 8%. My study was developed in Portugal in which the 
incentives used by Aas (2009) adjusted to the 2013 cost of living index
5
 would 
correspond respectively to €6.70 (the €25 incentive) and €33.30 (the €125 incentive). 
Although the reasons underlying these intricate effects of incentive size are not 
yet clear, based on this previous evidence I hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The two incentive structure will have a positive impact on screening 
uptake while the single incentive will result in lower uptake (compared to no 
incentive)  
 
Thus, in summary, the objectives of this study are two-fold. I aim to test the 
impact of financial incentives to increase the uptake of colorectal cancer screening by 
comparing:  
1)  The effect of an offer of a financial incentive with no incentive;  
2) The effect of a single versus a double financial incentive of the same amount. 
 
 
6.4 Method 
6.4.1 Eligible sample 
The study was developed in a public health centre in Lisbon, Portugal. Eligible 
participants were patients aged 50-74 years old who had not performed colorectal 
cancer screening within the last two years (N=2478). This individual-level sample was 
composed by 1824 families registered at the health centre: 1190 single individuals; 613 
families with two members and 21 families with three members. Randomisation was 
done at family-level to avoid that members of the same family would receive different 
incentive offers. The 1824 families were allocated to different treatments by random 
number generation. Regardless of the family-level of randomisation, each participant 
received an individual letter and, as such, data analysis was performed at the individual 
level of analysis.  
                                                 
5
 http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/rankings_by_country.jsp  
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6.4.2 Procedure 
Although Portugal does not have an organised population-level cancer screening 
programme, colorectal cancer screening is free for people 50-74 years old, if requested 
by their GPs. The common test for colorectal cancer screening is the Faecal Occult 
Blood Test (FOBT), characterised by the analysis of microscopic blood in stools. To 
allow for accurate estimates, six stool samples need to be collected in three different 
days (two samples per day) and this procedure is performed directly by patients.  
Contrary to the UK, the FOBT is not currently implemented as a population-level 
screening method in Portugal. There is no systematic and organised invitation to the 
target population aged 50-74 year; each individual patient and personal GP decide about 
the need to perform the test. In Portugal, colorectal cancer screening is typically a multi-
stage process: 
i) Patients have to obtain a medical credential from their GP, which will allow 
them to perform free screening  in a certified lab; 
ii) Patients have to pick up a test kit from the lab, usually including 6 stool 
collection tubes and an informative leaflet; 
iii) Patients do the test at home during 3 consecutive days (2 collections per day); 
iv) When completed, patients return the test to the lab; 
v) After 5-7 working days, results are usually ready and patients can pick up the 
results in hand and deliver them to their GP.     
 
For the purpose of this study, this standard procedure was condensed and 
framed into three discrete steps. Patients were invited by letter to perform colorectal 
cancer screening and asked to:  
 
Step 1: Pick up both the credential and stool test kit in the health centre; 
Step 2: Perform the test at home and return it to a referenced lab; 
Step 3: Pick up their results in the lab and drop them in the health centre. 
 
Steps 1 and 2 are the most important stages in this process. Step 1 enrols people 
in the process and Step 2 is the actual performance of the test. Many studies evaluate the 
screening uptake by Step 1 but without Step 2, in which there is the actual performance 
of the screening test, Step 1 is not a valid measure of screening rates and a potential 
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waste of resources. However, Steps 1 and 3 are the moments when patients enter in 
contact with the health centre and, therefore, the two steps selected to be incentivised. 
Furthermore, by incentivising Step 3, it was possible to closely monitor the final rate of 
completion of screening because in the Portuguese Health System, patients return their 
test results in hand.  
 
6.4.3 Incentive scheme 
This study is a 3-way randomised controlled trial: (1) a control group (N=868); (2) a 
group offered a single €10 incentive (N=805) and (3) a group offered two €5 incentives 
(N=805). The invitation letters framed colorectal cancer screening as a three-step 
process spread over time. Although the perceived costs of compliance may be 
experienced in different degrees by patients, I nevertheless consider that, in the short-
term, complying with screening can be described as a cost to individuals (Koszegi, 
2003). And I also assume that the incentive offered compensates the cost of screening, 
providing a net gain to patients (Table 6.1).  
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 Engagement  Performance  Return  
Control Cost Cost Cost 
One incentive Cost Cost Gain 
Two incentives Gain Cost Gain 
Table 6.1 Spread of gains (incentive delivery) and costs (screening process) 
 
For patients offered a single €10 incentive at the end of the screening process, 
there is a sequence of costs ending with a gain. This sequence is in agreement with a 
preference for improving outcomes, ending with a large gain. If step 1 and step 2 are 
accounted mentally by participants as a single ‘bundle’ of cost, this could be considered 
a two-outcome sequence and we should expected a preference for improving outcomes. 
But, to test segregation of gains, I explicitly framed screening as a three-outcome 
sequence. The ‘two incentive’ group is expected to be the most effective intervention 
because it benefits from a segregation of gains plus a spread of gains that covers more 
evenly the screening procedure. 
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6.4.4 Time schedule and implementation 
The study was approved in October 2012 by the health centre coordinator and the local 
health authorities. At a later stage, the Ethics Committee of the Ministry of Health also 
had to approve the study. The study lasted five months from February to June 2013. 
A private lab was selected to handle the FOBT. They offered to provide the stool 
collection tubes (six per patient). Furthermore, the Ethics Committee considered 
mandatory that the closest hospital to the health centre assumed the responsibility for 
the follow-up of patients with positive screening results (for colonoscopies) as fast as 
possible. After a period of negotiations, the hospital committed to a 3 (min) to 6 (max) 
months to respond to positive results. There is no data about positivity rates available 
yet.    
 
 
6.5 Results 
 
6.5.1 Sample characteristics  
Incentive groups have a slightly higher proportion of females: 47% in the control group, 
54% in the ‘one incentive’ group and 50% in the ‘two incentive’ group (X2=8.525 
p=.01). The age differences between groups are statistically different (F=4.087 p=.02) 
but minimal. The average age in the control was 59.4(SD=7.3), 60(SD=7.2) in one 
incentive and 60.4(SD=6.7) in two incentives. Since the random assignment did not 
result in perfectly balanced groups, these differences were controlled for in the 
regression models below.  
It was not possible to access further socio-demographic characteristics or 
patients’ health records, which are not stored locally in each health centre but at a 
centralised national level. This data is not organised in the national health system in a 
way to be easily retrieved per health centre but only through individual patient names 
i.e., on a one-by-one patient basis. National health records could provide information 
about past compliance with screening (which is a critical point and directly related to 
my research question 3) but it would still not have been possible to retrieve information 
about income (also related to research question 3) which is a type of data not included in 
the patient registration form.    
 
6.5.2 Step 1: Engaging in screening 
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Results for Step 1 are shown in Figure 6.1: 55.7% of patients complied in the control 
group, 44,4% of patients in the ‘one incentive’ group and 62.6% of patients in the ‘two 
incentive’ group.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Screening rates for step 1 of colorectal cancer screening  
 
The differences between the three groups are significant (X
2
=26.390 p=.000). 
However, taking both incentive groups together, there is no difference to the control 
group (53.5% versus 55.7% X
2
=.266 p=.316). A binary logistic regression analysis 
(Table 6.2) showed that age had a small (B=.016) but significant impact (P=.007) in the 
uptake of screening in Step 1. The sex of the participant was not significant. The uptake 
of ‘one incentive’ group was significantly lower than the control group (B=-.350 
p=.001). The group offered two incentives had a higher uptake (B=.180), at .1 level of 
significance (p=.07). The coefficients for the treatment effects are significantly different 
(F=9399.55 p<.001).  
 
  B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
Sex (0=male) -,001 ,084 ,000 1 ,994 ,999 
Age ,016 ,006 7,251 1 ,007 1,016 
One incentive (1=incentive; 
0=otherwise) 
-,350 ,105 11,153 1 ,001 ,705 
Two incentives(1=incentive; 
0=otherwise) 
,180 ,101 3,189 1 ,074 1,197 
 Constant -1,481 ,383 14,924 1 ,000 ,228 
-2 Log likelihood=3208,966; Cox & Snell R Square=,014; Nagelkerke R Square=,019 
Table 6.2 Logistic regression analysis for Step 1 of colorectal cancer screening 
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6.5.3 Step 3: Completing screening 
From the participants that picked up the screening kit in Step 1, 94% of the 
individuals in the control group completed the screening (=return their test results), 
compared to 90% in the ‘one incentive’ group and 98% in the ‘two incentive’ group. 
These attrition rates correspond to a final completion of 52.8% in the control group, 
41.4% in the ’one incentive’ group and 61.1% in the ‘two incentive’ group (Figure 6.2). 
These differences between the groups are also significant (X
2
=8.525 p=.01). The 
differences found in the uptake of screening at step 1 were maintained for the 
completion rates at step 3. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Screening rates for step 3 of colorectal cancer screening  
 
The regression model for step 3 is presented in Table 6.3 below. Participants in 
the ‘one incentive’ group finished the screening process significantly less often than 
people in the control group (B=-.220 p=.02). Patients offered the two incentives were 
more likely to have completed screening compared to the control group (B=.150 p=.04). 
The coefficients for the treatment effects are also significantly different (F=7359.44 
p<.001). There was no significant impact of age or gender in the completion rates. 
These results support both hypotheses. Both at step 1 (uptake of screening) and 
step 3 (completion of screening), the offer of two incentives increased screening rates 
compared to a single incentive of the same amount, confirming hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, the offer of the single €10 incentive caused an adverse effect and reduced 
screening rates significantly below the control group. This effect did not occur with two 
segregated €5 incentives, supporting hypothesis 2. 
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  B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 
Sex (0=male) ,005 ,082 ,000 1 ,953 ,985 
Age ,006 ,003 6,241 1 ,231 ,916 
One incentive (1=incentive; 
0=otherwise) 
-,220 ,305 10,154 1 ,002 ,805 
Two incentives(1=incentive; 
0=otherwise) 
,150 ,201 3,195 1 ,004 1,699 
 Constant -1,280 ,353 12,922 1 ,000 ,520 
-2 Log likelihood=2908,963; Cox & Snell R Square=,020; Nagelkerke R Square=,022 
Table 6.3 Logistic regression analysis for Step 3 of colorectal cancer screening  
 
 
6.6 Discussion 
To the best of our knowledge, this randomised controlled trial is the first study ever 
testing preferences for sequences of outcomes in the field. And it did so addressing an 
important public health problem – low colorectal screening rates. Hitherto, there were 
very few studies testing behavioural interventions to promote colorectal cancer 
screening (Stone et al, 2002; Holden et al, 2010) and only two randomised controlled 
trials offering incentives (Miller & Wong, 1993; Freedman & Mitchell, 1994) – both 
using cost reduction incentives (prepaid postage) and thus not directly relevant to my 
analysis of tangible conditional incentives.  
In this large field study, patients were randomly allocated to receive an offer of 
€10, two offers of €5 or no incentive (control group) to perform colorectal cancer 
screening. Compared to no offer of a financial incentive (56%), one incentive of €10 
was less effective (44%) but the offer of two incentives of €5 was significantly more 
effective (63%). Hypothesis 1 proposing that two smaller incentives outperform a single 
larger incentive was confirmed, corroborating previous lab studies (Thaler & Jonhson, 
1990; Linville & Fischer, 1991; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; Morewedge et al, 
2007). However, unlike these previous studies, evaluating within-subjects preferences 
for integrated or segregated gains, my work establishes the independent effect of 
segregation of gains (over integrated gains) using a between-subjects design in a field 
study.    
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Research on anticipatory utility (Caplin & Leahy, 2001) and a preference for 
segregating gains in a sequence of events (Thaler, 1985, 2008) are both in line with the 
result of two incentives ( at the beginning and end of a sequence) being comparatively 
more effective than one incentive (given only at the end of a extended process). 
Although it was expected that segregated incentives would be more effective than a 
single incentive to encourage screening uptake, the crucial question is related to why a 
single incentive reduced the uptake compared to the control group. Results show an 
adverse effect of the single €10 incentive that is not present if two smaller incentive 
sizes (€5) are offered (supporting hypothesis 2). Anticipatory utility may explain a 
preference for €5 now and another €5 later but does not account for the negative effect 
of a single offer of €10.  
A positive (but less) significant effect of the single €10 could be simply 
interpreted as a preference for segregated gains. A nonsignificant effect of the single 
€10 incentive could be interpreted as the incentive not being appealing enough and 
corroborate the evidence from meta-regression in chapter 4 that cancer screening is 
particularly resistant to the offer of incentives. However, a negative effect compared to 
the control group suggests a crowding-out effect that could be explained by incentive 
size. Several justifications based on incentive size are offered for this result.  
Firstly, the €10 incentive may trigger higher levels of risk perception. Patients 
may interpret higher incentives as a signal of a greater need or urgency to perform 
screening. Benabou and Tirole (2003) show that higher rewards may diminish the 
agent’s performance as they represent the principal’s better information on the task; 
patients may see it as negative information about their health status. The offer of €10 is 
not particularly high but for a population that is not accustomed to monetary offers in 
health contexts, it may have a signalling effect and prompt some to be concerned about 
screening and diagnosis risks. Smaller incentives at different points in time may 
minimise risk perception and still be motivating without becoming threatening. The 
preference for spreading outcomes seems particularly important when there are costly 
events in the sequence. Starting and finishing with a gain may fade the perceived risks 
of the screening process. 
Secondly, and with similarities to the first explanation, higher incentives may 
increase attentiveness toward the complexity and length of the screening process (Von 
Thadden & Zhao, 2012). The interpretation of the principal-agent theory by Benabou 
and Tirole (2003) also states that a higher incentive may signal the task is onerous, 
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complex or difficult. Moreover, higher incentives may prompt a cognitive overload by 
pressuring individuals to completely understand the task or think more about it (Ariely 
et al, 2009) which may lead to avoidance, particularly in an older population. Smaller 
incentives may promote a better understanding of the screening process by creating a 
more manageable level of attention given to the decision to undergo (or not) screening.  
Thirdly, a different explanation is based on research about “protected values” 
(Baron & Spranca, 1997) or “sacred values” (Tetlock et al 2000) results – in much a 
similar way to the case of blood donation. This line of research proposes that there are 
some human exchanges that should not be traded off against money. Many older people 
have a close and trusting relationship with their doctors (Wrede-Sach et al, 2013) and 
patients may feel suspicious and sceptical about a monetary offer that they deem 
unnecessarily high in exchange for a behaviour they should perform for free.  However, 
the offer of two smaller €5 incentives may have been interpreted less as a monetary 
offer and more as a symbolic gift. For older people, the doctor-patient relationship can 
be considered particularly sacred and be more responsive to small size incentives. If this 
assumption is correct, segregating incentives may have a potential double positive 
effect: it may not only increase the overall subjective value of the incentive by fostering 
anticipatory utility and providing hedonic gains from temporally spread benefits; but 
also may avoid the perception of economic transactions in the patient-doctor 
relationship by keeping incentive size low.  
Fourth and final, a large incentive for screening can be perceived as an 
inappropriately high compensation for a behaviour that patients should be doing 
regardless of payment. This may lead to distrust towards the health organisation, 
particularly a public health centre, which is in essence characterised by providing free 
care (in itself already an embedded financial incentive) in the name of social welfare. 
Screening is supposed to be a procedure improving only the health of the patient but a 
high incentive may point out that the organisation has concealed interests related to the 
screening of patients, other than patients’ own health. 
This study also provides an indirect evaluation of the ‘optimal’ level of incentive 
size. By segregating the offer of a single €10 incentive into two €5 incentives, I show 
that people code incentive offers not by their overall payoff but by a unit of reference – 
probably the value of each single unit of incentivisation. This could be interpreted as a 
test for the effect of incentive size. If patients show a preference for receiving €5 each 
time instead of €10 – despite the overall payoff being the same - this suggests that small 
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incentives around €5 may be a good estimate for the ‘optimal’ incentive offer – at least 
for health care compliance. An incentive of €5 may correspond to an incentive of $5 (as 
suggested my meta-regression in chapter 4) or £5: although the absolute value is not the 
same, these may be psychologically equivalent in terms of unit of incentivisation. This i 
still a hypothesis for future studies because although my results suggest this possibility, 
I cannot strictly draw this conclusion from my research design. 
 
6.6.1 Policy implications  
The main contribution to policy is empirical evidence recognising that the temporal 
framing of health behaviour matters. How the compliance process is framed to patients 
may be critical to promote health behaviour. If no incentives are offered to increase 
compliance, the health procedures should be integrated as much as possible i.e., 
describe colorectal cancer screening as single articulated process. Given that 
compliance is likely to be perceived as an immediate cost to patients, losses (screening 
steps) should be integrated. But if some incentive is offered to patients, this gain should 
be segregated and highlighted to patients.  
If the health compliance process is simple e.g., attending a medical appointment, 
patients should be informed that the incentive will be given at the end: cost 
(appointment) followed by a gain (incentive), benefiting from people’s preference for 
improving outcomes. However, if compliance is more complex and lengthy, the overall 
available incentive amount (e.g., £20) should be distributed in such a way that it 
accompanies patients in the completion of the health process. For instance, many 
vaccines can also be easily framed as a multi-step procedure given the need for multiple 
immunisation dosages e.g., HPV, MMR or hepatitis B. In this situation, incentives 
could be distributed as £10, 0, £10 or £5, £5, £10, both distributions being predictably 
better than a single offer of £20 at the end of the process. Incentives offered in this and 
similar contexts could benefit from segregation. The offer of a single incentive 
contingent with the uptake of screening is the standard approach used in previous 
incentive health interventions (all studies discussed in the systematic review in chapter 
4 have followed this pattern) but our results suggest that a single offer at the end the 
process may not be as effective as multiple incentive moments. Smaller incentives 
offered throughout the screening procedure may help smooth the process along. Several 
smaller incentives may engage patients in the screening process by incentivising the 
initial enrolment and facilitating screening completion. 
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Medication adherence is one of the most favourable contexts to apply mental 
accounting principles. Adherence to medication schedules usually involves a sequence 
of adherence moments e.g., a pill twice a day for seven days. Research on medication 
adherence, mostly in the area of contingent management for substance users, tested 
different profiles of incentive offers (Petry, 2000): constant, increasing and, less 
frequently, an increasing profile that is reset to the minimum amount when patients miss 
a dose (Higgins et al, 2012). This research has mostly shown that increasing offers of 
incentives are more effective than constant ones but no other incentives distributions 
have been tested so far. Contingent management for substance users has been greatly 
influenced by operant conditioning and behaviour modification techniques but not 
behavioural economics and mental accounting. There is a gap in research for the 
application of U-shaped incentive schemes in long adherence schedules.     
  An interesting aspect of this study is the considerable uptake of the control 
group (56%) without any offer of incentive. This rate is significantly superior to 
previous historical rates reported by the health centre (25%-30%) without this 
systematic invitation for screening. This suggests that the simple invitation of patients 
by letter without further incentivisation was suitably appealing to this older population. 
The results from my control group are similar to the only two pilot studies performed by 
the National Health Authorities, also just simply using an invitation letter with no 
incentive offer. In 2011, 3225 patients were invited to perform screening of which 55% 
attended (ARS Alentejo, 2011). In 2012, 7957 patients were invited and the uptake rate 
was 48% (ARS Alentejo, 2012). In my study, considering only the ‘two incentive’ 
group tested in this study – because the single incentive had a negative effect in 
screening rates - results show an absolute risk reduction (ARR) of 8.3% by offering 
financial incentives, corresponding to 151 people needing to be incentivised to avert one 
future case of cancer – assuming a 8% prevalence rate from Ferlay et al (2007). The 
cost per returned test according to the health centre management is estimated to be €11, 
to be added to the incentive value to calculate an on overall intervention cost.    
 
6.6.2 Limitations and future studies 
Information about patient income and past compliance with screening could not be 
extracted from national health records. This implies that my research question 3 could 
not be examined in the study – as in the previous chapter for the case of Chlamydia 
screening. Furthermore, past compliance behaviour could have been a particularly 
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relevant aspect to control for because there is evidence for colorectal cancer screening 
(Redelmeier & Kanheman, 2003) that memories of past procedures interfere with future 
willingness to perform screening – and how this past evaluation of screening interacts 
with a present incentive offer is an important question to answer.  
In this case, it was also not possible to collect data on the potential psychological 
mechanisms underlying these results like e.g., sensitivity to rewards or risk perceptions, 
to support my post-hoc explanations, although for reasons somewhat different from the 
Chlamydia study. Given the age range of patients (50-74), individuals would need to be 
contacted by phone or a survey should have been mailed with the invitation letter 
(considering that an online survey would not be appropriate for such an older sample). 
Nonetheless, (i) information about telephone contacts was not disclosed by the health 
centre due to confidentiality concerns and (ii) a mailed survey would introduce the same 
risk for self-selection bias as in the Chlamydia study because only patients with 
particular characteristics (e.g., higher educational level or literacy) could feel inclined to 
answer. 
Future studies should try to disentangle more clearly the underlying effects 
explaining the results of this study and understand the reasons behind this crowding-out 
effect for a single incentive. The ‘two incentive’ group could have been the most 
effective intervention because (i) it benefits from a segregation of gains, (ii) it spread 
gains that covers more evenly the screening procedure and (iii) kept each incentive offer 
lower. These different effects may have worked independently or as complements and 
there may have been one effect which was dominant. This is a valid theoretical question 
and a crucial concern for similar future health interventions to determine incentive 
design i.e., is it more important to segregate or keep incentives small?  
Furthermore, most of my proposed justifications were based on incentive size 
but other different explanations could be examined. For instance, there could be aging 
effects involved. Research has shown that older people respond to framing effects 
similarly to younger people (Strough et al, 2001) and thus not likely to be a narrow 
choice bracketing problem (Read et al, 1999). But they do respond to uncertainty 
differently – older adults weigh certainty more heavily than younger people (Mather et 
al, 2012).  A single incentive offered at the end of a lengthy screening process may 
sound uncertain and its value being heavily discount by older people – to the point that 
it becomes a disincentive.  
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Chapter 7 
 
General Discussion 
 
The offer of contingent financial incentives has a long tradition in behavioural change 
interventions and has recently regained momentum as a strategy to promote individual 
health behaviour. However, patient financial incentives are still controversial as a policy 
tool in developed countries and some fundamental questions had not yet been answered 
in the literature. 
I outlined the main research gaps to be tackled in three research questions: (1) 
Are patient financial incentives effective? (2) Which sort of incentive is more effective? 
(3) Are income and past behaviour effect modifiers of the impact of incentives? These 
questions were posed for both blood donation and compliance with health care. On one 
hand, blood donation has long taken a leading role in the discussion about the potential 
detrimental effects of offering money in exchange for health behaviours and a 
discussion based on empirical evidence was long overdue. On the other hand, 
compliance with health care involves a large set of behaviours with an influential 
impact in patient health and overall health expenditure. Health care compliance was 
defined as the extent to which people comply with health recommendations (according 
to WHO, 2003) and I particularly analysed compliance with one-shot or short-term 
health behaviours – appointment keeping, cancer screening, TB screening, STI 
screening, treatment adherence and immunisation.  
Two meta-analyses and two field studies developed within the scope of this 
thesis allow me to answer these three research questions for both contexts, albeit with 
different degrees of comprehensiveness. Table 7.1 summarises the main findings of this 
work that will be further discussed next.  
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Research Questions For Blood Donation For Compliance 
1 Are incentives effective? 
Blood quantity No 
Yes 
Blood quality Possible adverse effect 
2 
Which sort of incentive is 
more effective? 
 
Type 
 
No difference between financial and 
nonfinancial incentives  
 
Segregated incentives 
Gain-framed and offered with certainty 
Size 
 
No impact of incentive size 
 
Small size incentives <=$10 
3 
 
Are income and past 
behaviour effect modifiers    
of the impact of incentives? 
Income 
Indirect evidence suggesting low income 
donors are more attracted by incentives 
Incentives are more effective for low 
income patients 
Past behavior 
No difference between first-time and 
previous donors 
Evidence suggesting incentives work 
mostly in past non-compliers 
Table 7.1 Summary of the main findings of this work 
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I fundamentally contribute to the literature by showing that financial incentives 
should not be considered a panacea to promote changes in health-related behaviour. 
Standard economic theory and operant conditioning make general predictions about 
how behaviour will change in response to changes in incentive structures – incentives 
that allegedly induce cost-benefit calculations and rational choice. These general 
predictions can be basically summarised in three main assumptions: (1) financial 
incentives will increase the likelihood or frequency of behaviour; (2) behaviour is a 
positive monotonic function of incentive size i.e., the larger the incentive, the higher the 
likelihood of behaviour change and (3) incentives have a higher impact on low income 
people because of diminishing marginal utility of income. I show that by and large most 
of these assumptions do not hold in the contexts of blood donation and health care 
compliance.  
The first assumption is robustly disproved for blood donation and is 
conditionally accepted for health care compliance, dependent on the particular health 
setting and incentives used. For health care compliance, the impact of financial 
incentives ranged from strongly positive (e.g., TB screening or appointment keeping in 
meta-regression) to detrimental (the single incentive in the colorectal cancer screening 
study). The non-significant effect of incentive features in the meta-analysis about 
compliance in chapter 4 likely reflects this need for conditionality in the use of 
incentives in this context; a lack of a positive effect may be explained by a cancellation 
effect due to conflicting positive and adverse impacts of incentive offers.  
The second assumption is also not supported for blood donation. Although some 
individual studies suggest a positive effect of high incentives $15+ (Lacetera et al, 
2012; Iajya et al, 2013), these results reflect (albeit significant) very small effect sizes 
(e.g., 0.08% increase). I propose that incentives do not work to motivate ‘altruistic’ 
blood donors but may attract a few blood ‘sellers’. And blood ‘sellers’ respond to 
incentive size but the numbers of blood sellers that incentives attract is not sufficient to 
have a considerable impact on overall blood rates. For health care compliance, there 
was evidence of an opposite direction: incentives >=$10 may actually have a negative 
effect in the likelihood to comply. I propose that, in this case, incentives are effective - 
generally speaking - but mostly by working as motivational levers that trigger people to 
take care of their own health – a goal people already have at baseline but that may not 
be too salient in daily life. Thus, small incentives work better than higher incentives 
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because small size rewards can be more easily interpreted as prompts or reminders 
compared to higher incentives, which may raise risk perception or suspicion alerts. The 
threshold for this differentiation seems to be around $10: incentives lower than $10 are 
more effective than higher incentives. 
The third assumption seems to be the exception. I could not show from the 
available evidence that financial incentives attract low income blood suppliers – there 
was no research providing data on this. But the fact that studies on the impact of blood 
quality suggest a negative effect of incentives may be symptomatic that incentives catch 
the attention of people with poorer health status – unlikely to come from affluent 
socioeconomic backgrounds. And this third assumption was strongly supported for 
health care compliance: low income patients are 2.5 times more likely to comply with 
health care when offered a financial incentive.  
Taken together, my results are indicative of support for Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008) proposal that sensible choice architects choose the right incentives for the right 
people in the right context. However, it does not seem to be strictly a question about the 
cognitive effects of changing framing and salience – as these authors defend – but also a 
question of considering social preferences when planning to use incentive schemes. I 
endorse that differences in the effect of incentives between blood donation and 
compliance are mostly explained by social preferences whereas differences within each 
of these health context are likely to be explained by framing and salience effects.  
For blood donation, incentives are offered in exchange for a behaviour that 
strictly benefits the health of others. For compliance, incentives are offered for people to 
take care of their own health. As I previously mentioned, there is evidence that 
monetary incentives have been proven detrimental to ‘other-regarding’ preferences by 
triggering self-interest (Bowles, 2008): the mere priming of money has been shown to 
increase selfish behaviour (Vohs et al, 2008). Thus, financial incentives may crowd-out 
nonmonetary motivations – acting as substitutes. Financial incentives should then be 
used only to trigger self-interested behaviour like the individual uptake of health care 
but not to increase prosocial behaviour as blood donation.  
Changes in the framing, salience, type and size of incentives seem to work 
within the boundaries previously delimited by social preferences. More clearly, in the 
case of blood donation, where incentives do not seem to be an adequate intervention, 
changes in the design of incentive schemes have little room to work. Hence the lack of 
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significant differences between lotteries, vouchers, gifts and incentive sizes ranging 
from $3 to $23.  
But in the case of health care compliance, for which incentives match the self-
interest nature of this context, it is important to understand how patients code, organise 
and structure the information about the financial incentive offer. For instance, in the 
Chlamydia study the £5 voucher increased screening from 1.5% to 22.8% while the 
£200 lottery only generated a 2.8% screening rate. The certainty effect (Kanheman & 
Tversky, 1986) is likely to be underlying this result – and producing a massive 20% 
difference. In the case of colorectal cancer screening, using a cognitive framing effect of 
segregating versus integrating the overall payoff offered to patients has an extreme 
impact. Compared to the control group, offering two €5 separate incentives increased 
screening rates by 8% whereas offering a single €10 incentive decreased the uptake of 
screening by 12%. And these differences were produced by changes in information 
framing. The minor differences found in blood donation studies do not compare with 
the magnitude of the differences found between incentive schemes in the case of health 
care compliance. 
After this overall assessment of my research results, I will now summarise how I 
have addressed each of the research questions I initially proposed.  
 
7.1 Are financial incentives effective? 
Incentives are not effective to increase blood donation. This statement is based in the 
systematic review and meta-analysis performed for blood donation. For quantity of 
blood donated, there was a null effect of offering patient financial incentives. Although 
the meta-analysis for quantity of blood donated included a limited number of studies 
(six studies), it nevertheless comprised a total sample of 93,328 individuals and the 
overall estimate was robust to sensitivity analyses. The statistical heterogeneity found 
between-studies was moderate and an overall estimate based strictly on high quality 
studies with large sample sizes still showed no effect of incentives.  
I took the quantity of blood supplied upon the contingent offer of an incentive as 
a proxy for Titmuss’ argument of economic efficiency. Titmuss never claimed that 
blood quantity would decrease if incentives were introduced, contrary to common 
belief. The result of the null impact of incentives to increase blood donations is a 
positive reply to Titmuss’ hypothesis. According to the available evidence, incentives 
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are economically inefficient because, given the same amount of blood donated, the cost 
per unit from paid suppliers is higher than that from unpaid donors. 
With respect to the quality of the blood donated, results are less robust but 
suggest an adverse effect. The analysis for quality of blood donated was based on two 
experimental studies and 13 observational studies, which provided a less reliable source 
of information given the mixed data from donors and units of blood, and the lack of 
specification for paid versus unpaid donors. Despite the need for caution in the 
interpretation of this data, nevertheless it should be emphasized that these observational 
studies involved 454,653 participants. This observational data strongly suggested an 
adverse effect of incentives if offered not contingent upon quality of blood. Was 
Titmuss right to be concerned? Apparently yes. 
 Can these results be taken as evidence of crowding-out? Strictly according to the 
operational definition I used, results do not support a crowding-out effect. Motivational 
crowding-out was defined has a negative effect of offering incentives, measured as 
reduced levels of blood donation in the incentivised group compared to the control 
group. There was a null – but not negative – effect in blood quantity and therefore it 
cannot be said that incentives have a crowding-out effect. But for blood quality, there 
seems to be a crowding-out effect if incentives are not offered conditional to a quality 
control. But given that the opposite is found when incentives are contingent upon 
quality and the fact that observational data is prone to self-selection bias, I cannot draw 
a precise conclusion.  
This definition of motivational crowding-out was chosen because (i) it fits the 
policy and economic perspectives that consider crowding-out as an inverse income 
effect and (ii) analysing the immediate impact of incentives allows us to analyse a 
broader range of studies because very few studies analyse what happens to behaviour 
after incentives are no longer offered. However, I am only observing external effects. 
Titmuss’ notion of ‘crowding-out’ (he never coined the term) was broader and more 
difficult to measure. He was concerned with more than a possible adverse effect in 
blood supply. He was mainly troubled about “the consequences, national and 
international, of treating human blood as a commercial commodity” (p.58). Titmuss was 
compelled to raise these questions to understand the “extent to which specific 
instruments of public policy encourage or discourage, foster or destroy the individual 
expression of altruism and regard for the needs of others” (p.59), over and above the 
specific context of blood donation, which worked mainly as a symbol of humanity. And 
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it should be emphasised that claiming no evidence of motivational crowding-out is 
based on a very narrow and restricted definition. 
Incentives may have some crowding out effect on who donated rather than how 
many donated. For example, incentives may have distanced voluntary donors and 
attracted new, incentive-driven donors without affecting the overall number of donors. I 
cannot evaluate the latent negative externalities in human motivation and altruism 
caused by the transaction of blood but can simply say that paying for blood is not 
effective. 
Incentives are effective to increase health care compliance. I base this claim 
on the results of the systematic review and meta-analysis of 20 experimental studies 
involving 151,875 participants. Results showed that patients offered financial incentives 
are about three times more likely to comply with health guidelines. If I restrict my 
conclusion to the results from high quality studies, I can say that the likelihood of 
complying with health care increases about 40% in the presence of incentives. However, 
the overall positive estimate enclosed substantial between-studies heterogeneity, 
suggesting the importance of analysing the key effect modifiers of this general effect.  
Financial incentives were significantly effective to increase compliance with TB 
screening, appointment keeping and treatment adherence. In contrast, incentives were 
less effective in promoting immunisation and do not have a significant impact in 
increasing cancer and STI screening.  
On one hand, this effect may be grounded on the specificities of the barriers 
reported for noncompliance. For instance, people forget their appointments because they 
have unexpected competing activities or, in-between, their health status improved. 
People do not tend to miss appointments due to the high disutility of complying. These 
common barriers may be reasonably well addressed with the offer of a financial 
incentive. For treatment adherence, incentives may be effective to address memory 
lapses with medication schedules or compensate the discomfort of side-effects of 
treatment. But the barriers reported for missing cancer or STI screening are more 
complex and thus suggesting that compliance has higher perceived costs for patients. 
The psychological costs of screening are often disregarded in the analysis of poor 
screening rates (Marteau, 1989; Lerman et al, 1991; Wardle & Pope, 1992). The utility 
of not complying with screening guidelines may be perceived as superior to the 
disutility of receiving a possible positive result. Nevertheless, taking both contexts that 
were shown resistant to incentives in meta-regression – STI and cancer screening - I 
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showed in two field studies that incentives may be effective if well-informed by 
behavioural research. It seems that, for simple barriers to compliance, standard 
applications of incentives are enough to increase compliance but, to address more 
complex barriers, behaviourally driven incentives schemes may be necessary. 
On the other hand, there is also the possibility that the association between 
health setting and the effect of incentives is spurious and explained by covariates 
unrelated to the barriers underlying each health setting. Both incentive size and patient 
socioeconomic status appeared to be associated with the substancial variability 
explained by the health setting under analysis – and I will discuss this alternative 
explanation in the answer to the next research questions.  
Claiming that incentives are effective to promote health care compliance implies 
that no evidence of motivational crowding-out was detected – according to the 
economic definition. I found no evidence of a negative effect of incentives in the meta-
analysis and the chlamydia study. But a significant negative effect was found in the 
colorectal cancer study, with the uptake of screening in one incentive group 
significantly lower than the control group. This evidence indicates that the significant 
positive estimate for the impact of incentives does not preclude possible negative 
effects, further corroborating the need to identify critical effect modifiers that explain 
these exceptions.  
 
 
7.2 Which sort of incentives is more effective? 
Given that no significant effect was found for blood donation, this question becomes 
less meaningful. Corroborating the overall estimate, no significant differences were 
found between different types of incentives. The financial incentives that were 
offered included money, vouchers, gifts, lottery tickets and cholesterol tests, with an 
estimated value between $3 and $23. The overall null effect of incentives in blood 
donation that remained stable if different types of incentives were separately examined. 
However, this conclusion is based on very small subgroup analyses that did not allow a 
more formal test with meta-regression. 
The lack of difference between types of incentive in blood donation is an 
important contribution the literature. There has been a considerable debate about where 
a distinction may lie between financial incentives as cash or lotteries and non-financial 
incentives as gifts and medical tests. The former tends to raise more opposition whereas 
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the latter is more commonly assumed as a more legitimate or effective way to 
incentivize blood donation (Costa-i-Font et al, 2013; Sass, 2013; Lacetera & Macis, 
2010a). My results showed that what I considered financial (cash and vouchers) and 
nonfinancial (gifts as t-shirts or medical tets) incentives are equally ineffective. 
However, I could not test the impact of cash versus other incentives because only one 
study offered cash (Mellstrom & Johnassen, 2008) – probably this lack of evidence 
reflects the expected negative effect of cash in donation rates. These authors did find a 
negative significant effect of offering cash; however, their sample was self-selected and 
composed of people already motivated to donate blood. It could be the case that money 
crowds-out voluntary donors or simply any incentive could have this adverse effect on 
commited donors.  
A possible criticism for this lack of significant effects is that the size of the 
incentives offered was not sufficient high to motivate behaviour (Lacetera et al, 2013). 
However, with respect to incentive size, my results show no significant differentes 
between low (=<$5), medium ($5+-$15) and high ($15+) incentives. I also discussed 
the possibility that individual studies may show a different picture, as proposed by 
Lacetera (2012) and Iajya et al (2013). Lacetera et al (2012) defended that $15 gift cards 
were effective to increase blood donation but this change was from 0.6% to 1.7%, 
which is a nonsignificant difference when the estimates are adjusted for the cluster 
design of this study. Iajya et al (2013) reported that incentives corresponding to US$14 
and US$23 significantly increased blood donation but report changes from 0% (no 
incentive and $5 incentive) to 0.4% and 0.8% respectively. This could hardly be 
considered evidence for effectiveness. Thus, I argue that the impact reported in these 
studies is negligible.  
Curiously, the same authors who suggested the problem with lack of incentive 
effects could be overcome with high incentives (Lacetera et al, 2013) had previously 
proposed that incentives should be symbolic (Lacetera & Macis, 2010b). There is in fact 
evidence that very small incentives (as low as $1) can change behaviour considerably in 
other health domains as compliance (e.g.,Helmus, Saules, Schoener, & Roll, 2003; 
Malotte, Rhodes, & Mais, 1998; Tulsky et al., 2000; Volpp et al., 2008). However, 
blood donation seems particularly resistant to the impact of incentives – high or low, 
financial or nonfinancial. 
For health care compliance, small incentives <=$10 (£5) framed as gains 
and given with certainty should be used. This statement is based on both field studies 
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and, to a lesser extent, meta-regression results. Meta-regression did not clearly support 
the use of a particular type of incentive but identified some tendencies.   
Meta-regression showed the puzzling tendency for a negative effect of incentive 
size. I provided field evidence that, in fact, there may be a crowding-out effect of high 
incentives in the case of compliance – at least compliance with cancer screening. I 
compared the offer of a single (€10) versus double (€5x2) incentive offer and showed 
that – compared to no incentive - the single incentive was significantly worse but two 
incentives significantly better.  It is not indisputable that the justification for this result 
lies in the incentive size but I have no reason to rule out this explanation either. Small 
incentives seem to provide sufficient motivation to comply with health guidelines 
without raising red flags – related to motivation effects or risk perception. Incentive size 
also seems to be associated with the health settings in which incentives were and were 
not effective. Results from a nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney U test) showed the 
health settings in which incentives had an impact had average offers under $10. This 
simple analysis cannot be taken as evidence of causal effects but seems to reinforce the 
patterns from a greater impact of low incentive offers to promote compliance with 
health care.  
Higher incentives may increase perceived risk by signalling a potential threat, 
create a cognitive overload or because higher incentives are already targeting more 
complicated and resistant health behaviours at baseline. An alternative justification is 
based on the concept of motivational crowding-out. Under the offer of small incentives, 
people maintain their perception of autonomous behavior, whereas higher incentives 
draw attention to the external control of patients’ decisions. Regardless of the 
explanation, there is a counterintuitive negative effect of incentive size when offered for 
compliance with health care. And this result is consistent with a rising number of papers 
revealing a nonmonotonic relationship between incentive size and behaviour (Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000; Ariely et al, 2009; Pokorny, 2008) – which may ultimately be 
considered also an expression of motivational crowding-out effets.   
Although not a particular type of incentive per se, I showed that incentives 
framed as potential gains were more effective than incentives framed as potential losses. 
This result does not support common assumptions based on Prospect Theory and loss 
aversion which often presume a superiority of loss-framed information. I defend two 
main possible hypotheses for this result. One justification is based on the discrepancy 
between stated versus revealed preferences: the work by Alk et al (2011) showed that 
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health message framing is more effective at producing changes in attitudes and 
intentions than actually altering health behaviour. Most previous work presenting 
evidence about the impact of loss aversion is based on self-reported choices between 
hypothetical alternatives (Kanheman & Tversky, 1979; Baumesteir et al, 2001) and not 
real behaviour. Research from operant conditioning – which only analyses behavioural 
outcomes - has consistently failed to prove the higher impact of punishement over 
reinforcement to promote behaviour change (Postman, 1947; Magoon et al, 2008).  
My work, nonetheless, does not provide behavioural data comparing gains 
versus losses – it is restricted to the analysis of framing effects of incentives offers. And 
in that sense, I resort to a related research on framing negotiation offers. Negotiation 
offers framed as gains to the other party lead to better outcomes than loss framed offers 
(De Dreu et al, 1994). Framing an incentive offer as a potencial gain may create a 
positivity effect and suggest to the agent that the principal cares about his well-being 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2006). Incentive offers have been shown to increase positive mood 
(Meloy et al, 2006) for which gain-framed messages are more congruent than loss-
framed messages.   
Meta-regression did not support a preference for cash or incentives given with 
certainty. However, I compared a £5 voucher with a £200 lottery voucher and found a 
clear support for a higher effectiveness of the small certain voucher in the case of 
Chlamydia screening. The expected value for the two incentives could not be matched 
and thus my conclusion is based on a preference for certainty and not expected value. 
My results corroborate Zenner et al (2012) large observational study showing that 
vouchers (and not lotteries) cause the positive effect of incentives upon increased 
Chlamydia screening. I propose that, in the case of an activity which requires an 
immediate effort and creates uncertainty as it is the case of disease screening, a certain 
reward (even if small) is more effective than a larger prize draw. Meta-regression results 
include a variety of health settings and perhaps a preference for incentives offered with 
certainty is higher in the case of screening i.e., an activity for illness detection with a 
higher perceived risk than appointment keeping or adherence to medication.   
 
 
7.3 Are income and past behaviour effect modifiers of the impact of incentives? 
For blood donation, there was no evidence to inform about the role of income and no 
difference was found between first-time and previous donors. The limited evidence 
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for blood donation only allowed performing a subgroup analysis between participants 
who were first-time donors and experienced donors, showing no difference. 
The available studies did not include information about donor income and 
therefore, it was not possible to test the validity of Titmuss’ concern about incentives 
attracting more deprived people. Nonetheless, the fact that studies on the impact of 
blood quality suggest a negative effect of incentives may be indicative that incentives 
attract more deprived people with a poor health status.    
Incentives are significantly more effective to increase health care 
compliance in low income people but no evidence to analyse the role of past 
compliance behaviour. Meta-regression showed that incentives strongly increased the 
likelihood of low income people complying with health care, 2.5 times more than higher 
income patients. The fact that incentives were extremely effective in promoting TB 
screening is most likely explained by the characteristics of the participants targeted in 
such studies - deprived individuals, many of which unemployed or even homeless.  
No definitive conclusion could be drawn about the impact of past compliance 
behaviour in the effectiveness of incentive offers. There was a single study included in 
the qualitative review in chapter 4 that reported on this difference (Stoner et al , 1998), 
which showed that the offer of a voucher for free mammographies was only effective to 
promote screening in previously non-compliant women but was indifferent to woman 
that were already compliant with screening.  
 
 
 
7.5 Main contributions to behavioural research  
All empirical chapters in this thesis are innovative pieces of work in their own right and 
I make several crucial contributions to behavioural research. 
To the literature about motivational crowding-out effects, I contribute with three 
main results. Firstly, there is no evidence of a motivational crowding-out effect when 
financial incentives are offered to increase blood donation – according to our restricted 
definition. This result does not differ according to the type of incentive offered i.e., 
financial or nonfinancial incentives. Secondly, I provide the first ever evidence of a 
crowding-out effect of positive financial incentives in the field. Evidence for 
motivational crowding-out in the case of positive incentives (rewards) was only based 
on stated preferences (Frey & Oberholzer-Ghee, 1997; Frey & Goette, 1999) or lab 
studies (Ariely et al, 2009; Pokorny, 2008). Evidence from the field is strictly related to 
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unexpected effects of penalties (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Holmas et al, 2010). I 
show that a positive incentive of €10 significantly decreased compliance with cancer 
screening in naturalistic setting. Thirdly, and closely related to this second result, I show 
that, in the context of compliance with health care, smaller financial incentives are more 
effective to promote behaviour change. This negative effect of incentive size is a 
contribution to behavioural research by demonstrating a clear departure from standard 
economic assumptions – namely that, the higher the incentive, the higher the likelihood 
to promote change. I add to the limited studies suggesting this effect (Ariely et al, 2009, 
Pokorny, 2008). And this preference for receiving small incentives seems to be related 
to the value received per unit of incentivisation and not the overall payoff from the 
incentive.  
 To literature about mental accounting and preferences for sequences of events, I 
make a dual contribution. On one hand, I show that people prefer segregated gains and 
spread benefits when faced with a three-outcome situation distributed over time. To 
date, research had mostly focused on choices of a single outcome (now versus later or 
close future versus far future) or choices involving the preference for a sequence of two 
events, usually showing a preference for improving outcomes. There were only a couple 
of papers in the literature (Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993) 
examining the joint evaluation of three outcomes, proposing a preference for benefits 
spread over time. I add to this scarce evidence by corroborating that people prefer 
benefits to be distributed over time instead of having concentrated gains in the 
beginning (classical time discounting hypothesis) or the end (preference for strictly 
improving outcomes). On the other hand, I make a significance improvement in terms 
of external validity by testing and supporting these temporal preferences in the field – 
which is the first study to date to provide such evidence – and showing the independent 
main effect of segregated gains.          
To the literature about messages framing, I contribute by showing that gain-
framed incentives are more effective at increasing compliance with Chlamydia 
screening than loss-framed incentives. Moreover, I demonstrate this effect with field 
data from a randomised controlled trial, providing higher quality evidence than previous 
studies – mostly based on self-report measures.  Prospect theory spurred a considerable 
interest and research about the framing of health messages. Heavily influenced by the 
predictions of loss aversion in the case of risky financial decisions, research on health 
messages often assumes that loss-framed messages are more effective in promoting 
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behaviour change (Rice, 2013). However, research about the framing of health 
outcomes may not be directly comparable with research about incentive messages 
framing. The few studies claiming to test gain-framed versus loss-framed incentives 
showed mixed evidence (Goldsmith & Dhar, 2013; Romanowich & Lamb, 2013; Roll 
& Howard, 2008). However, these papers actually test different types of incentives, not 
framing effects. Comparing a condition in which patients accumulate rewards starting at 
zero with a condition in which patients receive an initial endowment from which 
deduction are made is not a framing effect. This is the difference between using positive 
and negative reinforcement dicussed in table 2.1 (p.47) which have different 
motivational properties. I present evidence for a positive impact of gain versus loss 
framed incentives in the strict sense – just a change in wording in the information given 
about the incentive offer.  
Overall, I also contribute to the discussion about the relative contributions of 
standard versus behavioural economics. Standard economic theory is a general 
normative and prescriptive model of choice whereas the strength of behavioural 
economics relies in its descriptive validity. Debates over the quality and validity of both 
standard economic theory and behavioural economics models have been mostly been 
framed as horse race aiming to establish which is best (Harrison & Rutstrom, 2009). But 
increasingly more researchers are expressing more reconciliation and contingency 
(Harrison & Rutstrom, 2009). I propose that this view is demonstrated by my results. 
The meta-analysis about compliance shows a positive effect of incentives, regardless of 
type or size. In the Chlamydia study, both incentives significantly increased screening 
although the voucher was particularly effective. In the colorectal cancer study, two 
incentives were preferred to a single incentive. All this could be predicted and explained 
by standard economic theory, with cost-benefit calculations and anticipatory utility. 
However, one needs to resort to behavioural economics to explain why incentives do 
not work to promote blood donation, why a single incentive has a detrimental effect 
compared to two incentives proving the same overall payoff or why incentive size may 
have a negative effect.  
I proposed self-interest behaviour versus ‘other-interest’ behaviour as a crucial 
dimension to clarify the relative contributions of standard versus behavioural economics 
but this argument is not exhaustive. The relative predictive power of standard economic 
theory versus behavioural economic theories should be further analysed by task domain 
and target population (Harrison & Rutstrom, 2009). 
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7.6 Policy Implications  
My results have several important policy implications. First and foremost, the offer of 
financial incentives is not recommended to promote blood donation, regardless of 
incentive type. It is expected to have a null impact in the quantity of blood donated and 
a possible adverse effect in blood quality. This result is critical and timely: there have 
been recent public endorsements of the use of financial incentives to promote blood 
donation, claiming to be based on empirical evidence.  In a recent influential paper in 
Science, Lacetera and colleagues (2013) claim that “there should be little debate that 
the most relevant empirical evidence shows positive effects of offering economic 
rewards on donations” (p.928). This bold claim has already had a significant impact in 
the media and policy audiences
678
 but my results, based on a comprehensive synsthesis 
of the literature, do not support this statement.    
For compliance with health care, incentives are expected to work particularly to 
address simple barriers to compliance and for patients with lower socioeconomic status. 
For these contexts and patients more responsive to incentives, it does not seem to any 
particular requirement regarding the incentives to be used. Small size incentives, 
preferably certain and not under the format of prize draws, are likely to be effective. 
Results showed that vouchers seem to be as effective cash and more easily managed 
from an administrative and ethical point of view.   
This rationale poses an important cost-effectiveness question though. If financial 
incentives appear to be effective in increasing health care compliance mostly in cases 
where minor barriers are identified and are less likely to improve compliance when 
more complex barriers are reported, then it is reasonable to assume that alternative non-
financial interventions such as simple reminders or opportunistic screening should be 
implemented as these would likely provide a higher value for money. For sensitive 
health contexts as STI screening or cancer screening either (i) compliance is promoted 
by using incentives well-informed by behavioural research taking in consideration the 
characteristics of patients and contextual setting or (ii) other nonfinancial interventions.  
However, the empirical test of financial incentives is not the only consideration 
if these interventions are contemplated as policy tools. Moral judgments that are not 
                                                 
6
 http://releases.jhu.edu/2013/05/23/offering-economic-incentives-to-attract-blood-donations-should-be-
encouraged-researchers-write-in-science/ 
7
 http://newsroom.iza.org/en/2013/05/24/economic-incentives-increase-blood-donations-without-
negative-consequences-iza-fellows-write-in-science/  
8
 http://www.themunicheye.com/news/Economic-incentives-increase-blood-donations-2770  
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about the readily measurable consequences also play a part. For instance, Titmuss’s 
arguments against the use of incentives in blood donation had deep roots in his 
humanist conception of social policy as a tool for human progress that should be 
protected from what he considered to be exploitative economic interests. He endorsed 
blood donation as a core example of how society should be governed by relationships 
characterized by reciprocity. Regardless of the effectiveness of incentives to increase 
blood stocks, paid donors become blood sellers and blood donation becomes blood 
supply. Regarding compliance with health care, studies on the public acceptability of 
incentives (Promberger et al, 2012; Parke et al, 2011) also suggest that the effectiveness 
of incentives should be balanced with their acceptability in the target population when 
designing incentive schemes. Vouchers – from both an effectiveness and ethical 
perspective – appear to be the best option.  
As I have discussed, the higher impact of incentives in patients facing high 
economic deprivation puts forward the possibility that incentives could be used as a 
policy tool to tackle health inequalities (Oliver & Brown, 2012). This is still a divisive 
topic, not necessarily dependent on effectiveness results. Targeting certain social groups 
may be controversial because of unfairness perceptions from untargeted groups (Oliver, 
2009). Also, public acceptability may drive the decision to use financial incentives as a 
strategy to promote health in more deprived social groups. The general public finds 
acceptable to offer incentive to low income people when these individuals are not 
pictured as responsible for their own situation e.g., smokers, drug addicts (Parke et al, 
2011). This is a particularly important question because there is a call for tailored health 
interventions that acknowledge the specificities of different social groups (Michie et al, 
2009). Interventions to promote health behaviour have been shown to adversely increase 
health inequalities, because most interventions rely on the axiom of the impact of 
information and appeal to long-term health goals. This standard type of intervention 
may not be productive because more deprived people tend to have lower educational 
levels and higher discount rates – thus probably more accessible to the offer of 
immediate rewards.  
  
 
  
190 
 
        
7.7Limitations and future research  
Not a particular limitation of my work - but a limitation that my work exposed – is the 
scarcity of large well-designed field studies that test the impact of interventions to 
promote health behaviour. This is limitation was found for interventions using financial 
incentives but this is also true for other nonfinancial interventions. And this is related to 
the important question of the comparative effectiveness of different interventions. I 
tested the impact of offering incentives by comparing them to no incentive (control 
group). However, for policy making, the crucial question is usually which intervention 
to use – not if some intervention should be implemented. Therefore, a key point that 
was not analysed in this work is the relative impact of incentives when compared to 
other types of interventions as providing information, educational programmes, 
remainders or practitioner-based interventions. 
Two fundamental hypotheses could not be properly tested with secondary data: 
the impact of negative incentives and the role of past health behaviour. Although the 
literature suggests a high effectiveness of penalties based on loss aversion from prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), there is no experimental evidence comparing 
penalties with other types of incentives. In addition, even if penalties were shown to be 
superior in terms of comparative effectiveness, these negative incentives are likely to be 
the more difficult type of intervention to implement. Applying penalties involve access 
to patients’ financial resources or providing patients with an initial endowment from 
which deductions would be made. Furthermore, negative incentives can be more liable 
to ethical criticisms for inducing avoidable psychological suffering in patients. 
Moreover, more research on the role of past behaviour for a better understanding of the 
impact of baseline motivation and habit as moderators of financial incentives.  
The cost-effectiveness of patient financial incentives is also a limitation in the 
contribution of our results. I only provide data about absolute risk reduction and number 
of patients needed to incentivise to avoid one future case (of Chlamydia and colorectal 
cancer). There are only a couple of studies examining this topic so far. Gift and 
colleagues (2005) analysed the cost-effectiveness of a $20 incentive for return to a 
Chlamydia screening appointment by comparison to a telephone reminder. They 
showed that the telephone reminder yielded the highest return rate (33%) and was the 
least costly in terms of cost per infection treated ($622 program, $813 societal). 
Olmstead and co-workers (2007) compared a prize-based intervention with an expected 
vaue of $400 for drug abstinence with a control and concluded that the incentive 
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intervention is likely to be slightly cost-effective.  Future research should be developed 
to examine if incentives are a cost-effective way to promote health behaviour changes – 
and this is a particular important question under budget constraints.  
It remains unknown if alternative strategies such as opportunistic screening in 
GP practices, offered upon registration with the NHS or other health appointments, 
which are less dependent on individual initiative, may be more cost-effective. For 
instance, establishing opportunistic screening as routine and mandatory – as it is already 
proclaimed for HIV testing (Beckwith et al, 2005) - might offer better uptake rates at no 
additional cost of further intervention.  
Finally, I did not evaluate the long-term consequences of offering patients a 
financial incentive to comply with health recommendations that, in most cases, they will 
likely be asked to repeat at some point in the future. Although this is not a limitation per 
se because this question was established a priori to be out of my scope, it is 
nevertheless a question for future research. There are competing hypotheses to be 
clarified: incentives have a positive, neutral or negative impact on future behaviour 
according to different theoretical traditions. The clarification of this question is crucial 
for policymaking to evaluate the sustainability of incentives and discard harmful 
unobserved effects that could have been triggered by the first incentive offer.     
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Health Care Compliance 
•Medical adherence OR medical nonadherence OR medical non-adherence 
•Medical compliance OR medical noncompliance OR medical non-compliance 
•Medical concordance OR medical nonconcordance OR medical non-concordance 
•Medication concordance OR medication nonconcordance OR medication non-
concordance 
•Medication persistence OR medication nonpersistence OR medication non-persistence 
•Medical near/ within2 (adher$ OR comply$ OR persist$ OR follow$ OR conclusion 
OR conclude$ OR finish$ OR terminat$ OR stick$ OR continu$ OR accept$ OR 
concord$ OR taking OR dropout OR stop$ OR quit$ OR leav$ OR reduc$ OR attend$ 
OR participat$ OR enroll$ OR maintain$ OR retention OR retain$) 
•Treatment near/ within2 (adher$ OR comply$ OR persist$ OR follow$ OR conclusion 
OR conclude$ OR finish$ OR terminat$ OR stick$ OR continu$ OR accept$ OR 
concord$ OR taking OR dropout OR stop$ OR quit$ OR leav$ OR reduc$ OR attend$ 
OR participat$ OR enroll$ OR maintain$ OR retention OR retain$) 
•Medication near/ within2 (adher$ OR comply$ OR persist$ OR follow$ OR conclusion 
OR conclude$ OR finish$ OR terminat$ OR stick$ OR continu$ OR accept$ OR 
concord$ OR taking OR dropout OR stop$ OR quit$ OR leav$ OR reduc$ OR attend$ 
OR participat$ OR enrol$ OR maintain$ OR retention OR retain$) 
•Immunisation OR immunization OR vaccine OR vaccination 
•Attendance near/ within2 (visit OR appointment) 
•Preventive visit 
•Refill OR pill count 
•Screening 
•Appointment near/ within2 (doctor OR medica$ OR pregnancy OR keep$ OR mak$ 
OR maintain$) 
•Health promotion 
•Health services near/ within 2 (utilization OR utilization OR use OR uptake) 
•Medical services near/ within 2 (utilization OR utilization OR use OR uptake) 
•Abstinence 
Incentive 
•Reward OR Payment OR Prize OR Award OR Cash transfer OR Monetary OR 
Economic OR Token economy OR Raffle OR Contingency management OR Lottery 
OR lotteries OR Coupon OR Gift OR Incentive OR Reinforcement OR Compensation 
OR Recompense OR Competition OR Contest OR Bonus OR Contingent pay OR 
Endowment 
•Motivat$ OR Inducement OR Induc$ OR Reinforc$ OR Compensat$ OR 
recompensat$ 
•Reimbursement OR Refund OR Repay$  
•Punishment OR Loss OR Cost OR Deposit contract OR Disincentive OR Penalty OR 
penal$ OR Sanction OR Fine OR Punish$ OR Reimburs$ OR Free OR Reduc$ cost OR 
Reduc$ price OR copay$ OR co-pay$ OR “cost sharing” 
Research Design 
•Randomized controlled trial OR Rct OR Quasi-randomized controlled trial OR 
Pseudorandomized controlled trial OR Randomised controlled trial OR Quasi-
randomised controlled trial OR Pseudorandomised controlled trial OR Pct OR Clinical 
controlled trial OR Cct OR Experiment OR Evaluation OR Intervention OR Empirical 
OR Assessment OR Quantitative OR Quantification OR Quantify OR Random 
allocation OR Test 
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Appendix 3: Invitation Leaflets for the Chlamydia study 
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Have you ever had sex? 
If so, there is one in ten chance that you have
Chlamydia.
Chlamydia is one of the most common sexually
transmitted infections. Most men and women who have
Chlamydia don’t know they have it.
If left untreated, Chlamydia can cause fever, painful
urination, eye diseases and infertility.
But it is really easy to treat with antibiotics. Find out if
you have it by taking a simple do-it-yourself test.
Tomorrow and the next day there will be tests available
in the reception for you to pick up.
There are instructions inside the test on how to do it. If
you have any doubt, there will be a person in the
reception to explain and help you.
The Chlamydia test is free and confidential. If you have
ever had sex and are 24 years old or younger please
pick up a test in the next few days.
You will gain a £5 HMV voucher
if you take the test
Are you under 24? 
£5
 
Gain-framed incentive offer of the £5 voucher 
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Have you ever had sex? 
If so, there is one in ten chance that you have
Chlamydia.
Chlamydia is one of the most common sexually
transmitted infections. Most men and women who have
Chlamydia don’t know they have it.
If left untreated, Chlamydia can cause fever, painful
urination, eye diseases and infertility.
But it is really easy to treat with antibiotics. Find out if
you have it by taking a simple do-it-yourself test.
Tomorrow and the next day there will be tests available
in the reception for you to pick up.
There are instructions inside the test on how to do it. If
you have any doubt, there will be a person in the
reception to explain and help you.
The Chlamydia test is free and confidential. If you have
ever had sex and are 24 years old or younger please
pick up a test in the next few days.
You will gain the chance to win a
£200 HMV voucher if you take the test
Are you under 24? 
£200
 
 
Gain-framed incentive offer of the £200 voucher lottery 
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Have you ever had sex? 
If so, there is one in ten chance that you have
Chlamydia.
Chlamydia is one of the most common sexually
transmitted infections. Most men and women who have
Chlamydia don’t know they have it.
If left untreated, Chlamydia can cause fever, painful
urination, eye diseases and infertility.
But it is really easy to treat with antibiotics. Find out if
you have it by taking a simple do-it-yourself test.
Tomorrow and the next day there will be tests available
in the reception for you to pick up.
There are instructions inside the test on how to do it. If
you have any doubt, there will be a person in the
reception to explain and help you.
The Chlamydia test is free and confidential. If you have
ever had sex and are 24 years old or younger please
pick up a test in the next few days.
You will lose a £5 HMV voucher
if you don t take the test
Are you under 24? 
£5
 
Loss-framed incentive offer of the £5 voucher 
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Have you ever had sex? 
If so, there is one in ten chance that you have
Chlamydia.
Chlamydia is one of the most common sexually
transmitted infections. Most men and women who have
Chlamydia don’t know they have it.
If left untreated, Chlamydia can cause fever, painful
urination, eye diseases and infertility.
But it is really easy to treat with antibiotics. Find out if
you have it by taking a simple do-it-yourself test.
Tomorrow and the next day there will be tests available
in the reception for you to pick up.
There are instructions inside the test on how to do it. If
you have any doubt, there will be a person in the
reception to explain and help you.
The Chlamydia test is free and confidential. If you have
ever had sex and are 24 years old or younger please
pick up a test in the next few days.
You will gain the chance to win a
£200 HMV voucher if you take the test
Are you under 24? 
£200
 
Loss-framed incentive offer of the £200 voucher lottery 
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